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￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
OnMarch 15, 1955Albert Einstein learned of the passing of his closest
childhood friend Michele Angelo Besso — one month and three days
before his own death on April 18, 1955. Besso had been an invaluable
“sounding board” for Einstein’s scientific ideas during their years at
the Federal Polytechnic Institute in Zürich and at the patent office in
Bern. It was Besso also who first introduced Einstein to the works of
Ernst Mach. At the end of his 1905 paper on the theory of special
relativity, Einstein (1905) thus explicitly acknowledged Besso for his
“loyal assistance” and “valuable suggestions”.
Fifty years later, Einstein felt his own time was running out. In
his letter of condolence to the Besso family, Einstein included the
following intriguing passage:
Now he has departed from this strange world a little
ahead of me. That means nothing. People like us, who
believe in physics, know that the distinction between past,
present and future is only a stubbornly persistent illusion
(Einstein and Besso, 1979).1
It was Einstein’s own theory of special relativity that had led him to
this counterintuitive belief. The distinction between past, present and
future was no longer an absolute fact of the matter, but had become
a relative one, dependent on the observer or the adopted frame of
reference.
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ . According to the relativity of simultaneity,
an event, say on one of the planets in the Trappist-1 system, may
well be in the future according to my reference frame, but in the past
according to your frame of reference. Hence, whether an event is past,
1 The original reads: “Nun ist er mir auch mit dem Abschied von dieser sonderbaren
Welt ein wenig vorausgegangen. Das bedeutet nichts. Für uns gläubige Physiker hat
die Scheidung zwischen Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft nur die Bedeutung
einer, wenn auch hartnäckigen, Illusion.”
5
6 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
present or future does not depend on the event itself, but on the frame
of reference that is adopted. In other words, even though Einstein is
in the past for us, and we are in the future for him, we cannot say
that Einstein is in the past tout court, without first specifying a point
of reference (Dieks, 2014, 104).
In that sense, time is very much like space. What is here for me,
need not be here for you. And what is to the left for you, may well
be to the right for me. Whether a point is left, right, here or there
depends on the frame of reference that is adopted. No point in space
is objectively here; no location absolutely left or right. Instead, all places
across space are ontologically on a par; no place more privileged than
any other. All points in space are equally real.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . The theory of special relativity
suggested that the same applies to time. All moments across time
are ontologically on a par; no time more privileged than any other.
Indeed, all events in the history of the Universe are equally real —
regardless of whether we judge them past, present or future.
This metaphysical picture of time, called eternalism, is in serious
conflict with our common sense. It runs against some of our deepest
and most cherished intuitions about the fabric of reality. We all feel,
after all, as if the present moment is metaphysically privileged. We
consider the present to be real, but deny reality to the past and future.
Past events were real, but are no longer; future events will become
real, but are not yet. This picture of time is called presentism.
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Notice how different the ontology of the
world is on both pictures. For the presentist, reality is confined to the
present moment, and extends in the three spatial dimensions only.
That is, reality for the presentist is fundamentally three-dimensional.
For the eternalist, in contrast, reality stretches not only in space, but
also in time. That is, the fabric of reality for the eternalist is not three-,
but fundamentally four-dimensional.
The eternalist picture of time finds a natural representation in the
so-called block universe. Whether past, present or future, all events
‘lie frozen’ in the four-dimensional block, much like the scenes from
a movie are fixed on the film roll. That is, from an atemporal point
of view — or what Price (1996) calls the view from nowhen — every
event in the history of our Universe is set out in the block.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿? Einstein at first struggled to accept the
eternalist picture of time which seemed to follow from his theory of
special relativity. His initial reaction to Hermann Minkowski’s four-
dimensional spacetime formulation of special relativity was to shake
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 7
it off as ‘überflüssige Gelehrsamkeit’ or ‘superfluous erudition’ (Pais,
1982, 152). In his intellectual autobiography, Rudolf Carnap (1963,
37-38) recalls a discussion with Einstein around 1954:
Einstein said that the problem of the Now worried him
seriously. He explained that the experience of the Now
means something special for man, something essentially
different from the past and the future, but that this impor-
tant difference does not and cannot occur within physics.
That this experience cannot be grasped by science seemed
to him a matter of painful but inevitable resignation. [. . .]
Einstein thought that there is something essential about
the Now which is just outside of the realm of science.
The above quote suggests that Einstein was not yet ready to give up
on the reality of the Now and our presentist view of reality. Yet four
years earlier, upon visiting Einstein in Princeton, Karl Popper (1992,
148) had called Einstein “Parmenides” in view of his belief in “a four-
dimensional Parmenidean block universe in which [all] change was
a human illusion, or very nearly so.” Einstein “agreed that this had
been his view”, Popper added.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Whichever may be the case, when
Einstein sat down to pen his letter of condolence, the block universe
certainly provided comfort, as he somewhat clumsily tried to explain.
When death befalls a loved one, we generally assume that that person
has ceased to exist. A person who has died, we think, is no longer
real. Indeed, for the presentist, a deceased individual only lives on
in our thoughts and memories. “Grandma may be gone”, we say,
“but she lives on in our hearts.” We “pity the dead precisely because
they are dead,” writes Lockwood (2005a). “For not only do the dead,
by definition, fail to exist at the present moment; they have exhausted
their potential for existing in the present” (p. 53, emphasis in original).
Not so for the eternalist. On the block universe view, the dead are
not gone forever by having become unreal. They have not faded from
existence, but have merely disappeared from view, as they inhabit
different spacetime regions than we do now. The discussions among
Einstein and Besso in 1905 were still as real as Einstein’s grieving in
1955. For Einstein, Besso lived on, but somewhen else.2
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . This idea is but one of the many consequences
of the block universe. Indeed, the implications of the eternalist con-
ception of time are as varied as they are puzzling. As the Oxford
2 Notice that this idea “cuts both ways”, as Lockwood (2005a, 54) observes. “If our
loved ones are to be thought of as being out there in space-time, as real as ourselves,
then so too are Hitler, Jack the Ripper, and Atilla the Hun!”
8 ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ : ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
philosopher John Lucas (1989) said in his book The Future, “the block
universe gives a deeply inadequate view of time. It fails to account for
the passage of time, the pre-eminence of the present, the directedness
of time and the difference between the future and the past.”
The aim of this doctoral dissertation, then, is to closely explore the
block, in all its dimensions, and to tease out, as best as I can, what its
implications are for the nature of time and human freedom. The four
questions that will preoccupy us in this thesis are the following:
1. Does the block universe view of time follow inevitably from the
theory of special relativity?
2. Is there room for the passage of time in the block universe?
3. Can we distinguish past from future in the block universe?
4. Is there room for human freedom in the block universe?
Einstein was not the only one in his time to flirt with eternalist ideas.
Many of the giants of the last century — Minkowski, Weyl, Gödel,
Eddington, Cassirer and Jeans — took the block universe seriously,
and mused poetically about its alleged implications. In what follows,
therefore, I let the giants talk, and I thereby briefly introduce each of
the four dimensions to be considered in this thesis.
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ : ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
The view that past, present and future are fused together in a four-
dimensional entity may be attributed to Hermann Minkowski. In his
1908 address for the 80th Assembly of German Natural Scientists and
Physicians at Cologne, Minkowski (1909) began with the prophetic
and electrifying words:
Gentlemen! The views of space and time which I wish to
lay before you have sprung from the soil of experimental
physics, and therein lies their strength. They are radical.
Henceforth space by itself, and time by itself, are doomed
to fade away into mere shadows, and only a kind of union
of the two will preserve an independent reality (Lorentz
et al., 1952, 75).
Minkowski continued:
We should then have in the world no longer space, but
an infinite number of spaces, analogously as there are
in three-dimensional space an infinite number of planes.
Three-dimensional geometry becomes a chapter in four-
dimensional physics (Lorentz et al., 1952, 79-80, emphasis
in original).
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ : ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 9
HermannWeyl shared the same opinion. “Reality”, wrote Weyl (1922,
217), “is not a three-dimensional Euclidean space but rather a four-
dimensional world, in which space and time are linked together indissolubly”
(emphasis in original):
However deep the chasm may be that separates the intu-
itive nature of space from that of time in our experience,
nothing of this qualitative difference enters into the ob-
jective world which physics endeavours to crystallise out
of direct experience. It is a four-dimensional continuum,
which is neither “time” nor “space”.
Minkowski christened the four-dimensional manifold the ‘absolute
world’. Weyl gladly adopted the same terminology. It probably was
the Harvard psychologist William James who first coined the term
‘block universe’ in 1884. James thus spoke of a “solid” and “iron
block” when describing a deterministic universe (James, 1956).3
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Both Minkowski and
Weyl were inspired by the theory of special relativity when making
the claims above. Neither Minkowski nor Weyl, however, wrote down
an actual argument from special relativity for eternalism and the four-
dimensionality of the world.
The fact that one can draw a picture of the block (physicists call
it a Minkowski diagram) does not count as proof for its existence.4
The four-dimensional picture is also not unique to relativity theory.
Classical Newtonian physics, for example, also admits a formulation
in four-dimensional terms. Dieks (2014, 104) thus emphasizes that
“block universe representations are not confined to relativity theory
or even to physics in general.” Indeed, any “history book specifies
events at different places and times [in four-dimensional fashion].
The same applies to television guides or railway timetables.” But
no one considers television guides or railway timetables as proof for
the eternalist worldview.
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . The first argument from special relativity for
the block universe was independently put forth by Hilary Putnam
(1967) and Cornelis Willem Rietdijk (1966), more than sixty years after
the birth of special relativity. Some year later, yet another argument
appeared in print by Nicholas Maxwell (1985). It is therefore known
as the Rietdijk–Putnam–Maxwell argument, or RPM argument.
The RPM argument, however, is not without its problems and flaws.
In the first chapter, I thus provide a detailed overview and critical
3 One of the topics in the first chapter is the question whether the block universe is
deterministic, or merely determinate.
4 Neither does a picture of a unicorn prove its existence.
10 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ : ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
analysis of the philosophical literature on the RPM argument for the
four-dimensionality of the world. I raise a total of eleven objections
against it, and conclude that the validity of the RPM argument is
underdetermined by the formalism of special relativity.
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ : ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
“Hitherto, the scientist and the plain man had been at one in thinking
that events came to maturity with the passage of time, somewhat as
the pattern of a tapestry is woven out of a loom”, wrote Sir James
Hopwood Jeans (1935, 19) inMan and the Universe. We are all familiar
with the flow of time, or what philosophers call temporal becoming.
But the idea that time has a transitory character seems to be in tension
with the block universe, which looks like a “timeless tapestry” (Prior,
2008, 161), an unchanging four-dimensional block in which nothing
comes to be, and nothing ceases to exist. In short, the block universe
suggests that the passage of time may well be illusory.
￿ ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . In his Philosophy of Mathematics
and Natural Science, Hermann Weyl (1949) thus pointed out that:
The objective world simply is, it does not happen. Only
to the gaze of my consciousness, crawling upward along
the life line of my body, does a section of this world come
to life as a fleeting image in space which continuously
changes in time (p. 116, emphasis in original).
Arthur Eddington (1920, 51) put it even more succinctly when he
wrote that “events do not happen; they are just there, and we come
across them.” Einstein (1920, 122) agreed that “[f]rom a ‘happening’
in three-dimensional space, physics becomes, as it were, an ‘existence’
in the four-dimensional world”.5 Or again:
Since there exist in this four-dimensional structure no
longer any sections which represent ‘now’ objectively, the
concepts of happening and becoming are indeed not com-
pletely suspended, but yet complicated. It appears there-
fore more natural to think of physical reality as a four-
dimensional existence, instead of, as hitherto, the evolu-
tion of a three-dimensional existence” (Einstein, 1961, 171,
emphasis in original).
5 “There remains only the ‘absolute world’ of Minkowski”, wrote Cassirer (1920, 449).
“The world of physics changes from a process in a three-dimensional world into a
being in this four-dimensional world.”
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ : ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ 11
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ . ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . The debate on temporal becoming
has philosophical roots reaching as far back as the pre-Socratic
philosophers, Heraclitus and Parmenides. These two giants of the an-
cient Greek world fundamentally disagreed about the nature of time.
Whereas Heraclitus embraced the flux of becoming, Parmenides ar-
gued that change is impossible and that the flow of time is illusory
(Hoy, 2013).6 Heraclitus thus wrote:
Everything flows and nothing abides; everything gives
way and nothing stays fixed. You cannot step twice into
the same river, for other waters are continually flowing on
(as translated by Wheelwright, 1959, 29).
Parmenides, on the other hand, argued that:
What Is has no beginning and never will be destroyed: it
is whole, still, and without end. It neither was nor will be,
it simply is — now, altogether, one, continuous.
￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ . ￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿ . The contemporary debate on temporal
becoming began in 1908, just three years after Einstein’s discovery of
special relativity, with McTaggart’s watershed paper on The Unreality
of Time.7 McTaggart distinguished the A-series and B-series of time.
In the A-series, events are ordered as past, present and future. That
is, every event is said to possess an intrinsic, monadic temporal A-
property of being present, or being past or future to different degrees.
Which time is present, however, continuously changes as the present
(or ‘now’) ‘moves’ towards the future with the passage of time.
In the B-series, events are ordered as earlier-than, later-than and
simultaneous-with, yielding a total or partial ordering.8 Whereas the
A-properties are constantly changing, the B-relations, in contrast, are
eternal and ‘static’. Of course, “things may change in B-series time,”
writes Hoefer (2002, 203), “by having one set of properties at one
point, and a different set of properties at a later point. But time itself
does not ‘change’ or ‘move’ ” (emphasis in original). What is more,
no time is intrinsically present on the B-series view.
McTaggart (1908) considered the A-series to be essential to time.
But he also argued for its logical inconsistency, and thus ended up de-
fending the unreality of time. Most philosophers of time today do not
6 According to Karl Popper (1998), the views of Heraclitus (‘everything changes’) and
Parmenides (‘nothing changes’) were reconciled in modern science by its quest for
Parmenidean invariance in a world of Heraclitean flux.
7 See McTaggart (1908). McTaggart’s paper was republished as chapter 33, Time, in his
1927 volume The Nature of Existence (McTaggart, 1927).
8 McTaggart also introduced a C-series of time where events are ordered via a ternary
betweenness relation. See also Chapter 2 in that regard.
12 ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ : ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
subscribe to McTaggart’s radical conclusion. But the debate between
the A-theorists, who defend temporal becoming, and the B-theorists,
who deny it, persists.
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . The A- and B-theorists, however,
seem to agree on at least one point. If the block universe view of time
is true, then there can be no temporal becoming. That is, eternalism
is incompatible with the passage of time. The question at the heart
of the second chapter is whether this commonly accepted verdict is
really true. I attempt to clarify the current debate by distinguishing
four degrees of temporal becoming, and I then briefly discuss the
compatibility of each form of becoming with the block universe.
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ : ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
When we speak of the passage of time, we take it for granted that
time passes from the past to the future. Many of the processes around
us also occur in one direction only. An ice cube spontaneously melts,
but never unmelts; coffee and milk mix, but never unmix; eggs are
scrambled, but never unscrambled; and we all grow older, but never
younger. This one-way direction or asymmetry of time was dubbed
‘the arrow of time’ by Eddington in 1928 in The Nature of the Physical
World. There is however a deep puzzle behind the arrow of time.
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . It is worthwhile distinguishing two problems. The
first problem is the well-known conflict between the time-asymmetry
of macroscopic processes, such as those described above, and the
time-symmetry of the microscopic laws governing those processes.
Call this the problem of the asymmetries in time.
However, as Dainton (2010, 6) observes, to many “the arrow of time
runs deeper; there is a directedness that belongs to time itself, rather
than to anything in time” (emphasis in original). The idea is that
the temporal dimension is fundamentally different from the spatial
dimensions because it possesses an intrinsic orientation which has
no spatial counterpart. That is, whereas space is isotropic, time is
fundamentally anisotropic. This brings me to the second problem.
The block universe, as described by the theory of special relativity,
does not come equipped with a temporal orientation at all. Call this
the problem of the asymmetry of time.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Eddington did not always distinguish between both
problems, but he certainly was aware of them. With respect to the
second problem, Eddington (1928, 34) wrote:
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ : ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ 13
In the four-dimensional world [. . .] the events past and
future lie spread out before us as in a map. [. . .] We see
in the map the path from past to future or from future
to past; but there is no signboard to indicate that it is a
one-way street. Something must be added to the geomet-
rical conceptions comprised in Minkowski’s world before
it becomes a complete picture of the world as we know it.
Ernst Cassirer (1920, 449) similarly referred to the lack of a temporal
orientation in the block universe:
The direction into the past and that into the future are
distinguished from each other [. . .] by nothing more than
are the ‘plus’ and ‘minus’ directions in space, which we
can determine by arbitrary definition.
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ . In the third chapter,
I ask whether Minkowski spacetime, the arena of special relativity,
is endowed with a temporal orientation, and if so, where this time
orientation comes from. I thus look at four ways of grounding the
direction of time in more fundamental facts. One of the questions
that will preoccupy us in this chapter is how the asymmetries in time
are related to the asymmetry of time, and whether one is more fun-
damental than the other.
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ : ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
Just as the block universe may offer comfort to the bereaved, when
applied to the past, so it threatens our free will, when applied to
the future. Indeed, if the events in your future are just as real and
determinate as the events in your past and present, then the story of
your life, from birth till death, is a book engraved in stone. Contrary
to popular opinion, you are not holding the pen to a future that is
still unwritten. You are, at most, turning the pages of a book that is
already written. Every future thought and every future action is “as
real (and fixed) as Socrates’ drinking the hemlock in the past is real
(and fixed)”, exclaim Bishop and Atmanspacher (2011, 105).
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ . Sir James Hopwood Jeans (1935) in Man
and the Universe put it even more poetically, comparing the spacetime
manifold to a piece of tapestry that was “already woven throughout
its full extent, both in space and time, so that the whole picture exists,
although we only become conscious of it bit by bit — like separate
flies crawling over a tapestry.”
14 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
It is meaningless to speak of the parts which are yet to
come — all we can speak of are the parts to which we are
yet to come. And it is futile to speak of trying to alter
these, because, although they may be yet to come for us,
they may already have come for others.
Such a view reduced living beings to automata. From
being a creative machine, [. . .] the human consciousness
declined to being a mere recording instrument. It could
no longer claim any affinity with either the artist who de-
signed the tapestry, or the craftsman who realized the de-
sign. A human life was reduced to a mere thread in the
tapestry.
As the flow of time dragged its consciousness over these
threads, it might register horror, pity, or satisfaction at
what it saw, but only as a spectator at a cinema, who feels
his emotions stirred by what he sees on the screen. The
picture influences him, but he cannot influence the picture
— he has no more influence over the pictures yet to come
than a barometer has over the weather yet to come (pp. 19-
21, emphasis in original).
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . In the fourth chapter, I challenge
the conventional wisdom that the block universe view of time is in-
compatible with libertarian free will. To that aim, I first look at the
traditional challenges from determinism and indeterminism. I find
inspiration in the works of Dennett, List and Hoefer, and propose a
fourfold classification of scientific theories based on how much free-
dom they allow. This enables me to formulate a libertarian model of
free will that is compatible with the block universe.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
An appendix has been appended to this dissertation, with the title
Special Relativity in a Nutshell. Its objective is twofold: (1) to provide a
concise but self-contained introduction to Einstein’s theory of special
relativity, and (2) to introduce the mathematical notation that will be
used in this doctoral dissertation.
The approach taken is geometrical. By this, I mean that the block
universe perspective is adopted from the very outset. Most textbooks
on relativity theory start with a three-dimensional approach based on
inertial observers. Here, in contrast, the four-dimensional Minkowski
spacetime is introduced from the beginning. The reader is invited to
consult the appendix whenever the need arises.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 15
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
Part of the first chapter on The Rietdijk–Putnam–Maxwell Argument, in
particular the section on the conventionality objection, has appeared
in print:
Thyssen, P. (2019). Conventionality and Reality. Foundations
of Physics, 49, 1336-1354 (https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-019-
00294-8).
The second chapter on Four Degrees of Temporal Becoming has been
submitted to the journal Erkenntnis, and is currently under review.
The fourth chapter on Four Degrees of Freedom was co-authored with
my supervisor Sylvia Wenmackers, and has been submitted to the
journal Synthese, where it is currently in revision.
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Countless people have helped me in some way or the other during my
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here. I owe an enormous debt of gratitude to Sylvia Wenmackers
for all her time and careful remarks, which so greatly improved the
dissertation you are now reading. Exploring the nature of free will
together has been one of the highlights of my PhD.
Much of this work has grown out from discussions with Gerard
Bodifee. Although we disagree on almost everything, we do share the
same passion for physics and philosophy. Our conversations often
acted as a catalyst, and inspired or provoked many a new thought.
I am very grateful also to Harvey Brown for welcoming me in
the Department for the Philosophy of Physics at Oxford University,
where I spent some time as a visiting scholar in June 2017. His insight-
generating comments forced me to refine or clarify most of my ideas.
I am also deeply indebted to Dennis Dieks, Olimpia Lombardi,
Cristian López, Colin MacLaurin, Vesselin Petkov and Tomasz Placek
for many useful comments on earlier versions of the chapters in this
dissertation, which have substantially improved the text.
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THE R IETD I JK–PUTNAM–MAXWELL ARGUMENT
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
This chapter provides a detailed overview and critical analysis of the
philosophical literature on the Rietdijk–Putnam–Maxwell argument
for the four-dimensionality of the world. After briefly introducing the
debate on the dimensionality of the world, I present the arguments by
Rietdijk, Putnam and Maxwell, and highlight the differences between
them. I subsequently raise a total of eleven objections against it, and
conclude that the validity of the Rietdijk–Putnam–Maxwell argument




One of the central questions in the philosophy of time could be called
the reality question: which spatiotemporal events are to be considered
real? Are only present events real (presentism)? Or are past and future
events equally real (eternalism)? Or are past and present events real,
but not future events (possibilism)? That is, what is the temporal and
ontic structure of the world?1 Intimately related with this question
is the dimensionality question: is the world fundamentally zero-, one-,
three-, four- or higher-dimensional?
Markosian (2004) calls presentism the “common sense” view of
time; Putnam (1967, 240) calls it the view of “the man on the street.”
Presentism derives its appeal from our intuition that past events were
real, but no longer are, and that future events will come to be real, but
are not yet. Some claim possibilism to be even closer to our intuitions
about time, as it captures the fact that past and present events seem
fixed and determinate, whereas future events are open and indetermi-
nate (Savitt, 2014). Presentism and possibilism certainly appear more
natural than their rival, eternalism, which seems furthest removed
from our common sense. Common sense also takes the world to be
fundamentally three-, and not four-dimensional.
But with the advent of special relativity (SR), a major paradigm
shift was set in motion with regard to our understanding of time and
simultaneity. The relativity of simultaneity, in particular, challenged
our presentist intuitions and seemed to imply an eternalist picture
of time instead — suggesting that we live in a fundamentally four-
dimensional world, or block universe, where past, present and future
events exist on an equal footing. As a result, the eternalist view of
time has become the favoured position among philosophers of time
(Savitt, 2014).
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . The most careful formulation for the four-
dimensionality of the world and eternalism was independently put
forward by the Dutch physicist Cornelis Willem Rietdijk in 1966
and by the American philosopher Hilary Putnam in 1967, more than
fifty years ago.2 Seemingly unaware of this, the British philosopher
Nicholas Maxwell published a similar argument in 1985.3
1 When I say that past and future events are real, I do not intend to say that they are
real now, which is obviously false. I wish to say that they are real simpliciter. That is,
I take my claim to quantify unrestrictedly, over the entire spatiotemporal manifold.
2 Although Putnam’s paper appeared in print later, Putnam did present his paper at
a meeting of the American Physical Society on January 27, 1966.
3 See Rietdijk (1966), Putnam (1967) and Maxwell (1985). Both Rietdijk and Maxwell
further developped their ideas in Rietdijk (1976), Rietdijk (2007), Maxwell (1988) and
Maxwell (1993).
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Since there is a common core to all these arguments, they warrant
unification and are commonly referred to as the Rietdijk–Putnam–
Maxwell argument, or RPM argument.4 This being said, there are
important differences in style and content between the arguments by
Rietdijk, Putnam and Maxwell (see §3).5
RPM were not the first to argue for eternalism on the basis of SR.
Einstein, Minkowski, Weyl, Eddington, Cassirer, Jeans and Gödel all
flirted with an eternalist worldview (see the introduction). But RPM
were the first to explicitly write down an argument.6
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ . The RPM argument has been highly influential in the
philosophical literature on SR.7 Callender (2000) thus confesses that
“some quibbles aside, I’ve always found Putnam et al.’s argument
eminently sensible” (p. S592).8 Dorato (2008, 57) calls it “simple but
brilliant”.
Stein (1968), however, deems the RPM argument to be “seriously
misapplied” (p. 5) and to lack “internal clarity” (p. 22). In his view,
the entire argument is “incorrect” (p. 14) and the “asserted conclu-
sions do not follow” (p. 5).9 Sklar (1981, 129), too, finds Rietdijk’s
argument “replete with infelicities of expression and formulation”.10
Indeed, despite its lasting popularity, a plethora of objections have
been raised against RPM, exposing different flaws and fallacies in
their argument. Yet most, if not all, of these objections have been
met with counterobjections. This leaves us with the question as to the
actual strenghth, validity and soundness of the RPM argument.
A detailed review and critical analysis of the philosophical litera-
ture on the RPM argument is presently non-existent, and long over-
due. This chapter aspires to fill this gap. My aim is threefold. First
and foremost, I hope to offer some clarity to a muddled debate by
4 The RPM argument is also called the block universe argument because it establishes
that reality is a four-dimensional block, where past, present and future events exist
on a par.
5 Another well-known variation on the RPM theme is the Andromeda paradox, which
was put forward by Penrose (1989, 392-394).
6 More recently, Calosi (2014) has offered a generalized argument against presentism
on the basis of SR, which he claims to remain untouched by some of the objections
directed at the RPM argument, to be developped in §4.
7 A citation count in Google Scholar on February 13, 2020 reveals that Putnam (1967)
has been cited 485 times, Rietdijk (1966) 229 times, and Maxwell (1985) 139 times (as
indexed by Google Scholar in February 2020).
8 In his recent bookWhat Makes Time Special?, Callender (2017, 53) echoes his previous
verdict: “[RPM] has been controversial for over forty years. Yet with a few i’s dotted,
it is utterly convincing.”
9 Stein (1968, 20) furthermore laments the “prevalent laxness [and] lowering of critical
standards in philosophical discourse [which] precludes understanding and is the
death of philosophy” (emphasis in original).
10 Sklar, however, admits that the argument by Putnam (1967) is “framed with greater
philosophical sophistication.”
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bringing together the scattered, disparate and frequently contradic-
tory literature of the last fifty years.
Second, although I realise it is practically impossible to add some-
thing truly novel or substantial to an already saturated literature, I
do have a number of important remarks to make which should foster
the presentism–eternalism debate.
And finally, while any attempt at an exhaustive bibliography is
destined to fail, the bibliography at the end of this chapter should
be ambitious enough to help the reader find her way in the vast and
ever-growing literature on the philosophy of SR.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . The outline of my chapter is as follows. I start with a brief
introduction to the reality and dimensionality question (§2). Drawing
on the work of Callender (2000) and Peterson and Silberstein (2010), I
introduce the notion of a reality field, and its associated reality values
and relations, to denote the ontological status of spacetime events.
I continue with a careful presentation of the arguments by Riet-
dijk, Putnam and Maxwell from SR in favour of eternalism and the
four-dimensionality of the world (§3). Building on Dickson (1998),
I suggest that there are not one but four distinct arguments being
made here: (1) the reality argument, (2) the truth argument, (3) the
determinism argument and (4) the becoming argument. Whilst they
are all similar in flavour, there are important differences nonetheless,
and the conclusions drawn are of differing plausibility.
After discussing the relative merit of each of these arguments, I
finally turn to the objections that have been raised against the RPM
argument (§4). I distinguish a total of eleven objections, and conclude
by arguing that the validity of the RPM argument is underdetermined
by the formalism of SR (§5).
￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿?
My focus in this chapter is on the presentism–eternalism debate, and
RPM’s role in it. Let me therefore start by briefly characterising the
presentist and eternalist position. Although possibilism will surface
here and there as a conceivable intermediate position, it is not my
aim here to gauge the prospects for this metaphysical view.
In what follows, I take Minkowski spacetime as common ground
for all participants in the debate. That is, I consider the debate from
the point of view of SR, despite some excursions to general relativity
and quantum mechanics.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Presentism is an umbrella term, covering a wide
range of different views. Depending on which spatiotemporal shape
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the present takes on, for instance, different flavours of presentism can
be distinguished (Figure 1). On some accounts the present is reduced
to a point; on others, the present is bowtie- or cone-shaped. Some of
these flavours will be discussed further on. For the moment, however,
I want to keep the discussion focussed, and will take the present to be
a three-dimensional Cauchy hyperplane, spanning the entire spatial
extent of the world. Call this the hyperplane present. With that in place,
let me briefly unpack the standard presentist position.
On the presentist view, the present is singled out as a uniquely
special moment we call now. Only those events that constitute the
present moment are real. Past events are no longer real and future
events are not yet real. According to hyperplane presentism, the
world, as a consequence, is three-dimensional.11
Notice also that presentism is a realist thesis (Saunders, 2002): there
is an objective, universal fact of the matter as to which events consti-
tute the present moment, whether or not we have epistemic access to
it. That is, the presentist thesis makes an ontic claim about the nature
of time, not an epistemic one.
In presentism, time is usually assumed to pass: present events dis-
appear into the past as future events come into existence, leading to
a succession of presents or a moving now. This dynamic aspect of
time is referred to as the passage of time or temporal becoming. Change
and temporal becoming are thus taken to be fundamental aspects of
reality. The passage of time, however, is not logically entailed by the
belief that only the present exists (see Monton, 2006 and Chapter 2).
In any case, our focus here is on the reality of events and on the
dimensionality of the world, not on becoming.12
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . On the eternalist view, all past, present, and future
events are real and determinate. No special status is accorded to the
present moment.13 The world, as a consequence, is four-dimensional.
11 Not all presentists would agree on this: according to the point presentist, the world is
zero-dimensional; for the bowtie and cone presentists, the world is four-dimensional.
12 For the prospects of temporal becoming in the block universe, see Chapter 2.
13 Just as the Eiffel Tower is considered real, despite being spatially removed from me
here in Leuven, so dinosaurs and super-intelligent robots are to be considered real,
despite being temporally removed from me now anno 2020.
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The eternalist account of time finds a natural representation in the
so-called block universe, where all events coexist on an equal footing.
From a God’s eye point of view — or what Price (1996) calls the view
from nowhen — every moment of the universe’s history is set out,
and time no longer flows. Reality, in the words of Black (1962, 181),
is “a timeless web of ‘world-lines’ in a four-dimensional space.”
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿? The difference between presentism and eternalism
is thus cashed out in terms of which events are real. For the presen-
tist, the events simultaneous with the here-and-now are real. For the
eternalist, all events are real, whether or not they are simultaneous
with the here-and-now.
But what exactly does it mean to say that a particular event is real?
This question has remained largely untouched in the philosophical lit-
erature. Two exceptions are Callender (2000) and Peterson and Silber-
stein (2010). Callender asks us to consider a four-dimensional mani-
fold of events, where each event carries a lightbulb that can be on or
off. When a lightbulb is on, the corresponding event is real; when
the lightbulb is off, the event is not real. Presentism, on this view,
holds that only present lights are on, whereas eternalism maintains
that all lights are on (Figure 2).14
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Instead of associating a lightbulb
with each event, Peterson and Silberstein (2010) introduce a reality
field R on the set M of spacetime events a,b, c, . . . The reality field
denotes the ontic status of each event by assigning it a dimensionless
reality value or R-value:
R ⇥ M ∫ {0, 1}
a "M ¿ R (a) (1)
The reality field is assumed to be a scalar field; all observers therefore
agree on the value of the reality field at a particular point of spacetime.
Every event, in other words, has a unique, observer-independent R-
value, with R = 1 denoting a real event, and R = 0 an unreal event
(Figure 3). This is called the uniqueness criterion.
Peterson and Silberstein next introduce a binary reality relation R
which holds between any two events having the same R-value. For
instance, if a,b "M share the same R-value, then they are said to be
equally real.15 This is written as aRb (read: ‘event a and event b are
equally real’ or ‘event a is real for event b’). Due to the uniqueness
criterion, the relation R is:
14 Possibilism is an intermediate position between presentism and eternalism, arguing
that only past and present lights are on.
15 Notice that a and b can be equally real in virtue of both being unreal (i.e. in virtue
of both having an R-value of 0).
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Figure 3: Reality values.
1. Reflexive: aRa is true (since a has a unique R-value);
2. Symmetric: if aRb is true, then bRa is true (since a and b share
the same R-value);
3. Transitive: if aRb is true, and bRc is true, then aRc is true (since
a and c share the same R-value).
This turns R into an equivalence relation. R thus provides a partition
of the underlying set M into two disjoint equivalence classes: the
class of real events and the class of unreal events.
The reality relation R not only allows a proper distinction between
presentism and eternalism, it will also enable us to make the structure
of the RPM argument more explicit, which in turn should help us to
expose the different assumptions that go into the argument (§3).
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ . With this in place, let us rewrite the pre-
sentist credo that all (and only) present events are real more explicitly.
Let M be the set of all spacetime events a,b, . . ., and S the relation
of simultaneity among the elements of M. Then aSb is shorthand
for ‘event a is simultaneous with event b’. If b represents the here-
and-now, b is real.16 That is, R (b) = 1. The present for b consists of
all events simultaneous with b. Hence, if aSb holds true, then a is
16 This is also the first assumption in Putnam (1967), who phrases it as follows: “I-now
am real” (p. 240).
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present for b. Following the presentist credo, a is therefore real for b:
aSb º aRb, (2)
with R (a) = R (b) = 1. Call this the thesis of hyperplane presentism.
￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿–￿￿￿￿￿￿–￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . One of the best-known arguments from
SR in favour of eternalism and the four-dimensionality of the world
is the Rietdijk–Putnam–Maxwell argument. The RPM argument is a
reductio ad absurdum (but see Stein, 1968, 17). As with all apagogical
arguments, the purpose of the RPM argument is to establish a claim
(eternalism) by showing that the opposite scenario (presentism) leads
to a ridiculous, absurd or contradictory conclusion. That is, RPM
start from the presentist doctrine according to which all (and only)
present events are real and determinate (future and past events being
unreal and indeterminate) and proceed to show the untenability of
this position in light of SR.
The argument relies on the well-known relativity of simultaneity:
for any event that is future with respect to one observer, there always
is a second observer (simultaneous with the first) for whom that event
is present and hence (following the presentist credo) real. But surely
— the argument continues — if an event is real for one observer, it
has to be real for all observers. Thus, Putnam (1967, 242, emphasis in
original) concludes: “future things (or events) are already real!”17 The
same can of course be said for past events, implying that future and
past events are real after all. This refutes presentism, and confirms
eternalism.
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Let us go through the argument in a bit more
detail. Consider the set M of all spacetime events a,b, . . ., and let S
and R be the relations of simultaneity and reality as defined above.
Now consider two inertial observers O1 and O2, with O2 moving
towards O1 (Figure 4). The spatial axis of O2 is therefore tilted with
respect toO1’s axis.18 Next, let a and b be two events on the worldline
of O1 such that a chronologically precedes b. Finally, consider an
17 Putnam’s use of the adverb “already” is unfortunate as he thereby mixes a tensed
adverb with the tenseless verb “are” (Dorato, 2008, 58).
18 Notice that the spatial axes of O1 and O2 partition Minkowski spacetime into a past
(all events below the axis), present (all events on the axis) and future (all events
above the axis). However, since the spatial axes of O1 and O2 differ, O1 and O2 will
not necessarily agree on what events are past, present and future. This, of course, is
a natural consequence of the relativity of simultaneity.








Figure 4: The Rietdijk–Putnam–Maxwell argument.
event c on the worldline of O2 that is spacelike separated from both
a and b, such that:
(i) At a, c is present relative to O1;
(ii) At c, b is present relative to O2.
This is taken to be the case despite the fact that a and c (or c and
b) are spacelike separated from one another, and hence epistemically
inaccessible. I will return to this point in §4.1 and §4.3.
According to the presentist credo, as given in Eq. (2), two events are
deemed to be co-real when they are co-present.19 That is, two events
are said to co-exist when they co-occur. Hence, we can conclude from
(i) and (ii) that:
(iii) At a, c is real for O1;
(iv) At c, b is real for O2.
Now according to SR, there are no privileged observers. O1 must
therefore recognize the ‘equal authority’ of O2 (Dickson, 1998, 167).
Hence, everything O2 judges to be real, should be real also for O1.
The claim, more precisely, is that whatever is real for O2, who is real
for O1, should be real for O1 as well. Putnam (1967, 241) elevated
this to a principle, which he dubbed the principle that There Are No
Privileged Observers:
If it is the case that all and only the things that stand in
a certain relation R to me-now are real, and you-now are
also real, then it is also the case that all and only the things
that stand in the relation R to you-now are real.
19 Notice that on this definition, the reality of events is as epistemically inaccessible as
their presentness.
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The reality relation R, in other words, is transitive, as I previously
observed in §2. Given that, it follows from (iii) and (iv) that:
(v) At a, b is real for O1.
But b is in the chronological future of a. Hence, on a presentist read-
ing:
(vi) At a, b is not real for O1.
A contradiction thus arises between (v) and (vi):
(C) At a, b is real and not real for O1.
According to RPM, the absurdity of (C) forces us to reject premise
(vi). This shows the presentist position to be untenable and estab-
lishes an eternalist worldview instead. After all, by allowing O2 to
move at different speeds towards and away from O1 and by placing
O2 at different distances from O1, any event in the future and past
lightcone of a, as well as any event in the absolute elsewhere of a can
be made real. Putnam (1967, 247) thus concludes that “we live in a
four-dimensional and not a three-dimensional world.”
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Allow me to write down the RPM argument one last
time in shorthand notation for further convenience:
(i) cSa;
(ii) bSc;
(iii) cSa º cRa;
(iv) bSc º bRc;
(v) bRc 0 cRa º bRa;
(vi) ¬bSa º ¬bRa;
(C) bRa 0 ¬bRa.
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . According to Dickson (1998), there are not one,
but four distinct arguments being made of differing plausibility: (1) a
reality argument, (2) a truth argument, (3) a determinism argument,
and (4) a determinateness argument.20 Each of these arguments re-
lies on the same geometrical features as presented in the Minkowski
diagram in Figure 4, but each argument reaches a different conclu-
sion. Dickson’s distinction is rarely made by other authors — a fact
to be deplored as it has led to unneccessary confusion about what
20 Dickson associates the reality and truth argument with Putnam (1967), the determin-
ism argument with Rietdijk (1966), and the determinateness argument with Maxwell
(1985).
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exactly the RPM argument is supposed to entail. It will prove worth-
while therefore to follow Dickson and disentangle the four possible
readings of the RPM argument.
The determinism and determinateness argument, in particular, are
fundamentally similar, but importantly different. In view of their
close resemblance, I prefer to discuss both arguments together, un-
der the determinism heading, for reasons that should become clearer
further on. I also want to introduce yet another argument that was
overlooked by Dickson: the (temporal) becoming argument. I thus
distinguish (1) the reality argument, (2) the truth argument, (3) the
determinism argument, and (4) the becoming argument.
In what follows, I highlight the differences between the four argu-
ments, and discuss their relative merit. I furthermore argue that there
really is but one master argument: the reality argument. The truth
argument, determinism argument, and becoming argument are but
corollaries to the reality argument.
￿.￿ The reality argument
According to Dolev (2006), the RPM argument relies on an ontological
assumption. “The assumption”, Dolev explains, “is that the difference
between past, present and future, concerns the ontological status of
events, and that it is to be analyzed in terms of reality claims, claims to
the effect that events are or are not real” (p. 178, emphasis in original).
Putnam’s goal, then, is to establish which events are real on the
basis of SR. Starting from the presentist credo according to which “all
(and only) things that exist now are real”, Putnam (1967) shows this
position to be incompatible with SR. Instead, Putnam insists that all
past, present and future events are equally real. Call this the reality
argument. Notice that this is also how I have presented the RPM
argument above, by making explicit use of the reality relation R.
￿.￿ The truth argument
Although the RPM argument is usually read as an ontic thesis, it
also has semantic implications, as emphasized by Putnam (1967, 243).
According to Putnam, the theory of SR implies that all propositions
have a definite truth value, including past and future contingents.21
Dorato (2008) calls this semantic determinateness. Notice that the se-
mantic determinateness of past- and future-tense statements follows
directly from the reality argument (§3.1). If past and future events
21 Past and future contigents are statements concerning past or future events that are
contingent. That is, they are neither necessarily true (like the statement that “2+ 2 =
4”) nor necessarily false (like the statement that “2+ 2 = 5”).
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are real, then all statements about past and future events must have
definite truth values. Call this the truth argument.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ’￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Putnam (1967) was swift at applying the
truth argument to the problem of future contingents, as first dis-
cussed by Aristotle in book IX of his De Interpretatione. Aristotle was
an indeterminist; he believed that future contingent statements have
no truth value. The proposition that “there will be a sea battle to-
morrow”, for example, is neither true nor false according to Aristo-
tle since the outcome of this future event is not determined at the
present time.22 The proposition will acquire a definite truth value (by
becoming true or false) once the event it describes becomes present
(by occuring or failing to occur).
According to Putnam (1967, 244), “Aristotle was wrong. At least
he was wrong if Relativity is right”. Here is what Putnam has in
mind. Let event b in Figure 4 represent a sea battle. Then the sea
battle is in the future for observer O1 at a. Following Aristotle, the
proposition that “there will be a sea battle tomorrow” has no truth
value for O1 at a. But for O2 at c, the sea battle is in her present, and
the proposition therefore has a truth value forO2 at c. And since there
are no privileged observers, it must be the case that the proposition
also has a truth value for O1 at a, despite it being a future contingent,
and contrary to Aristotle’s opinion.23
￿.￿ The determinism argument
According to Rietdijk (1966), the RPM argument does not establish
the reality of past and future events, or the truth of past and future
contingents, but determinism. Here is what Rietdijk has in mind. Con-
sider event b in the chronological future of a (Figure 4). Assuming
O1 to be a free agent, it seems that O1 at a can influence b in an
arbitrary way. However, according to O2 at c, b has already occurred,
and is therefore fixed. And since O2 at c is simultaneous with O1 at
a (according to O1), O1 is forced to conclude that b is fixed and unal-
terable. O1 can “do nothing at all to prevent event [b] in his absolute
future” (p. 342). That is, b “is pre-determined from time immemo-
rial”, thereby excluding “the possibility of saving freedom of will”
(p. 343). Call this the determinism (or relativistic fatalism) argument.
22 Notice that Aristotle’s view commits us to a three-valued logic (Tooley, 1999). This
goes against the law of bivalence (or the law of the excluded middle, if you like)
according to which every proposition p is either true or false (symbolically: p1¬p).
23 Miller (2013) raises the same point: “for any future-tensed claim uttered at t, that
claim is either true at t, or false at t, and it is determinate, at t, which of these truth
values it has” (p. 356, emphasis in original).
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￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . It is important not to
confuse this form of determinism with the notion of nomological de-
terminism, as traditionally understood. Dieks (2014), for instance,
carefully distinguishes block determinism from physical determinism (see
also Dieks, 1991, 2012a, Sklar, 1981/1985 as well as Norton, 2018b).24
Physical determinism is a doctrine about the relations between events
at different times; block determinism is a doctrine about the events
themselves (or, perhaps more correctly, about the events and their one-
to-one representation in the block universe).
Physical determinism holds when the boundary conditions at one
time (defined via a Cauchy hypersurface) and the laws of nature fully
determine the conditions at any other time (both earlier and later).
Block determinism, in contrast, holds when “the four-dimensional
Minkowski picture of the world is accurate and faithful”. In that case,
Dieks (2014, 105) continues:
[H]istory cannot be different from what the representation
says it is. The cannot here expresses logical necessity; [. . .]
There is no connection at all here with physical determin-
ism or causality. The future, and the past, are fixed and
determined in the block determinism sense because they
cannot be different from what they will actually be (in the
case of the future) or from what they actually were (in the
case of the past).
Physical determinism and block determinism are thus independent
notions. It is not because one holds, that the other necessarily holds
too. In particular, it is not because the block universe is block de-
terministic, that it also has to be physically deterministic. The block
universe could just as well be physically indeterministic.
To make this more concrete, consider the following example. Pick
a foliation of Minkowski spacetime, and consider the time slice t = 0.
Suppose you measure the z-spin of an electron that is determinately
x-spin up at t = 1. Since ∂ ãx = 1”2 (∂ ãz + ∂⇤ãz), there is an equal
chance that the z-spin of the electron will be z-spin up or z-spin down
at time t = 1. Which outcome will be realized, is physically undeter-
mined, at least on the orthodox (Copenhagen) reading of quantum
physics. The situation at time t = 0 does not fix or determine the
situation at time t = 1. And yet, in the block universe, the future time
slice at t = 1 ‘already’ exists since it is part of the block universe. So in
that sense, the outcome is fixed. Although the outcome is physically
undetermined, it is block determined.
24 Physical determinism is to be taken as synonymous with nomological determinism.
Another, albeit more confusing, term for block determinism is temporal determinism,
as used by Dainton (2010, 407).
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￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿? To avoid unneccesary confusion, I
prefer to keep the term ‘determined’ for physically determined, and
to use the term ‘determinate’ for block determined. The outcome of a
quantum event, on this reading, can be undetermined despite being
determinate. Conversely, if it were to turn out that we do not live in
a four-dimensional block universe, but that the universe unfolds over
time, with an open and indeterminate future becoming fixed and
determinate, then future events might well be determined despite
being indeterminate.
To the extent that Rietdijk (1966) believes he has offered proof for
physical determinism, he is deeply confused.25 The RPM argument,
after all, establishes determinateness, not determinism. Indeed, as
Dorato (2008, 65) points out, SR “by itself is clearly not sufficient to
enforce determinism or indeterminism, despite the fact that [SR] is
somewhat friendlier to the requirements of determinism [than, say,
classical physics]” (emphasis in original).
In that regard, Maxwell (1985) is more careful than Rietdijk, as he
clearly argues for block determinism, and not physical determinism.
Notice, however, that the block determinism argument (or the de-
terminateness argument if you like) follows directly from the reality
argument, referred to above (see §3.1). If future events are real, then
they are also fixed and determinate. The converse, however, does not
necessarily hold true. We intuitively take past events to be fixed and
determinate, even though we no longer consider them real.26
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ . According to Rietdijk, the determinism
argument implies a denial of free will. Of course, Rietdijk may well
have reached this conclusion by his failure to properly distinguish
physical determinism from block determinism. Be that as it may, the
tension, to be explored here, is not the traditional tension between
free will and physical determinism, but an altogether new, and sur-
prisingly underexplored, tension between free will and block deter-
minism.27 Dainton (2010, 9) makes the point explicit:
If the block universe view is true, [. . .] the future is just
as real, solid and immutable as the past. How our lives
will unfold from now until the moment of our deaths is
(in a manner of speaking) already laid down. How could
it be otherwise if the future stages of our lives are just as
real as the past stages? This is not to say that we have
25 Unfortunately, this really seems to be the case, as argued for in Dieks (2012a).
26 Notice that on a possibilist view (also known as the growing block theory, becoming
theory, or now-and-then-ism), the fixedness and determinateness of past events also
renders them real, as illustrated in Figure 2.
27 Both tensions will be studied much more closely in Chapter 4.
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no power over the ways our lives will unfold, for we do.
We will all make choices, and the choices that we make
will contribute to the ways our lives will turn out. But if
the block view is true, the choices that we will make are
inscribed in the fabric of reality in precisely the same way
as the choices that we have already made.
The same worry was already raised by Sir James Jeans (1937, 145) in
his book The Mysterious Universe (see also the quote by Jeans in the
introduction):
[O]ur consciousness is like that of a fly caught in a dusting-
mop which is being drawn over the surface of the picture;
the whole picture is there, but the fly can only experience
the one instant of time with which it is in immediate con-
tact, although it may remember a bit of the picture just
behind it, and may even delude itself into imagining it is
helping to paint parts of the picture which lie in front of
it.
The point is the following: if the events in our future are just as
real as the events in our past and present, then the entire history of
events is fixed and unalterable, with no room for alternative future
possibilities. This certainly seems in tension with our freedom to
choose and shape our own future. Petkov (2009, 152) thus claims that
“in the Minkowski four-dimensional world [. . .] there is no free will,
since the entire history of every object is realised and given once and
for all”. Bouton (2017, 92) similarly concurs that “since all [. . .] events
are supposed to be fully determinate in space-time, there is no free
will.”
Notice that it makes no difference whether or not the history of the
world is governed by deterministic laws. In the words of Lockwood
(2005b): “regardless of whether our future choices and actions are
fixed relative to earlier events or states of affairs [i.e. physical deter-
minism], they are, if they are real, fixed absolutely in virtue of their
reality alone [i.e. block determinism]” (p. 57).
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Levin (2007) calls this relativistic fatalism.28
But in his opinion, the doctrine of relativistic fatalism only threathens
certain conceptions of free will. We thus have to distinguish between
incompatibilist, libertarian free will and compatibilist free will.
On a libertarian conception of free will, the future has to be open
and indeterminate in order for agents to have access to alternative
28 See also Bishop and Atmanspacher (2011). For more on the issue of fatalism in SR,
see Miller (2013), Le Poidevin (2013), and Marques (2019).
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possibilities. This is known as the principle of alternate possibilities
(Frankfurt, 1969).29 Libertarians, in other words, require our actions
to transform a potential event into an actual one. But if all future events
are ‘already’ actualized, then we “can no longer think of [ourselves]
as genuinely adding items to the inventory of the real” (Lockwood,
2005b, 55), which rules out libertarian free will.
That is not to say that we have been reduced to mere spectators
of our own lives; as Dainton (2010, 9) already pointed out above,
our choices and actions do contribute to the ways our lives turn out.
Hence, pace Jeans, we most certainly are shaping the future by helping
to paint the picture. But, Dainton would argue, we no longer have the
freedom to paint whichever picture we like, since the block contains
but one picture.30
On a compatibilist conception of free will, relativistic fatalism can
easily be outflanked. For the classical compatibilist, after all, free will
does not require the ability to do otherwise; it merely requires the
ability to do what one wants (McKenna and Coates, 2019). On such
a reading, then, free will is perfectly consistent with a causally fixed,
unique, and fully determinate future.31
I will return to the tension between libertarian free will and block
determinism in Chapter 4. As will become clear, the issue is much
more subtle than I just oulined above. In fact, it is not clear at all
whether block determinism rules out libertarian free will. I will thus
propose a new model of libertarian free will that not only answers the
traditional challenge from physical determinism, but also the chal-
lenge from block determinism, as described above.
￿.￿ The becoming argument
In his discussion of Putnam’s 1967 article, Dorato (2008) points out a
“remarkable consequence [that] was not addressed by its author. [. . .]
To the extent that the notion of temporal becoming presupposes the
unreality of future events as its necessary condition, [SR] seems to
rule out also temporal becoming” (p. 59, emphasis in original). This
necessary condition was first made explicit by Dorato (1996, 586):
An ontological asymmetry between a “fixed,” determinate
past, and an “open,” indeterminate future, is a necessary
condition for objective (mind-independent) becoming.
29 According to the principle of alternate possibilities, the action of an agent is free iff
the agent could have acted otherwise under exactly the same conditions. See also
Chapter 4.
30 “Assuming that [the four-dimensional Minkowski] picture exists is equivalent to
assuming that the universe has a unique history”, writes Dieks (2014, 104).
31 The same argument can be found in Miller (2013, 357-358).
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Since the RPM argument shows the future to be fixed and determi-
nate, instead of open and indeterminate, it also rules out temporal
becoming. Call this the becoming argument. In the words of Dickson
(1998, 167-168): “the universe does not unfold, one instant at a time;
rather, it is given once, as a ‘block’ of space-time”.32
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ . The becoming argument is not the
first argument from SR against temporal becoming. Hermann Weyl
(1949), for instance, already pointed out that “[t]he objective world
simply is; it does not happen” (p. 116, emphasis in original). Even
Einstein (1961) considered it “more natural to think of physical real-
ity as a four-dimensional existence, instead of, as hitherto, the evolu-
tion of a three-dimensional existence” (p. 171, emphasis in original).
Cassirer (1920, 449) agreed that the world of physics had changed
“from a process in a three-dimensional world into a being in this four-
dimensional world.”
It was Gödel (1949), however, who most famously argued against
temporal becoming. Contrary to RPM, Gödel’s argument was more
directly based on the relativity of simultaneity:
Change becomes possible only through the lapse of time.
The existence of an objective lapse of time, however,
means (or, at least, is equivalent to the fact) that reality
consists of an infinity of layers of “now” which come into
existence successively. But, if simultaneity is something
relative in the sense just explained, reality cannot be split
up into layers in an objectively determined way. Each ob-
server has his own set of “nows”, and none of these var-
ious systems of layers can claim the prerogative of repre-
senting the objective lapse of time (p. 558).
As with the issue of libertarian free will in the block universe (§3.3),
the issue of temporal becoming is not as straightforward as I just
outlined above, and will need more attention in Chapter 2.
For example, even though Minkowski spacetime does not posit a
preferred foliation, there are (highly symmetric) general relativistic
spacetimes which do admit of a natural foliation (§4.8). A notion of
absolute simultaneity might also be added to SR, as in neo-Lorentzian
interpretations of SR (§4.9). Finnaly, a global folitation also seems
required in quantum physics in order to account for the observed
violations of Bell’s inequality (§4.10). There may be yet other ways
out of Gödel’s and RPM’s argument against temporal becoming in
the block universe, as I show in Chapter 2.
32 The relation between the unreality of the future and temporal becoming can of
course be questioned. I return to the alleged tension between the block universe
and temporal becoming in Chapter 2.
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￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ . The becoming argument is sometimes
used to argue that the block universe is static or that change is an
illusion. But such claims go one bridge too far. First, to say that the
block is static suggests that the block endures and somehow exists in
time (Dainton, 2010, 8). But it is the other way round: time exists in
the block, as the fourth dimension. This of course does not alter the
fact that the content of the block is fixed. The history of the Universe
is unique, and cannot be different from what she is. In this atemporal
sense, the block is indeed a static, unchanging entity.
Second, even though the block as such cannot change, this does
not imply that there can be no change within the block. Time is the
dimension by virtue of which objects can change by having different
properties at different times (i.e. at different points along the temporal
dimension). As Dieks (2014, 105) correctly observes, the fact that “the
block per se is changeless [. . .] implies nothing about the presence or
absence of physical change in the universe.”
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . It should be clear from our discussion of the reality
argument, the truth argument, the determinism argument and the
becoming argument in §§3.1–3.4 that there really is but one master
argument: the argument for the reality of all events. The other three
arguments are but corollaries to the master argument. The truth of
past and future contingents follows from the reality of past and fu-
ture events. It is because future events are real, that they are block
determined (or determinate). And it is because future events are fixed




The RPM argument claims to have settled the presentism–eternalism
debate on the side of eternalism. Here is Putnam (1967):
I conclude that the problem of the reality and the deter-
minateness of future events is now solved. Moreover, it
is solved by physics and not by philosophy. We have
learned that we live in a four-dimensional and not a three-
dimensional world [. . .]. Indeed, I do not believe that
there are any longer any philosophical problems about Time
(p. 247, emphasis in original).
Despite Putnam’s confidence in the RPM argument, it has repeatedly
come under fire. A number of important objections have been raised
against it, exposing different flaws and fallacies in the argument. In
what follows, I present eleven objections to the RPM argument. The
list is by no means exhaustive; there certainly are other objections to
be found in the scattered literature on RPM, but the objections to be
outlined below are by far the most common and important ones.
Given the contradiction in (C) (see §3), one of the six premisses in
the RPM argument must be abandoned. RPM reject premise (vi), and
thereby establish the reality and determinateness of past and future
events. But there are other ways to avoid the contradiction in (C).
According to the conventionality objection (§4.1), premises (i) and (ii)
have to yield. The relativity objection (§4.2), the epistemic objection
(§4.3) and the presentism objection (§4.4) all argue that premises (iii)
and (iv) are flawed, albeit for different reasons. That is, they all take
issue with the presentist credo according to which aSb º aRb.
According to the transitivity objection (§4.5), finally, premise (v) is
mistaken. Notice that in each of these cases, the conclusion that past
and future events are real no longer follows.
The remaining objections are not directed at a particular premise
of the RPM argument, but they question the argument in its entirety
(again for different reasons). The becoming objection (§4.6) offers
an argument for temporal becoming, and thereby questions the RPM
argument against temporal becoming. The modesty objection (§4.7)
claims that RPM’s conclusion cannot follow from SR alone, since it
requires extra-theoretical assumptions which fall outside the domain
of SR. The robustness objection (§4.8), the neo-Lorentzian objection
(§4.9) and the quantum objection (§4.10) do not question the valid-
ity of the RPM argument in a special relativistic setting, but argue
that it no longer applies in a general relativistic, neo-Lorentzian, or
quantum setting, respectively. The triviality objection (§4.11), finally,
claims that the presentism–eternalism debate is a pseudo-debate.
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With so many objections, it may seem as if the RPM argument
is ready for the philosophical dustbin, despite its lasting popularity.
However, for each of the objections raised in §§4.1–4.11, I will also
advance one or more rebuttals. Some may go some way towards
restoring the RPM argument. Most, however, merely show the reality
question to be open-ended or ill-defined, and especially underdeter-
mined by the formalism of SR (§5).
￿.￿ The conventionality objection
Two debates have been central in the philosophical literature on SR:
(1) the debate on the conventionality of simultaneity;
(2) the debate on the dimensionality of the world.
The former debate was sparked by Einstein in 1905; the latter debate
was initiated by Minkowski in 1908, and is at the heart of this chapter.
Einstein believed the notion of simultaneity to be conventional, and
not factual; Minkowski considered reality to be fundamentally four-
dimensional, and not three-dimensional. A major contribution to the
second debate, in support of Minkowski’s claims, is of course the
RPM argument, as outlined in §3.
Yet both debates have lingered on to this day, without definite an-
swers. Most strikingly, the link between both debates has remained
largely underexplored. To make matters even worse, whenever the
link is explored, radically different conclusions are reached about the
way the former debate impacts the latter.
According to Weingard (1972) and Petkov (1989, 2007a,b, 2008), the
conventionality thesis lends further support to Minkowski’s claim
(see §4.4.3). Dieks (2012c), Ben-Yami (2015) and Cohen (2016), on the
other hand, argue for the opposite thesis and exploit the convention-
ality of simultaneity to undermine the RPM argument. Sklar (1981),
finally, remains largely uncommitted.
In what follows, I attempt to clarify the current situation by care-
fully exploring what implications the conventionality thesis has for
the RPM argument specifically, and the debate on the dimensionality
of the world more broadly. I first present the conventionality thesis
(§4.1.1), and subsequently raise the conventionality objection (§4.1.2).
I then distinguish two possible readings of the conventionality thesis
— an ontic and an epistemic one — and highlight the repercussion
of this distinction for the conventionality objection and its impact on
the RPM argument (§4.1.3). I return to the claim by Weingard and
Petkov in §4.4.3.







Figure 5: Standard synchrony as defined by Einstein in 1905.
￿.￿.￿ The conventionality of simultaneity
The thesis that distant simultaneity is a conventional notion (as op-
posed to a factual one) originated in the writings of Poincaré and Ein-
stein and was further developed by Reichenbach in the 1920s and by
Grünbaum in the 1950s (see Jammer, 2006 for a historical overview).33
The conventionality thesis can be summarised as follows. Consider
two distant events, one at location A in space, the other at location
B. To say that both events are simultaneous is to say that they occur
at the same time. That is, if an A- and a B-clock were placed at the
locations A and B respectively, both clocks should indicate the same
time. This of course presumes that the clocks have been previously
synchronised.
￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . In his 1905 paper, Einstein (1989) pro-
posed the following clock-synchronisation procedure (Figure 5).34 At
time tA, a light signal is emitted from point A towards point B (event
eA). At time tB, the signal is reflected back from B to A (event eB)
and returns at A at time tA ¨ (event eA ¨). Notice that the times tA and
tA ¨ are measured by the A-clock, whereas the time tB is measured
by the B-clock. If the speed of light is the same in the AB and BA
directions, it follows that the two clocks are synchronous when
tB = tA +
1
2
(tA ¨   tA) . (3)
33 The conventionality of simultaneity should not be confused with the relativity of si-
multaneity. Whereas the latter refers to the relativity of intersystemic simultaneity,
the former refers to the relativity of intrasystemic simultaneity.
34 See also the Appendix for the Einstein–Poincaré convention for simultaneity.





























Figure 6: Standard " = 1
2
versus non-standard " = 1
4
synchrony. Figure
adapted from Norton (2018a).
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Einstein’s procedure however re-
lies on an important assumption: the isotropy of the speed of light.
In order to verify the truth of this assertion, the one-way velocity of
light would have to be measured. But this requires the use of spatially
separated clocks that are already synchronised. As Einstein (1920, 27)
observed: “It would thus appear as though we were moving here in a
logical circle.” Reichenbach called this the ‘velocity-simultaneity circle
argument’. Einstein avoided the circularity by assuming the isotropy
of the velocity of light without further (experimental) proof.35 Ein-
stein’s definition of distant simultaneity is thus only a convention.
Other definitions are possible according to which
tB = tA + " (tA ¨   tA) , 0 < " < 1, (4)
with " the Reichenbach synchronisation parameter. The choice " = 1
2
is
called standard synchrony and leads to Einstein’s definition of simul-
taneity. But according to Reichenbach, the choice of " is completely
arbitrary (see Figure 6). This, in short, is the conventionality thesis of
simultaneity.
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ . Reichenbach arrived at the conven-
tionality thesis via a different route.36 According to his causal theory
of time (see also Chapter 3), all temporal relations are reducible to
causal relations. An event e1 is earlier than an event e2 if and only
if e1 can causally affect e2. Since eA, eB, and eA ¨ in Figure 5 are
35 Einstein was probably aware of the conventional character of his synchronisation
procedure. He was careful, after all, to use the words “by definition” when establish-
ing the isotropy of the speed of light, and titled the first section of his 1905 paper
“§1. Definition of Simultaneity”. See Einstein (1989, 142).
36 See Reichenbach (1922, 1924, 1928) (translated in Reichenbach, 1959, 1969, 1958 re-
spectively).
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connected via a light signal, eA can affect eB and eB can affect eA ¨ . It
follows that tA < tB < tA ¨ . But for any event e in the open interval
between eA and eA ¨ , e can only affect eB, or vice versa, if a causal
signal were to travel between them at superluminal speeds, which
is forbidden according to SR. It is this causal non-connectibility of e
and eB that leaves their temporal order indeterminate according to
Reichenbach. The event e is neither past, present, nor future with
respect to eB.
In summary, the temporal order for any two spacelike separated
events is indeterminate. It is only when a definition of distant simul-
taneity is introduced by hand (via a conventional choice of ") that
a temporal order between spacelike separated events can be estab-
lished. But this order merely reflects our choice of ", rather than
being an objective matter of fact.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . The thesis that distant simultaneity is a conventional
notion is not universally accepted. The most influential objection was
probably voiced by Malament (1977). According to Norton (1992,
194), Malament’s publication represented “one of the most dramatic
reversals in the philosophy of space and time.” It is not my aim in
this thesis to take a position with regard to the conventionality debate;
I merely want to point out what impact the conventionality thesis
would have on the debate about the dimensionality of the world (and
the RPM argument in particular) if it were true.
￿.￿.￿ The conventionality objection
According to the conventionality thesis, the temporal order for space-
like separated events is indeterminate. Hence, since c is spacelike
separated from a in Figure 4, it cannot be maintained that c is present
relative to O1 at a. Similarly, since b is spacelike separated from c,
it cannot be maintained that b is present relative to O2 at c. Both
premises (i) and (ii) are thus false, rendering the RPM argument un-
sound. Call this the conventionality objection.
Weingard (1972) and Sklar (1981) were among the first to apply the
conventionality thesis to the RPM argument. More recently, Dieks
(2012c), Ben-Yami (2015) and Cohen (2016) endorsed the same view-
point. Here is Sklar (1981, 135-136) by way of example:
If we now associate the real (for an observer) with the si-
multaneous for him, we must, accepting the conventional-
ity of simultaneity, accept as well a conventionalist theory
of ‘reality for’. It is then merely a matter of arbitrary stip-
ulation that one distant event rather than another is taken
as real for an observer. Now there is nothing inconsis-
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tent or otherwise formally objectionable about such a rela-
tivized notion of ‘reality for’, but it does seem to take the
metaphysical heart out of the old claim that the present
had genuine reality and the past and future lacked it. For
what counts as the present is only a matter of arbitrary
choice, and so then is what is taken as real.
￿.￿.￿ Ontic or epistemic?
In deciding whether the conventionality objection referred to above
has any strength, I believe one first has to decide whether the conven-
tionality thesis is an ontic or an epistemic thesis.37
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿? On an ontic reading of the conventionality
thesis, the relation of distant simultaneity is conventional, as opposed
to factual, because this relation does not exist in the objective world.
“[I]t is because no relations of absolute simultaneity exist to be mea-
sured that measurement cannot disclose them”, argues Grünbaum
(1955, 456). I will call anyone upholding this position an irrealist about
distant simultaneity.
On an epistemic reading of the conventionality thesis, on the other
hand, the relation of distant simultaneity is conventional, as opposed
to factual, because it is unverifiable. Even if the relation of distant
simultaneity exists, we nevertheless fail to have epistemic access to it,
and are thus forced to treat this notion in a conventional manner.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿? With respect to the epistemic reading
of the conventionality thesis, it is worth distinguishing two further
positions. The agnostic is non-committal about the possible existence
of distant simultaneity. The "-epistemicist, on the other hand, is con-
vinced that there is “a fact of the matter as to which distant events
are ‘really’ simultaneous with a given event”, even though we cannot
measure it empirically. That is, the Reichenbach "-parameter has a de-
terminate value, but due to the velocity-simultaneity circle argument
(referred to above, see §4.1.1), there is no way for us to determine its
value.38 I call this position "-epistemicism, borrowing the term from
debates on vagueness.39
37 I owe a great debt to Dennis Dieks for his time and careful remarks, which greatly
improved this section on the ontic–epistemic distinction.
38 This is similar to the hidden variables in certain interpretations of quantum mechan-
ics, such as the particle positions in Bohmian mechanics. Even though each particle
always has a definite position, thereby tracing out a classical (or semi-classical) tra-
jectory over time, we do not have epistemic access to these positions.
39 Epistemicism is a philosophical position according to which propositions involving
vague predicates (such as ‘is thin’ or ‘is a heap of sand’) have definite truth values,
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Figure 7: The impact of the conventionality thesis on the RPM argument.
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ . On the ontic reading of the conventionality thesis,
the conventionality objection certainly applies. After all, if the notion
of distant simultaneity does not belong to the ontological furniture
of the world, then clearly premises (i) and (ii) are without substance.
Not surprisingly, Weingard, Sklar, Dieks, Ben-Yami, and Cohen all
subscribe to this ontic interpretation when raising the conventionality
objection.
Sklar (1981), for instance, takes the simultaneity of distant events
to be “irrealist.” We are of course free to introduce such a notion
by choosing a particular value for the Reichenbach "-parameter. But,
argues Sklar (1981, 135), if every choice of " “can explain equally well
all the hard data of experience, why should we take the accounts
as differing at all in the real features they attribute to the world?”
(emphasis added). There is, in other words, “no fact of the matter at
all about which distant events are ‘really’ simultaneous with a given
event”. Ben-Yami (2015, 278) agrees that the definitions of distant
simultaneity “do not express any objective temporal order between
[spacelike separated] events.”
The consequence for the RPM argument is fatal. “If simultaneity
is purely conventional and lacks metaphysical significance,” Dieks
(2012c, 618–19) continues, “there is obviously no reason to suppose
that simultaneous events share a special ‘reality-property’, so that the
[RPM] argument seems to become a non-starter.” Cohen (2016, 46)
concurs that “since simultaneity between spatially separated events
is merely conventional and not an objective constituent of reality”,
the premises (i) and (ii) above are “devoid of physical import.”
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Granting that the ontic interpretation of the
conventionality thesis undermines the RPM argument, where does
even though it is impossible in principle to know what they are. I wish to thank
Sylvia Wenmackers for her suggestion to borrow this term here.








Figure 8: The RPM argument with " = 1
4
.
it leave us with regard to the debate on presentism and eternalism?
If there is no such thing as distant simultaneity of events, it would
seem that the present gets reduced to the here-and-now of each ob-
server. And if we accept the presentist credo that all that exists, exists
presently, then reality itself would get reduced to a single point (Fig-
ure 1). This was called point presentism by Harrington (2008). The
problem, according to Stein (1968, 18), is that it leads to “a peculiarly
extreme (but pluralistic!) form of solipsism.”
Not everyone has reached this conclusion though. Weingard (1972),
for instance, while agreeing that the conventionality thesis under-
mines the RPM argument, offers a new argument, based on the con-
ventionality thesis, in support of eternalism (see §4.4.3).40
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Let us turn to the epistemic interpretation of
the conventionality thesis and its impact on the RPM argument. Here
the situation becomes more subtle (Figure 7). To start, the agnostic
cannot judge the soundness of the RPM argument since he remains
undecided as to whether distant simultaneity exists or not.
The "-epistemicist, on the other hand, argues that the notion of
distant simultaneity exists, despite it being epistemically inaccessible,
and unlike the irrealist position which we just discussed. As such,
the epistemicist can still go both ways. Three situations are worth
distinguishing, as summarized in Figure 7:
Situation 1: If she assumes that " has a fixed value, different from
1
2
, then the conventionality objection fails, and the RPM argument
nevertheless goes through. To see that, compare Figures 4 and 8.
RPM assume standard synchrony with " = 1
2
, leading to the familiar
hyperplanes of simultaneity which are orthogonal to the worldlines
of the observers (Figure 4). But suppose now that " had a different
40 Sklar (1981) also voices a number of ways to deal with the threat of conventionality.









Figure 9: The RPM argument with direction-dependent ".
value in reality, say " = 1
4
. In that case, spacetime would be foliated
into one-sheeted hypercones of simultaneity (Figure 8).41 Yet, despite
such a different foliation of Minkowski spacetime, the relativity of
simultaneity still holds true, and the RPM argument goes through
unaffected, as can be judged from Figure 8.
Situation 2: One problem with the hypercones of simultaneity,
though, is that the notion of intrasystemic simultaneity is no longer
symmetric and transitive, and thus no longer an equivalence relation.
For example, although c is simultaneous with a in Figure 8 (cSa), a
is not simultaneous with c (¬aSc).
It is customary therefore to make " direction-dependent (with a
choice of " = 1
4
to the right implying 1  " = 3
4
to the left, as explained
by Dieks, 2014). This leads to a foliation of Minkowski spacetime
into hyperplanes, rather than hypercones, and restores the symmetry
and transitivity of intrasystemic simultaneity (Figure 9). However,
for " j 1
2
, the hyperplanes are no longer orthogonal to the time axis.
Even so, the relativity of simultaneity continues to hold true, and the
RPM argument still applies, as can be seen in Figure 9.
Situation 3: Finally, since the choice of the "-parameter is con-
ventional, nothing prevents the epistemicist from making " observer-
dependent as well. That way, a notion of absolute simultaneity can be
reintroduced, in which case the RPM argument obviously fails (Fig-
ure 10). Neo-Lorentzian interpretations of SR, in particular, subscribe
to this position (see for instance Craig, 2001, Craig and Smith (2008),
and the discussion in §4.9). The threat of non-locality, finally, has led
some Bohmians to similarly introduce a preferred foliation of space-
time (Dürr et al., 2014, see also §4.10).
41 Only for standard synchrony with " = 1
2
do the hypercones degenerate into the
familiar horizontal hyperplanes of simultaneity. See Torretti (1983), Redhead (1993).








Figure 10: The RPM argument with observer-dependent ".
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . According to Weingard, Sklar, Ben-Yami and others, the
conventionality of simultaneity undermines the RPM argument. I
have shown the situation to be more subtle than that and have argued
that the way in which the conventionality thesis impacts the RPM
argument depends on whether it is an ontic or an epistemic thesis.
If it is an ontic thesis, the RPM argument cannot be saved. But on
certain epistemicist positions regarding distant simultaneity, the RPM
argument is unaffected by the conventionality objection (Figure 7).
￿.￿ The relativity objection
Why take simultaneity as the determiner of what is real? “We must
accept that simultaneity and determinateness go hand in hand”, be-
gins Norton (2018b) in his evaluation of the RPM argument. But “I
see no good reason to accept this”, he continues. “The notion of de-
terminateness itself is sufficiently unclear as to leave me uncertain of
its connection to simultaneity” (see also §4.7 in that respect).
The connection, however, is easily made. RPM start from the pre-
sentist claim that all (and only) present events are real. Whether an
event e is real or unreal thus depends on its being present or not. But
which events are to be considered present in SR? According to RPM,
the present of an event e is the set of all events simultaneous with
e. Hence, whichever event stands in the simultaneity relation S to e
must be real for e, according to the presentist credo in Eq. (2).
Three objections can be raised against RPM’s use of the simultane-
ity relation S to gauge what is present, and by extension real, in
Minkowski spacetime: (1) distant simultaneity only holds relative to a
frame of reference, (2) distant simultaneity is epistemically inaccessible,
and (3) it is not clear whether the present in SR should be defined in
terms of simultaneity relations. I start with the former objection, and
discuss the latter two objections in the next two sections (§§4.3–4.4).
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￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . The RPM argument uses the notion of
distant simultaneity S to partition Minkowski spacetime M into the
past, present and future. But distant simultaneity is a relative notion
in SR. What is simultaneous with an event e depends on the frame
of reference that is adopted. Different observers in relative motion
will judge the simultaneity of events differently. As a result, they will
partition Minkowski spacetimeM differently, and will therefore fail
to share the same past, present and future. The past, present and
future on this reading are not relativistically invariant.
It might seem odd to gauge the reality of events via such observer-
dependent notions. Why base our ontology on frame-dependent con-
cepts such as S? Accoding to Weingard (1972, 119), the relation of dis-
tant simultaneity S “cannot have physical significance” since it fails to
be relativistically invariant. In his opinion, one should base one’s on-
tological claims on the use of invariant notions, such as the lightcone
structure of Minkowski spacetime. “[W]e would expect physically
significant concepts of past, present, and future to be relativistically
invariant ones so that the past, present and future of an event [. . .]
are the same in every frame of reference” (pp. 119-20). Call this the
relativity objection.
The same worry was already raised by Capek (1975, 612-613):
“Like Rietdijk, Putnam retains the old notion of the universal present
spread as a ‘world-wide instant’ across the whole universe, and uses
this notion in order to conclude that, in a sense, everything is present.”
But, objects Capek, Rietdijk and Putnam neglect “the one essential
idea of relativity that [. . .] ‘Here-Now’ can never be extrapolated to
‘Everywhere-Now”’ in a relativistically invariant way. Or in the words
of Stein (1968, 16):
[T]he fact that there is a time axis orthogonal to the di-
rection from a to c (or a time-coordinate function having
equal values at a and c) adds nothing [. . .] because “a time
coordinate” is not “time.” Neither a nor b is, in any physi-
cally significant sense, “present” [. . .] for any observer at
c — regardless of his velocity. (emphasis in original)
The common fallacy, then, in the arguments by Rietdijk, Putnam
and Maxwell is “their employment, in the context of the Einstein-
Minkowski theory, of notions about time that are illegitimate in that
theory” (Stein, 1968, 15-16).
￿.￿ The epistemic objection
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . One motivation, according to Sklar
(1981), for the presentist credo that all (and only) present events are
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real, is the epistemic remoteness of past and future events. However, if
we are to consider the past and future as unreal due to their epistemic
distance from us, then “surely we are to declare everything outside
the lightcone as unreal as well”, Sklar continues (p. 139). Events at
spacelike separation from us are, after all, causally non-connectible to
us, and therefore “totally immune from epistemic contact by us” (at
least at the present moment). Put differently, if we are to judge the re-
ality of events by their epistemic accessibilitiy, then there is no reason
at all why we should treat the elsewhere any different from the else-
when; the elsewhere is just as epistemically distant and inaccessible
from us as the elsewhen.42
On this reading, since c is spacelike separated from a in Figure 4,
it cannot be maintained that c is real for a, despite it being simulta-
neous (and hence, present) with a relative to observer O1. Similarly,
since b is spacelike separated from c, it cannot be maintained that b
is real for c. The reality claims in premises (iii) and (iv) are thus false,
and undermine the RPM argument. Call this the epistemic objection.
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ . The epistemic objection resembles
the conventionality objection (§4.1.2). It was the epistemic remoteness
of spacelike separated events, after all, that first led Reichenbach to
his conventionality thesis of distant simultaneity (§4.1.1). But just as
the epistemic inaccessibility of distant simultaneity does not necessar-
ily imply the non-existence of this relation (§4.1.3), so the epistemic
remoteness of spacelike separated events should not necessarily im-
ply their unreality.
Why then, do so many jump from the (fairly weak and rather un-
controversial) epistemic reading to the (much stronger) ontic reading?
One reason for this attitude, I believe, finds its origin in the ideas of
logical positivism and the adoption of a verificationist stance. Logi-
cal positivism, as developed in the 1920s by the Vienna and Berlin
Circle, subscribed to the verifiability criterion of meaning, according to
which propositions are meaningful only when they are empirically
verifiable. The proponents of logical positivism saw a beautiful ex-
ample of their core ideas in the theory of SR. Einstein, after all, had
successfully eliminated the aether from physics since there is no em-
pirical way to verify our motion through it. On such verificationist
grounds, the epistemic inaccessibility of spacelike separated events
would likewise lead to a rejection of their reality (see Dorato, 2008, 60
for a similar argument, based on the empiricist foundations of SR).
As with the conventionality thesis of distant simultaneity, it is not
my intention here to defend the verificationist stance, nor to reject
42 On this view, only the spatiotemporal coincidence of two events is epistemically
available to us, reducing reality to a point, as discussed in §4.1.3.
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it, as this would fall outside the scope and aims of this chapter. I
merely want to explore what implications the verificationist stance
would have for the RPM argument, if it were true.
￿.￿ The presentism objection
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . According to Baron (2018), the present
in Minkowski spacetime can be defined in an infinite number of ways.
That is, since it is not clear what requirements to impose on the
present, any set of spacetime points could be taken as constituting
the present. As a result, there is no best definition for the present
in SR. Yet, among the infinite possibilities, some definitions certainly
stand out. Let e "M be an event in Minkowski spacetime. It is worth
distinguishing between the following four presents (Figure 1):
1. Point present: the present of e consists only of e itself.
2. Hyperplane present: the present of e consists of e itself and a
hyperplane through e.
3. Bow-tie present: the present of e consists of e itself and all events
in the absolute elsewhere of e.
4. Cone present: the present of e consists of e itself and all events
on the backward lightcone of e.43
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Depending on which of the above four
presents is adopted by the presentist, different sets of spacetime
points will be considered real. For the point presentist, for instance,
the sum total of reality is reduced to a single point: the here-and-now
of every observer. As already mentioned, Stein (1968, 18) calls this “a
peculiarly extreme (but pluralistic!) form of solipsism.”
The hyperplane presentist, in contrast, sticks to the pre-relativistic
notion of the present by drawing hypersurfaces of simultaneity. This
is also the definition of the present adopted by RPM. For the bow-tie
presentist, all events in the absolute elsewhere of e are considered
real. And finally, for the backward cone presentist, reality is reduced
to what is observable. That is, reality is confined to the set of points
on the backward lightcone of e.
Each of these presentist positions has been advanced and argued
for in the philosophical literature (see Harrington, 2008 for a defense
of the point present,44 Weingard, 1972 for a defense of the bow-tie
present, and Godfrey-Smith, 1979 for a defense of the cone present.)
43 Besides the backward cone present, Baron (2018) also defines the forward cone present
and double cone present.
44 This view was first articulated by Robb, 1911, 1914, 1921, 1936. It was later also
advanced by Capek, 1966, 1975 and by Stein, 1968. See Arthur, 2006, 143-144 for
more details on the punctual (or point) present.
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And of course, all of these positions come with their own set of ad-
vantages and disadvantages (see Wüthrich, 2013 for a critical survey
of all the presentist positions).
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ . Since SR does not dictate which
present to adopt, our choice will have to depend on which extra-
theoretical assumptions and requirements we impose on the present.
Do we want the present to be global (like the hyperplane present) or
local (like the point present)? Does it have to be relativistically invariant
(like the bow-tie present and cone present)? Or should it be achronal
(like the hyperplane present)?
It bears repeating that SR leaves these questions underdetermined
(see also §4.7). Each of the above-mentioned presents, therefore, is
worth taking seriously. It is thus reasonable to ask how the RPM
argument would fare if we were to adopt a different definition of the
present. That is, would the RPM argument still go through if we were
to change the hyperplane present for one of the other three presents?
￿.￿.￿ RPM and point presentism
If one reduces the present to a point, the RPM argument cannot get
off the ground since the present for any observer does not extend
beyond the here-and-now (see also §4.1.3, where the ontic reading of
the conventionality objection led to the same conclusion).
￿.￿.￿ RPM and cone presentism
If the present for any observer is reduced to what is observable to that
observer, the situation becomes more interesting. To see why, let us
first rewrite the presentist credo for the (backward) cone presentist,
and then run the RPM argument anew on the basis of this modified
credo.
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Let E  be the relation among the elements of
M where E  stands for ‘is on the backward lightcone of’ (or ‘is in
the past horismos of’, see the Appendix). Then aE b is shorthand for
‘event a is on the backward lightcone of event b’. Now assuming b to
represent the here-and-now, b is real. The cone present for b contains
all events on the past lightcone of b. Hence, if aE b holds true, then
a is present for b. Following the presentist credo that all (and only)
present events are real, a must be real for b:
aE
 
b º aRb. (5)




Figure 11: The RPM argument starting from backward cone presentism.
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . With that in place, let us re-run the




(iii) cE a º cRa;
(iv) bE c º bRc;
(v) bRc 0 cRa º bRa;
(vi) ¬bE a º ¬bRa;
(C) bRa 0 ¬bRa.
As with the original RPM argument, a contradiction arises in (C).
However, while this refutes backward cone presentism, it fails to fit
the eternalist bill, and rather seems to establish a special relativistic
version of possibilism. It leads to the view that all (and only) events in
the causal past of b are real.45 As we will see in §4.6, the same view
of reality also follows from Stein’s theorem.
￿￿￿￿￿ ’￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . The possibilist view was ridiculed by Putnam
(1967) for two reasons. First of all, unless two observers share the
same here-and-now, they will not agree on what events are real and
determinate, as each observer has their own past lightcone. In lieu of
a global, observer-independent, division between the real and unreal,
every observer would have their own reality, leading to a fragmenta-
tion of reality.
Second, Putnam asks us to imagine a person, called Oscar. While
Oscar’s worldline lies entirely in the elsewhere of me-now, it does
45 I leave it as an exercise to the reader to run the same argument starting from forward
or double cone presentism. In the former case, reality is confined to the causal future
of any event; in the latter case, eternalism can be recovered.
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intersect the past lightcone of me-later. Then it will be true in my
future that Oscar has existed, even though Oscar does not exist in
my present. “Things could come to have been, without its ever having
been true that they are!”, exclaims Putnam (1967, 246, emphasis in
original).
Although startling, Sklar (1981) is not convinced that this refutes
the possibilist view. After all, Sklar dryly remarks, “we expect that a
move to a relativistic picture will force some violence on our ways of
speaking” (p. 138). Stein (1968) furthermore objects that one has no
right to apply the present tense to Oscar, as in SR “an event’s present
is constituted by itself alone” (p. 15, emphasis in original).
￿.￿.￿ RPM and bow-tie presentism
So far, substituting the hyperplane present with the point or cone
present has been detrimental to the RPM argument. This just goes to
show that the RPM argument will not hold water on every possible
definition of the present. Call this the presentism objection.
That being said, it turns out that adopting the bow-tie present is
instrumental in reaching the eternalist conclusion. This version of the
RPM argument was first proposed by Weingard (1972) and has since
been advocated by Petkov (2007a,b, 2008). Call this the Weingard–
Petkov argument, or WP argument, for the four-dimensionality of
the world.
Whereas the RPM argument relies on the relativity of simultaneity,
the WP argument relies on the conventionality of simultaneity. That is,
Weingard uses the conventionality thesis to first plead for the bow-tie
present, and then uses the bow-tie present to argue for eternalism.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Consider the set M of spacetime
events a,b, . . ., and let b represent the here-and-now. By carefully
choosing the "-parameter, any event in the absolute elsewhere of
b can be considered simultaneous with b, and hence present. The
present for b, in other words, coincides with the absolute elsewhere
of b — a spatially extended bow-tie-shaped region (Figure 1). The
bow-tie present contains all events that are causally non-connectible
to b, and are thus topologically simultaneous with b (following Reichen-
bach and Grünbaum’s terminology).46
Contrary to the (standard, " = 1
2
) hyperplane present for b, the
bow-tie present for b is relativistically invariant. It neatly partitions
Minkowski spacetime into an absolute present (b + elsewhere of b),
46 Sklar (1981, 136) refers to the bow-tie present of b as “the region of the ‘absolutely
simultaneous’ and ‘absolutely present’ ”.
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absolute future (upper lightcone of b) and absolute past (lower light-
cone of b).47
￿￿￿-￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Let A be the relation among the elements
of M where A stands for ‘is in the absolute elsewhere of’. Then
aAb is shorthand for ‘event a is in the absolute elsewhere of event b’.
Since b represents the here-and-now, b is real. The bow-tie present
for b consists of all events topologically simultaneous with b. Hence,
if aAb holds true, then a is present for b. Following the presentist
credo that all (and only) present events are real, a must be real for b:
aAb º aRb. (6)
This position was dubbed bow-tie presentism by Gilmore et al. (2016).
Although Sklar (1981) fails to see any way of ‘refuting’ this position,
it remains a peculiar view to say the least:
Having dismissed as unreal things whose only deficiency
is the fact that causal signals from them have taken time
to arrive at us now, or that causal signals from us will
take some time to arrive at them, it seems very suspicious
indeed to promote into the domain of the fully real those
things causally inaccessible to us (now) altogether. (p. 137)
Leaving these reservations aside, let us move on to the WP argument.
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿–￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . The WP argument, in essence,
is just the RPM argument, but using Eq. (6) instead of Eq. (2) to gauge
what is real (Figure 12):
(i) cAa;
(ii) bAc;
(iii) cAa º cRa;
(iv) bAc º bRc;
(v) bRc 0 cRa º bRa;
(vi) ¬bAa º ¬bRa;
(C) bRa 0 ¬bRa.
Once again, a contradiction arises in (C), thereby refuting bow-tie
presentism and establishing eternalism.
47 Savitt (2000) rejects the bowtie present because it fails to be achronal. According
to him, no events in the present of b should be in each other’s absolute future or
absolute past. To see why, imagine that your entire worldline from birth to death
was contained in the absolute elsewhere of b. Then according to b, your entire life
is present, which sounds absurd.




Figure 12: The Weingard–Petkov argument.
￿.￿ The transitivity objection
The most common objection to the RPM argument focusses on the
transitivity of the relation ‘is real for’.48 For — the objection runs —
the hyperplane present in SR is a relative (frame-dependent) notion.
What is present for O1 need not be present for O2. And since the
reality of events is tied up with their being present, reality itself is
bound to be relativized. What is real for O1 need not be real for O2.
There is thus “no compelling reason” according to Hinchliff (1996,
131) to subscribe to the transitivity of reality across different inertial
frames, as is done in premise (v) of the RPM argument. Quite the
contrary, we must accept the non-transitivity of R, lest we fail to “fully
[. . .] enter the relativistic spirit”, dixit Dainton (2010, 331). Just as bSc
and cSa in Figure 4 do not imply that bSa, so bRc and cRa do not
imply that bRa. Call this the transitivity objection.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . To see all this more clearly, recall that the
relation of simultaneity in SR is a ternary (three-place) relation among
two events and a given reference frame. Two events can only be said
to be simultaneous with one another relative to some observer. When
this is taken into account, the non-transitivity of S across observers
follows automatically:
bSO2c 0 cSO1a  bSO1a. (7)
If we now associate the real with the simultaneous, then R becomes a
ternary (three-place) relation as well, in which case:
bRO2c 0 cRO1a  bRO1a, (8)
contrary to premise (v) of the RPM argument. The flaw in the RPM
argument, in other words, is that R is taken to be a binary (two-place)
relation among events, rather than a ternary one like S.
48 See, for instance, Sklar (1974), Godfrey-Smith (1979), Sklar (1981) (republished in
Sklar, 1985), Hinchliff (1996, 2000), Dieks (2014), Norton (2015) and Norton (2018b).
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￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿–￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Observe that the transitivity objection also ap-
plies to the WP argument. For even the bow-tie present is a relative
notion. And so here as well, the non-transitivity of R follows directly
from the non-transitivity of A. That is, starting from:
bAc 0 cAa  bAa, (9)
and applying the presentist credo in Eq. (6), one obtains:
bRc 0 cRa  bRa, (10)
in contradiction with premise (v) of the WP argument.
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Giving up the transitivity of R, however,
comes at a price. If R is not transitive, then there exists not one reality,
but a plurality of (observer-dependent) realities (Bouton, 2017). The
non-transitivity of Rwould lead to a relativisation of existence, which
could serve as a basis for a form of ontological pluralism. Hinchliff
(1996) calls this position relativized presentism; Dorato (2008) refers to
it as ontic protagoreanism.
Whichever name one attaches to this position, the question is
whether such a position is even defendible. On this view, when two
observers in relative motion meet, they only share their here-and-
now without sharing any other point at spacelike separation (Figure
1). What is more, one could change what is real for us by changing
our state of motion (e.g. by jumping on a train, or travelling by plane).
If all of this sounds absurd to you, you are not alone. Callender
(2017, 54), for example, finds the relativisation of reality “more or less
nonsense — or at the very least, desparate”. Dorato (2008) similarly
maintains that the reality relation R “calls for transitivity as a matter
of meaning” (p. 60, emphasis in original).
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ’￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Putnam (1967) must have been aware of the
looming threat of relativisation too, as he considered the transitivity
of R to be his “most important assumption” (p. 240). He thus elevated
it to the principle that There Are No Privileged Observers.
Now, Putnam’s choice of words here is unfortunate at best, and
misleading at worst, as Sklar (1981) correctly remarks. The absence
of privileged observers in SR follows from the relativity postulate.
Einstein advanced this principle in order to prevent the introduction
of a privileged aether frame. However, it is not because all observers
have “equal rights to a legitimate world-description” (p. 130), that all
observers must also share the same reality. This is precisely the point
of the transitivity objection. If observers in relative motion can dis-
agree about what is simultaneous, why could they then not disagree
about what is real as well?
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Craig (2000, 4) therefore suggests it would have been better to call
Putnam’s principle the One Common Reality principle, to highlight
the fact that reality is assumed to be absolute, objective, monistic
and observer-independent — not relative, subjective, pluralistic and
observer-dependent.
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . The One Common Reality principle
is also at work in Peterson and Silberstein (2010), although they
refer to it as the uniqueness criterion (see §2). Peterson and Silber-
stein thus require every spacetime event to have a unique, observer-
independent R-value. An event is either real for all observers (with
R = 1) or unreal (R = 0). The uniqueness criterion “seems intuitive”
enough, write Peterson and Silberstein (2010, 212), “since an event
with an R-value of both 1 and 0 [. . .] would be both real and unreal,
which would be a contradiction.” The uniqueness criterion, therefore,
is an “absolute minimal criterion” for the notion of reality to make
any sense at all (p. 212).
It is also the uniqueness criterion that endows the reality relation
R with its transitive property. After all, if bRc implies that b and c
share the same R-value, and cRa means that c and a have the same
R-value, and b, c and a all have a unique R-value, then b and amust
have the same R-value as well.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . The fact though remains that both the One Common
Reality principle and the uniqueness criterion are being introduced
for intuitive reasons alone. And intuitions, everyone knows, are not
necessarily the most reliable guide to ontology. The ever-nuanced
Sklar (1974, 275) thus reminds us that it is “by no means inconsistent
or patently absurd” to assume that an event can have an R-value of
both 1 and 0, dependening on the point of view one considers. Even
if this leads to a relativisation of existence, “there doesn’t seem to be
anything very objectionable a priori about this” (Sklar, 1985, 296). In
short, the question whether the reality relation R is transitive or not
remains very much open.
￿.￿ The becoming objection
So far we have focussed on negative responses to RPM which seek
to expose different fallacies in their argument. Stein (1968, 1991),
in contrast, offers a positive response by showing that time-oriented
Minkowski spacetime is compatible with a relation of objective be-
coming.49 Stein thereby indirectly rebuts the RPM argument against
temporal becoming (§3.4). Call this the becoming objection.
49 Stein (1968) is a direct response to Rietdijk (1966) and Putnam (1967), whereas Stein
(1991) was provoked by Maxwell (1985). Stein’s theorem was further generalized by
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￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Stein considers the beefed-up structure of
time-oriented Minkowski spacetime, denoted M = áR4,⌘ab,  ç, with
  the temporal orientation. He then introduces a binary (two-place)
relation B among the elements of M, where B stands for ‘has be-
come for’. Then aBb is shorthand for ‘event a has become for event
b’. Stein furthermore requires B to satisfy five (natural) assumptions,
which he deems necessary for a notion of objective becoming:
1. B is definable from time-oriented metrical relations;
2. B is reflexive, i.e. a has already become for a (aBa);
3. B is transitive, i.e. aBb 0 bBc º aBc;
4. B is non-universal, i.e. for any point b, there is a point a such
that ¬aBb;
5. aBb holds whenever a is in the causal past of b, i.e. aJ b º
aBb.50
Stein then proceeds to prove the following theorem:
Theorem 1. Consider the binary relation B among the elements of time-
oriented Minkowski spacetime áR4,⌘ab,  ç, where B stands for ‘has become
for’, and where B satisfies the constraints 1. to 5. above. Then for any pair
of events a and b inM, the following holds:
aBb ø aJ b.
That is, a has become for b iff a is in the causal past of b. t
Stein’s theorem shows that there is only one relation satisfying the
five constraints above, namely the relation of being in the causal past.
In other words, all events in and on the past lightcone of b have
become for b and are thereby fixed, determinate and real; all events
outside the past lightcone of b have not yet become for b and are
therefore open, indeterminate and unreal (Figure 13).51,52
Clifton and Hogarth (1995), and was later extended to arbitrary spacetime regions
by Myrvold (2003). See also footnotes 51 and 52.
50 J+ (p) and J  (p) denote the causal future and past of an event p "M; I+ (p) and
I
  (p), in contrast, denote the chronological future and past of p. For more on the
causal structure of Minkowski spacetime, see the Appendix.
51 The fifth requirement that aBb holds whenever a is in the causal past of b can be
relaxed by the weaker condition that aBb only holds when a is in the chronological
past of b (i.e. when a is inside the past lightcone of b): aI b º aBb. In that case,
Stein’s becoming relation B would reduce to past chronological connectibility, rather
than past causal connectibility, as shown by Clifton and Hogarth (1995). As a result,
only the events inside the past lightcone of b would have become for b.
52 Stein’s becoming relation can also be extended to arbitrary spacetime regions, as
shown by Myrvold (2003). For any two arbitrary spacetime regions ↵ and  , ↵ has
become for   iff for every spacetime point a " ↵ there is a b "   such that aBb.





Figure 13: The past, present and future for b according to Stein’s notion of
objective becoming.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ . According to Clifton and Hoga-
rth (1995, 356), “Stein’s proof has settled the issue [. . .] in favour of
the possibility of objective becoming” in a special relativistic setting.
Callender (2000, S592) agrees that “the idea that Stein conclusively
refuted Putnam et al [. . .] seems to have achieved the status of con-
ventional wisdom.” Despite these claims, a number of important
criticisms have been voiced in the past.
To start, one might object that Stein’s becoming relation is impor-
tantly different from the one employed by RPM (Faye et al., 1997).
Stein considers what has become with respect to an event. Call this
worldline-independent becoming. RPM consider what has become with
respect to an event on a particular intertial worldline. Call this worldline-
dependent becoming. As a result, Stein’s becoming relation is rela-
tivized to a local spacetime point (viz. the here-and-now), whereas
RPM’s becoming relation is relativized to a global temporal moment
(viz. the spatially extended present).
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ’￿ ￿￿-￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . According to Stein’s becoming re-
lation, the present of an event is reduced to its here-and-now. This
point present is so far removed from our traditional conceptions of
a spatially extended present that Callender (2000, S592) wonders
“whether [B] is a relation of serious philosophical interest.” He thus
imposes one further condition upon B:
6. øa øb øB ⇥ aBb 0 bBa 0 a j b.
This non-uniqueness condition requires that every event a shares
its present with at least one other event b in Minkowski spacetime.
That is, Callender requires the present to have at least some spatial
extent (see also Callender, 2017). As weak as it is, Callender’s non-
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uniqueness condition turns Stein’s theorem for becoming into a no-go
theorem against becoming. Indeed, it can be shown that the only rela-
tion B satisfying conditions 1. to 6. is the universal relation U, where
each element of the setM is related to every element ofM.
￿￿￿￿￿ ’￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . According to Bigaj (2008), Stein’s analysis is
incomplete as it leaves the complement of the becoming relation B
undefined. That is, whereas B relates all events a to b that have become
for b, we also need the complementary relation O, relating all events
a to b that have not yet become for b. Call this relation the openness
relation, and let O stand for ‘is open for’. Then aOb is shorthand
for ‘event a is open for event b’ (i.e. ‘event a has not yet become for
b’ or ‘event a is indeterminate for event b’). In analogy with Stein’s
procedure, Bigaj requires O to satisfy the following five constraints:
1. O is definable from time-oriented metrical relations;
2. O is irreflexive, i.e. a is not open for a (¬aOa);
3. O is transitive, i.e. aOb 0 bOc º aOc;
4. O is non-universal, i.e. for any point b, there is a point a such
that ¬aOb;
5. aOb holds whenever b is in the causal past of a, i.e. bJ a º
aOb.
Bigaj finally introduces one further constraint:
6. For every a and b inM, either aBb or aOb.
With that in place, it is easy to show that no relations B and O can
possibly satisfy all of the above constraints. To that aim, let a and
b be two events such that a chronologically precedes b. Next, con-
sider an event c that is spacelike separated from both a and b (Figure
14). According to Stein’s theorem, ¬aBc and ¬cBb. It follows that
aOc and cOb. Using the transitivity of O, aOc 0 cOb º aOb.
However, since a is in the chronological past of b, it follows from
Stein’s theorem that aBb. We thus obtain the result that aOb 0 aBb,
contrary to the sixth requirement above.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Yet other objections can be raised against
Stein’s theorem. In the next chapter on temporal becoming, I will
develop two more objections. The first one refers to the fact that
Stein’s theorem requires Minkowski spacetime to be temporally ori-
ented. That is, for Stein’s becoming objection to pass muster, Stein
cannot work with Minkowski spacetime áR4,⌘abç as such, but needs
to consider the beefed-up structure áR4,⌘ab,  ç instead, where the
time orientation   is added by hand as extra structure.
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Figure 14: Bigaj’s objection to Stein’s theorem.
The second objection to Stein’s theorem argues that there is nothing
dynamic or flow-like to Stein’s becoming relation, and that it cannot
pick out a distinguished present. As such, Stein’s becoming relation
B fails to meet two defining requirements for a strong, dynamic form
of becoming, and can only aspire to a much weaker, deflated notion
of becoming.
￿.￿ The modesty objection
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ . In a recent paper, Norton (2015)
wonders what one can learn about the ontology of space and time
from the theory of relativity. He deplores the fact that Einstein’s
theories are all too often misinterpreted. In order to sift among the
plethora of answers on record, Norton (2015, 186-187) introduces four
requirements which any ontological claim should meet:
1. “Novelty. The morals we draw should be novel consequences
of relativity theory. They should not be results that could have
been drawn equally from earlier theories.
2. Modesty. The morals we draw should be consequences of rel-
ativity theory. They should not be results we wish could be
drawn from relativity theory but are only suggested to us by
the theory.
3. Realism. Relativity theory is to be construed as literally as pos-
sible.53
4. Robustness. We should not draw morals in one part of the the-
ory that are contradicted in others. In particular the morals we
draw from examination of special relativity should survive the
transition to general relativity.”
53 Norton (2015, 187) here implies that “we must take the theory to mean literally what
it says”, in contrast to a “fictionalist” reading of the theory according to which its
ontological pronouncements are nothing more than “useful mythmaking”.
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Failure to meet any of these requirements implies one is not dealing
with a moral worthy of inclusion in our catalog.
The RPM argument aspires at drawing an important ontological
moral from SR. It exploits the relativity of simultaneity to force upon
us an eternalist worldview. But does it meet Norton’s four require-
ments? Since the relativity of simultaneity is distinctive of SR, and
not to be found in classical mechanics, the RPM argument satisfies
the novelty requirement. RPM also take SR to provide an account of
the physical world that is literally true, thereby satisfying the realism
requirement. But according to Norton (2015, 196), the RPM argument
violates the requirement of modesty and robustness. I start with the for-
mer violation, and discuss the latter in the next section (§4.8).
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Notice the crucial role that is played by the
reality relation R in the RPM argument above (§3). And yet, R “has
nothing to do with physics!”, exclaims Dorato (2008, 58, emphasis in
original). “Unlike the [. . .] relation of simultaneity, denoted above by
S”, the reality relation R “plays no role whatsoever in any physical
theory” (p. 58). SR, as a theory of space and time, does not speak
of the reality or determinateness of events. No textbook on SR offers
a definition of these terms. Norton (2018b) thus finds it “awkward”
that the reality relation R plays such a prominent role in the RPM ar-
gument, since the notions of determinanetess and indeterminateness
“are not supplied as a theoretical term in special relativity.”
By invoking the reality relation R in the RPM argument, RPM sup-
plement the theory of SR with extra-theoretical metaphysical assump-
tions, which are supplied externally. According to Norton (2015, 196),
the use of R thus “amounts to introducing new physical assumptions
[. . .] into relativity theory”, thereby violating the requirement of mod-
esty. In the words of Sklar (1981, 131): “it is a great mistake to read off
a metaphysics superficially from the theory’s overt appearance, and
an even graver mistake to neglect the fact that metaphysical presup-
positions have gone into the formulation of the theory.”
The RPM argument, therefore, is not an argument for eternalism
from SR alone, but an argument for eternalism from SR plus numerous
assumptions about the reality of events (such as the intimate link
between the reality and simultaneity of events, as discussed in §4.2,
or the transitive character of reality, as discussed in §4.5).
￿.￿ The robustness objection
“Many of the philosophical responses to relativity theory look at the
special theory alone”, writes Norton (2015, 187). They thereby “trum-
pet results that are almost immediately contradicted by the emer-
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gence of general relativity.” That is, many of the ontological morals
that are drawn from relativity theory violate robustness. They might
hold in a special relativistic framework, but they do not survive the
transition to a general relativistic one. The RPM moral that past and
future events are determinate is but one example of this problem ac-
cording to Norton (2015, 196).
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Two remarks are in order before we proceed. First,
whereas all of the previous objections, as outlined in §§4.1–4.7, accept
SR but reject RPM, the robustness objection accepts RPM but rejects
SR. That is, whereas the former objections questioned the validity of
the RPM argument in a special relativistic setting, the robustness ob-
jection questions the setting itself. The end result, however, remains
the same. In rejecting SR, the robustness objection nonetheless ends
up overturning the RPM argument as well.
Second, the rejection of SR, to be considered here, does not oc-
cur on antinaturalist grounds by a wholesome rejection of science.
This, after all, would go against the naturalist attitude which requires
philosophical and metaphyical inquiry to be continuous with scien-
tific inquiry (Wüthrich, 2013). Instead, SR is rejected because is was
superseded by general relativity, just like Newtonian relativity was
superseded by SR. The reason is that SR only applies to ‘flat’ space-
times in the absence of gravity, which is hardly realistic and which
does not accord with the actual spacetime structure of our Universe.
It furthermore fails to take any quantum effects into account. As a
result, it is only natural to also consider the more fundamental, more
broadly encompassing theories, such as the theory of general relativ-
ity (GR), quantum mechanics (QM), quantum field theory (QFT) and
quantum gravity (QG).
Indeed, Norton’s robustness objection is not merely applicable in
a general relativistic framework. It can also be extended to a neo-
Lorentzian or quantum framework. To keep matters clear, I limit
the discussion here to the validity of the RPM argument in GR, and
discuss its validity in a neo-Lorentzian and quantum setting in the
next two sections (§§4.9–4.10).
All of the objections to be raised in this and the next two sections
have in common that they reject the relativity of simultaneity by the
introduction of a preferred frame of reference. In doing so, they
not only contradict SR, but they also undermine the RPM argument
which so crucially exploits the relativity of simultaneity in order to
drive a stake through the presentist heart.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ . The problem with the presentist enter-
prise, according to RPM, is that it is not clear which hypersurface
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of simultaneity is to be taken as the Now. Worse still, according to
the relativity postulate, no observer (or frame of reference) is privi-
leged. The A-theoretic assumption, then, that there nevertheless is a
preferred foliation of Minkowski spacetime seems to go against the
spirit of SR.
But when we move from SR to GR, the addition of a privileged set
of simultaneity hypersurfaces might be justified. First of all, in GR
the relativity of simultaneity no longer holds globally, as in SR, but
only locally for events infinitesimally close to any particular event
(Norton, 2015). Second, there are solutions to the Einstein field equa-
tions which describe universes that admit a preferred foliation (Dieks,
2014, 106).
Friedmann-Lemaître-Robertson-Walker (FLRW) universes have a
symmetric and homogeneous distribution of matter and energy, and
exhibit exact spherical symmetry about every spacetime point. As
a result, FLRW spacetimes posess a natural foliation into spacelike
hypersurfaces of constant spatial curvature that is unique and physi-
cally privileged (Wüthrich, 2013). The different folia can moreover be
labeled by a global cosmological time parameter t. As such, FLRW
spacetimes admit the reintroduction of a privileged time and an abso-
lute notion of simultaneity. Following Wüthrich (2013), “two events
are FLRW-absolutely simultaneous just in case they are within the same
spatial hypersurface of the privileged foliation, or, equivalently, oc-
cur at the same cosmological time t.” In summary, FLRW spacetimes
seem much more hospitable to the presentist enterprise.
A number of problems remain however. First, the question arises
whether and why we should imbue cosmological time with any on-
tological significance in order to objectively distinguish space from
time, and past from present and future. Second, the perfectly ho-
mogeneous FLRW spacetimes are but idealizations; they offer an ap-
proximate description of our actual Universe which, at least locally,
is far from spatially homogeneous.54 Finally, it is not clear how the
spacelike hypersurfaces of constant spatial curvature connect to our
presentist intuitions with regard to the present and temporal becom-
ing. “[I]t is not enough to simply identify a folium [. . .] as the present
and believe that one has explained our presentist intuitions”, writes
Wüthrich (2013, 19).
￿.￿ The neo-Lorentzian objection
There are other ways to introduce a preferred frame of reference. Hen-
drik Lorentz famously postulated an immobile and empirically unde-
54 This problem was already noted by Gödel (1949), and has been amply repeated in
the contemporary literature (see, for instance, Wüthrich, 2013).
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tectable aether while developing his aether theory between 1892 and
1895. He thereby introduced a unique rest frame and an absolute
notion of simultaneity.
In the neo-Lorentzian interpretations of SR today, the existence of
an aether is no longer postulated, but a preferred frame is still in-
troduced (Craig, 2000, 2001, Craig and Smith, 2008, Bourne, 2006).
The background spacetime, therefore, is no longer Minkowskian, but
Newtonian or neo-Newtonian. However, due to Lorentz symmetry,
the preferred frame is in principle undetectable, just as with the
aether frame in Lorentz’s theory. It is, in other words, impossible
to empirically distinguish SR from its neo-Lorentzian cousins. Neo-
Lorentzian SR is just SR with an extra non-empirical preferred frame.
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ’￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ . “The reason why some [presentists] have sought
all manner of strange replacements for special relativity when this
comparatively elegant theory exists is baffling”, writes Callender
(2008). Yet Callender reminds us that the addition of an absolute no-
tion of simultaneity does violate the demands of Ockham’s razor (see
also Wüthrich, 2013). Ockham’s law of parsimony, after all, states
that entities should not be multiplied without necessity. And since
the preferred frame cannot even be detected, it seems to be an unnec-
essary ad hoc addition to the relativistic framework. That is, when pre-
sented with the Einsteinian and neo-Lorentzian interpretations of SR
that make the same predictions, and whose mathematical formalisms
are identical, one should opt for the simpler, and more parsimonious
Einsteinian interpretation.
￿.￿￿ The quantum objection
Norton (2015) does not apply his robustness requirement outside the
realm of relativity theory, but it certainly could be extended to the
quantum realm as well. Quantum mechanics, after all, may offer a
more promising way of introducing a preferred frame of reference,
which could then be put into effect by the presentist to reintroduce a
notion of absolute simultaneity and to argue against RPM. Call this
the quantum objection. Two approaches can be distinguished: the first
approach is based on the collapse of the wavefunction; the other relies
on the violations of the Bell inequalities and quantum non-locality. I
briefly discuss both in the next two sections (§§4.10.1–4.10.2).
￿.￿￿.￿ Quantum becoming
Some advocates of collapse interpretations have invoked the objective
quantum collapse of the wavefunction as a potential mechanism to
distinguish the present (Stapp, 1977, Popper, 1982, Shimony, 1993,
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1998, Lucas, 1998, 1999, 2008, Tooley, 2008). Here is Lucas (1999, 10),
arguing to that end:
There is a worldwide tide of actualization — collapse into
eigenstate — constituting a preferred foliation by hyper-
planes (not necessarily flat) of co-presentness sweeping
through the universe — a tide which determines an ab-
solute present [. . .]. Quantum mechanics [. . .] not only
insists on the arrow being kept in time, but distinguishes
a present as the boundary between an alterable future and
an unalterable past.
The fixed and determinate past, on this reading, corresponds to wave-
functions which have collapsed to eigenstates, whereas the open and
indeterminate future corresponds to wavefunctions which are still in
a superposition of eigenstates.
Lucas’s presentist hopes have to be tempered in at least three ways.
First, the quantum collapses invoked by Lucas would have to occur in
a preferred basis, as superpositions in one basis can always be written
as eigenstates in another. An electron that is determinately x-spin up,
for example, can be written as a superposition of z-spin up and z-spin
down: ∂ ãx = 1”
2
(∂ ãz + ∂⇤ãz) . (11)
Hence, “a collapse to fixity in x-spin buys openess in z-spin”, writes
Callender (2017, 95). What is more, not all measurements need to
involve collapse. Consider measuring the x-spin of the electron above,
which is already in an x-spin eigenstate. Callender (2017, 95) thus
wonders whether the measurement outcome is “open because future
or [. . .] fixed because eigenstate”. In summary, it is far from clear
how one should map the determinate/indeterminate distinction into
the eigenstate/superposition distinction.
Second, even if a distinguished basis is postulated, such as the posi-
tion basis in GRW dynamical collapse theories, most collapse theories
fail to be Lorentz invariant. This is “usually regarded by physicists
not as a metaphysical virtue,” observes Wüthrich (2013, 19), “but as
a physical vice”.55
Third, which interpretation of QM to adopt is heavily disputed.
There are many viable alternatives to GRW or other collapse inter-
pretations. Importantly, neither hidden-variable interpretations (such
as Bohmian mechanics) nor many-worlds interpretations (such as Ev-
erettian QM) require collapse to solve the measurement problem.
55 It is worth observing, in that respect, that the only relativistic version of GRW
(namely rGRWf, as developed by Tumulka, 2006) does not violate Lorentz symmetry.
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￿.￿￿.￿ Quantum non-locality
The influential philosopher of science, Sir Karl Popper, was among
the first to invoke the spooky correlations between spacelike sepa-
rated events (as theoretically predicted by Bell, 1964/2004a and exper-
imentally confirmed by Aspect et al., 1981) to reintroduce a preferred
frame in SR. Popper (1982, 30) thus wrote:
It is only now, in the light of the new experiments stem-
ming from Bell’s work, that the suggestion of replacing
Einstein’s interpretation by Lorentz’s can be made. If
there is action at a distance, then there is something like
absolute space. If we now have theoretical reasons from
quantum theory for introducting absolute simultaneity,
then we would have to go back to Lorentz’s interpretation.
Before continuing, it bears repeating that the no-signalling theorem
(Redhead, 1989) ensures that non-local correlations cannot be used
to send superluminal signals or any other information across space-
like hypersurfaces. As such, non-local correlations cannot be used to
empirically detect the preferred frame. The preferred frame, while
metaphysically distinguished, is bound to remain hidden. While this
empirically ensures a ‘peaceful co-existence’ between QM and SR (Shi-
mony, 1984), theoretically and metaphysically the tensions between QM
and SR are not so easy to ignore, as Bell himself knew all too well.56
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ . To see how quantum non-locality may force a
preferred foliation upon spacetime by entailing a notion of absolute
simultaneity, I here follow the discussion in Callender (2008) (see also
Callender, 2017, 84-94 and Aharonov and Albert, 1981 for more de-
tails). Consider Bohm’s reformulation of the famous EPR paradox
(Einstein et al., 1935, Bohm, 1951). A pair of spin 1/2 particles (say
two electrons), labeled 1 and 2, is generated by a common source S
in the singlet state:∂ ã = 1”
2
(∂ xã1 ∂⇤xã2   ∂⇤xã1 ∂ xã2) . (12)
Both electrons are sent in opposite directions, with electron 1 moving
to the left and electron 2 moving to the right. In the Minkowski
diagram in Figure 15, L and R are two spacelike separated events. At
L, the x-spin of electron 1 is measured; at R, the z-spin of electron 2 is
measured. Finally, let us introduce two inertial observers, Alice and
Bob, who are in relative motion with respect to each other, and thus
foliate Minkowski spacetime differently, as indicated in Figure 15 by
the foliations tA and tB respectively.
56 According to Bell (2004b, 172), there exists “an apparent incompatibility, at the deep-
est level, between the two fundamental pillars of contemporary theory”.
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Figure 15: A relativistic EPR experiment as seen from the perspectives of
Alice and Bob. Figure adapted from Callender (2008).
For Alice, the situation looks as follows. At time tA = 1, the electrons
are in the singlet state:
∂ ãA;1 = 1”
2
(∂ xã1 ∂⇤xã2   ∂⇤xã1 ∂ xã2) . (13)
But at tA = 3, the x-spin of electron 1 is measured at L. Both outcomes
are equiprobable, but suppose that the electron is measured to be x-
spin up. This implies that the superposed singlet state (13) must have
collapsed to the first term:
∂ ãA;3 = ∂ xã1 ∂⇤xã2 . (14)
At tA = 4, the z-spin of electron 2 is measured at R. Since the singlet
state collapsed at tA = 3, electron 2 is determinately x-spin down, as
indicated in (14). There thus is an equal chance of obtaining z-spin
up or z-spin down. Assuming the former, the wavefunction becomes:
∂ ãA;4 = ∂ xã1 ∂ zã2 . (15)
Now let us move to Bob’s perspective. At time tB = 1, the system is
in the singlet state (12), which can be rewritten in the z-spin basis as:
∂ ãB;1 = 1”
2
(∂ zã1 ∂⇤zã2   ∂⇤zã1 ∂ zã2) . (16)
At tB = 3, the z-spin of electron 2 is measured to be z-spin up at R,
implying a collapse to the second term:
∂ ãB;3 = ∂⇤zã1 ∂ zã2 . (17)
Finally, at tB = 4, the x-spin of electron 1 is measured to be x-spin up
at L, reducing the wavefunction to:
∂ ãB;4 = ∂ xã1 ∂ zã2 . (18)
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Here is the problem. First, Alice and Bob disagree on which measure-
ment, L or R, caused the collapse of the singlet state. Alice says L;
Bob claims R. Second, the histories as told by Alice and Bob are com-
pletely different. Although the initial and final states at tA/B = 1 and
tA/B = 4 agree on both accounts, the intermediate states at tA/B = 3
are clearly incompatible. As Callender (2017, 88) points out, “if we
take the wavefunction at all seriously disagreements like this will not
do.” Either Alice is right and Bob is wrong, or vice versa. In any case,
by insisting on one (and only one) correct story, we must assume a
preferred foliation of Minkowski spacetime.
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Although this is congenial to the
presentist dream of reintroducing absolute time and temporal becom-
ing, it threatens the eternalist outlook and the validity of the RPM
argument. However, the argument just given relies on a collapse in-
terpretation of QM (such as the Copenhagen interpretation or GRW
theory). Most hidden-variable interpretations (such as Bohmian me-
chanics) also demand a preferred frame. But epistemic interpreta-
tions (such as Qbism) or retrocausal interpretations (such as the two-
state vector formalism) do not run into this problem. It also remains
a matter of debate as to how a relative-state formulation of QM fares
in view of the above (see Bacciagaluppi, 2002, Brown and Timpson,
2016, Norsen, 2016, Vaidman, 2016), and the same can be said for
most modal interpretations. It suffices, therefore, for the eternalist to
point at any of these interpretations as a possible way out.
Finally, even if we were to adopt a collapse or hidden-variable in-
terpretation with a preferred foliation of spacetime, we would still
face what Callender (2008, 2017) calls the coordination problem: why
should the metaphysically preferred foliation according to which the
world unfolds coincide with the physically preferred foliation which
quantum mechanics postulates?
￿.￿￿ The triviality objection
According to the final objection, the presentism–eternalism debate is
a “pseudo-debate” (Dorato, 2008, 66). That is, the ontological dispute
between presentists and eternalists lacks substance and is therefore
without meaning. To see this, consider the two different senses of the
copula ‘is’:57
57 Savitt (2006) distinguishes no less than five temporal senses of the copula is. Besides
the tensed and tenseless sense, as defined below, Savitt also differentiates between
the omnitemporal and transtemporal sense of the copula is, where e is real ø e is
always real in the former sense, and e is real ø e is real during a certain amount
of time in the latter. Finally, Savitt introduces the atemporal sense of the copula is
where e is real ø e is timelessly real, in order to cash out the difference between
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1. Tensed sense: an event e is real ø e is real now.
2. Tenseless sense: an event e is real ø e was real in the past, is
real now, or will be real in the future.
Now recall the presentist credo:
i. Any future event f is not real, as of now.
ii. Any past event p is not real, as of now.
But which sense of the copula ‘is’ is being used here?
1. Tensed sense: the future event f is not real now; the past event p
is not real now.
2. Tenseless sense: the future event f was not real in the past, is not
real now, and will not be real in the future; similarly for the past
event p.
On a tensed reading, the presentist credo is trivially true, and no
different from the eternalist credo. After all, both presentists and
eternalists agree that future and past events are not real now. On
a tenseless reading, however, the presentist credo leads to an out-
right contradiction. Hence, Dorato (2008) concludes that presentism
is “caught between the Scylla of a triviality [and] the Charybdis of a
contradiction” (p. 66). Or even shorter, “presentism is either trivial or
untenable” (Meyer, 2005, 213). Call this the triviality objection.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . The triviality objection was first
voiced by Callender (2000, S588) who admits that “it’s not obvious
that the two views [presentism vs. eternalism] differ over much.” In
order to illustrate his point, Callender introduces the lightbulbs from
§2. Recall that a particular lightbulb is on when the corresponding
event is real, and off when that event is not real. The presentism–
eternalism debate then revolves around the following question: are
non-present (past or future) lights on or off?58
The problem is that no-one can go out and check, as we are all
stuck in the present. That is, unless we are in the past or future, we
cannot possibly see past or future lightbulbs. Callender likens it to
the question: is the refrigerator light on or off when you close the
door? Here as well, we can only check by opening the door.
The refrigerator analogy, however, only goes that far. Whereas the
refrigerator presentist and eternalist at least agree on the presence of
a lightbulb inside the fridge, the temporal presentist maintains that
whenever a lightbulb is off, it does not exist. Only bulbs that are on
concrete and abstract existence. Numbers, classes and other mathematical objects,
for instance, can only be real in this atemporal sense.
58 ‘off’ exclaims the presentist; ‘on’ blurts the eternalist.
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exist. The sum total of physical existence, then, consists of lightbulbs
that are on. But this is exactly what the eternalist maintains as well.
Callender thus wonders where the conflict really lies.
Since then, the same objection has been raised independently by
Dorato (2006), Dolev (2006) and Savitt (2006) (see also Meyer, 2005).
Dolev (2006, 182) thus deplores the tendency to “parade arguments,
and invoke scientific theories, in support of views that cannot even
be intelligibly stated, or for settling a matter that has not been given
a meaningful formulation”.59
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Putnam was known to change his philosophical
views rather frequently, and should be applauded for it. Interestingly,
in 2008 Putnam also had a major change of heart with respect to the
RPM argument. Once a staunch eternalist, Putnam now announced
defeat. Not because of any of the previously mentioned objections,60
but because of the triviality objection just developped.
One reason for this sudden turnaround has to do with the fact that
Yuval Dolev, an active proponent of the triviality view, worked as a
PhD student under Putnam’s supervision.61 Putnam (2008, 71) thus
admitted that “Yuval Dolev, Mauro Dorato, and Steven Savitt are ab-
solutely right, and that the question whether the past and the future
are ‘real’ is a pseudo-question.” According to Putnam, not much sur-
vives of the original RPM argument, in view of these criticisms. Only
the truth argument, as developped in §3.2, still holds true.
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . The triviality objection, however, is
not without counterobjections. I think Callender is mistaken, and that
the triviality argument is without force. It suffices to compare which
lightbulbs are on for the presentist and for the eternalist in Figure 2
to see that the former set is a proper subset of the latter set. Clearly
then, presentism and eternalism are metaphysically distinct. Even if
both agree that all and only lighted bulbs are real, they nonetheless
have different ontologies. Reality for the presentist is but a subset of
reality for the eternalist.
Wüthrich (2010) debunks the triviality objection in essentially the
same manner. “The sum total of physical existence, according to the
presentist, can be organized in a three-dimensional manifold”, writes
Wuthrich. “In contrast, eternalists consider the full four-dimensional
‘block universe’ as the sum total of existence” (p. 441). That is, the
eternalist and (hyperplane) presentist give fundamentally different
59 The argument here could be the RPM argument, the scientific theory SR, and the
view it supports eternalism.
60 Putnam (2008, 71), for instance, explicitly said that he was “not convinced by a well
known criticism due to Howard Stein.”
61 Personal communication between Putnam and Dorato. See Dorato (2008).
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answers to the dimensionality question. Whereas the eternalist quan-
tifies over all events in M when quantifying over all real events,
the presentist first partitionsM into past, present and future events,
and merely quantifies over the equivalence class of present events
(Wüthrich, 2013).
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
I began this chapter with the reality question and the dimensionality
question, and briefly considered the presentist and eternalist answers
to it. The RPM argument purports to establish eternalism and four-
dimensionalism on the basis of SR. However, in view of the objections
raised in §§4.1–4.11, it is clear that the RPM argument is not without
problems. Each of its premises can be questioned, and it is doubtful
whether the RPM argument can survive the transition to a general
relativistic or quantum setting.
But rejecting the RPM argument does not establish presentism and
three-dimensionalism either. The presentism–eternalism debate may
give the wrong impression that the philosopher of time is dealing
with an either-or situation, whereas in actuality other metaphysical
positions are on offer too, such as possibilism (or historicism) or the
so-called moving spotlight theory (see Chapter 2). Not only that,
even presentism comes in mutually contradictory flavours. Whereas
the point presentist reduces reality to a point and takes the world
to be zero-dimensional, for example, the bow-tie presentist considers
the entire elsewhere to be real, and agrees with the eternalist that
the world has both spatial and temporal extension. Each variety of
presentism has its advantages and disadvantages, and it is not clear
which one we should adopt. Finally, presentism has to deal with its
own set of problems — metatime being just one major, unresolved,
problem.62
Returning to the RPM argument, the soundness of the argument
hinges, above all, on our interpretation of reality, and in particular
on the alleged transitivity of the reality relation R and its intimate
link with the simultaneity of events. Since the reality relation does
not belong to the formalism of SR, SR alone cannot answer the reality
and dimensionality question. Indeed, despite claims to the contrary,
SR leaves the debate on the reality and dimensionality of our world
underdetermined. What is needed in order to answer these questions
are additional metaphysical assumptions and presuppositions, which
fall outside the scope of SR.
62 Metatime seems a prerequisite for the present to undergo a dynamical updating. See
Wüthrich (2013) and Chapter 2.
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This resonates with the verdict drawn by Sklar (1974, 272): SR
“throws novel light on the philosophical questions, but it is unable
by itself to resolve fully the long-standing philosophical issues.” That
is, “acceptance of relativity cannot force one into the acceptance or re-
jection of any of the traditional metaphysical views about the reality
of past and future” events, dixit Sklar (1981, 140). Dieks (1991, 259)
concurs that “the theory of relativity does not enforce a particular
philosophical position concerning the absolute differences between
past, present and future.” Wüthrich (2013, 20), finally, concludes that
“fundamental physics does not uniquely determine the metaphysics
of time [but] it does impose constraints which any naturalist worth
her salt must respect.” Indeed, the metaphysics of time will always
be constrained by the straightjacket of physics, but physics alone is
powerless at settling the presentism–eternalism debate. The underde-
termination of metaphysics by physics is here to stay.
Chapter 2
FOUR DEGREES OFTEMPORAL BECOMING
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
The block universe theory of time is commonly held to be incompat-
ible with temporal becoming. This confuses Maudlin who upholds
both eternalism and passage. The aim of this chapter is to answer
Maudlin’s plea for clarification by distinguishing four degrees of tem-
poral becoming: (1) absolute becoming, (2) relational becoming, (3)
presentist becoming and (4) dynamic becoming. After discussing
their respective compatibility with the block universe, I argue that
Maudlin subscribes to a much more deflated form of becoming as
compared to most philosophers of time. Consequently, his form of
becoming is compatible with the block universe, whereas the stronger
forms of becoming are not.
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The Moving Finger writes; and, having writ,
Moves on: nor all thy Piety nor Wit
Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line,
Nor all thy Tears wash out a Word of it.
— The Rubáiyát, Omar Khayyám1
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . In a recent book symposium on
Bradford Skow’s Objective Becoming (2015), Tim Maudlin (2018) dis-
tinguishes the philosophers of time (such as Skow) from the philoso-
phers of physics (such as Maudlin himself). According to him, both
groups have deep interests in the nature of time, but their lingo
only partly overlaps. Philosophers of time write about “tensed” and
“tenseless” theories of time, and about “A-theories” and “B-theories”,
whereas philosophers of physics do not.
“I am not a philosopher of time”, Maudlin (2018, 1807) confesses
right away. “And for the life of me, I still don’t know whether the
views I hold [. . .] constitute a ‘tensed’ or ‘tenseless’ view; an ‘A-
theory’ or a ‘B-theory’ ” (p. 1808).2 Another terminological source
of confusion is Skow’s use of the terms “anemic” and “robust” when
discussing change and passage.
Even more troublesome to Maudlin is the alleged incompatibility
between the block universe (BU) theory of time and robust passage.3
Indeed, most philosophers of time seem to agree that if the BU theory
holds true, then time does not pass. I thus argued in the previous
chapter that the RPM argument for eternalism can also be read as an
argument against temporal becoming. Maudlin, on the other hand,
believes he is committed to both the BU theory of time and passage,
and does not see the problem with that.4
The aim of Maudlin’s book review, therefore, is twofold: first, to
critically comment on Skow’s Objective Becoming (and in particular, on
his use of the terms “anemic” and “robust”); secondly, and perhaps
more importantly, to ask Skow and the other philosophers of time for
clarification. “I just want to know where [my views] fit in the usual
set of distinctions”, writes Maudlin (p. 1808) — hoping that such an
elucidation will help to reunite both camps. “ ‘Tis a consumation
devoutly to be wished”, he concludes (p. 1814).
1 Quoted from FitzGerald (2009, 41).
2 In his reply to Maudlin, Skow (2018a) briefly addresses this issue, but Skow seems
to be as confused about Maudlin’s views of time as Maudlin is about Skow’s.
3 Maudlin (2018, 1809) thus writes: “when Skow frames the debate as between ‘the
block universe and robust passage’ I am again stymied.”
4 The views of Skow and Maudlin actually do not seem to diverge that much. Skow
(2018a, 1822), for one, admits that: “I accept the block universe theory, and I also
think that time passes”.
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￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . The goal of the present
chapter is to answer — at least in part — Maudlin’s plea for clarifi-
cation by distinguishing four degrees of temporal becoming: (1) absolute
becoming, (2) relational becoming, (3) presentist becoming and (4)
dynamic becoming.5 The higher the degree, the stronger the form of
becoming and, I argue, the less compatible with the BU ontology.
I show that Maudlin’s view on the passage of time corresponds to
a form of relational becoming, whereas Skow’s view on robust pas-
sage seems to correspond to a form of dynamic becoming. Maudlin
thus subscribes to a strongly deflated form of becoming as compared
to Skow’s robust becoming. This, I contend, explains why Maudlin
maintains the passage of time to be compatible with the BU, and
Skow does not.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . The current chapter is divided into two parts. In the first
part (§2), I offer a tentative characterisation of the notion of temporal
becoming. I use it to distinguish four degrees of temporal becoming
and subsequently take a closer look at each form of becoming (§§2.1–
2.4).
In the second part (§3), I briefly discuss the compatibility of each
form of becoming with the BU. I show that absolute becoming is
the only form of becoming which is truly compatible with the BU.
But I argue that this form is too deflated to be worthy of the name
‘becoming’. Indeed, as far as I know, no-one actually subscribes to
this view. Presentist becoming and dynamic becoming, on the other
hand, are clearly incompatible with the BU. The situation, I conclude,
is much less clear when it comes to relational becoming, and will
force us to investigate the direction of time in the following chapter.
￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ’￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Everyone is familiar with time’s transi-
tory character. We all share the impression that time flows or passes.
But does it really? Is the flow of time — or temporal becoming as
philosophers like to call it — an objective feature of reality, or is it
(merely) a subjective feature of human experience? Does temporal
becoming belong to physics or to psychology? Is it part and parcel of
the scientific image or of the manifest image?
In this chapter I will entertain the former position. In accordance
with Norton (2010, 24), I will thus treat our sense of temporal passage
as reflecting “a fact about the way time truly is, objectively.” That
5 The four degrees of temporal becoming, to be outlined in this chapter, are not related
to the four kinds of temporal becoming as outlined in Fitzgerald (1985).
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is, even if we were not around to experience it, the passage of time
would still obtain.
A first question then is: What exactly does the passage of time
consist in? According to Pooley (2013, 321), “time’s alleged passage
is notoriously difficult to pin down.” The problem is that the passage
of time is at once familiar and baffling (Prosser, 2016, 315). We are
familiar with temporal becoming; yet, we would be hard pressed to
come up with a precise definition of it. This worriment already befell
Saint Augustine who confessed that “if no one asks me, I know. But
if I wish to explain it to one that asketh, I know not” (Watts, 1912,
239).
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . As a result, humankind has used
all kinds of metaphors to capture time’s transitory aspect. Omar
Khayyám’s quatrain at the beginning of this chapter is but one poetic
attempt at capturing time’s relentless march from past to future. The
romantic poet Charles Cowded Clarke in his 1875 sonnet The Course
of Time referred to “the vast wheel of time, That round and round
still turns with onward might”, whereas George Santayana (1938, 85)
compared “the essence of nowness” to fire running “along the fuse
of time.”
In general, though, there seem to be two ways of expressing the
passage of time (Smart, 1949):6
1. Passive way: Time is stationary and we advance through time,
much like a ship advancing through the sea.
2. Active way: We are stationary and time streams past us, much
like a river streaming underneath us on a bridge.
Eddington (1920, 51) preferred the passive view when he said that
“events do not happen; they are just there and we come across them.”
Weyl (1949, 116) similarly pointed out that:
Only to the gaze of my consciousness, crawling upward
along the life line of my body, does a section of this world
come to life as a fleeting image in space which continu-
ously changes in time.
The lyrical poet Andrew Marvell, on the other hand, preferred the
active view when he spoke of “time’s wingèd chariot hurrying near”
(Craze, 1979, 317). We also speak of time flying or fleeing (tempus
fugit), and of the relentless flow of the mighty river of time.
6 Just as with passive and active symmetry transformations, both ways of expressing
the passage of time are supposed to be equivalent.
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￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Unfortunately, all of these metaphors
remain vague and incomplete at best, or downright wrong and mis-
leading at worst. So how is one to characterise the passage of time in
non-metaphorical terms? Here is a recent attempt by Norton (2010):
Time passes. Nothing fancy is meant by that. It is just the
mundane fact known to all of us that future events will
become present and then drift off into the past (p. 24).
Smart (1949, 483) likewise said that events “approach from the future,
are momentarily in the present, and then recede further and further
into the past.” And here is Broad (1938, 266) expounding the very
same idea:
An experience is at one time wholly in the future, as when
one says ‘I am going to have a painful experience at the
dentist’s tomorrow.’ It keeps on becoming less and less re-
motely future. Eventually the earliest phase of it becomes
present; as when the dentist begins drilling one’s tooth,
and one thinks or says ‘The painful experience I have
been anticipating has now begun.’ Each phase ceases to
be present, slips into the immediate past, and then keeps
on becoming more and more remotely past.
As time passes, in other words, the history of our world unfolds. To
many, this strongly suggests there being a unique set of global nows
successively coming into being. The passage of time then refers to the
movement of this objectively privileged present along the temporal
dimension (more on this in §§2.3 and 2.4).
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . On the basis of this (admittedly still
rough) characterisation of temporal becoming, Price (2011, 210) has
identified three paths to passage — three requirements that should be
satisfied if we are to fully capture our intuitive notion of the passage
of time:
(1) Temporal orientation: The view that time has an objec-
tive direction; that it is an objective matter which of
two non-simultaneous events is the earlier and which
the later;
(2) Distinguished present: The view that the present mo-
ment is objectively distinguished;
(3) Dynamic flow: The view that there is something objec-
tively dynamic, flux-like, or “flow-like” about time.
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Table 1: Four degrees of temporal becoming.
Kind of Temporal Distinguished Dynamic Tensed Dynamic
becoming orientation present flow becoming becoming
Absolute No No No No No
Relational Yes No No No No
Presentist Yes Yes No Yes No
Dynamic Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . In what follows, I will
speak of dynamic becoming (or dynamic passage) when all of Price’s
requirements are met. It should be clear, however, that weaker (de-
flated) notions of becoming can be obtained by satisfying only one or
two of the above requirements.
One could, for instance, endow the spacetime under consideration
with a temporal orientation and an objectively privileged present,
without making that present move — thereby meeting requirements
(1) and (2), but not (3). Or one could introduce a temporal orienta-
tion, and leave it at that — satisfying requirement (1), but not (2) and
(3). Some even claim that sense can be made of temporal becoming
without meeting any of the above requirements.
Clearly then, four kinds of temporal becoming can be distinguished
(Table 1). A precise definition of each kind of temporal becoming will
be provided further on. For the moment, suffice it to say that as you
go down the list, more requirements are met, resulting in stronger
kinds of becoming. We thus obtain a hierarchy of forms — or degrees
— of temporal becoming, with absolute becoming the weakest, and
dynamic becoming the strongest form of temporal becoming.
Each kind of temporal becoming presupposes the previous kinds.
That is, relational becoming presupposes absolute becoming; presen-
tist becoming presupposes relational becoming; and dynamic becom-
ing presupposes presentist becoming.
The distinction between absolute and relational becoming was first
made by Dorato (2006).7 Both absolute and relational becoming are
examples of what I will call tenseless becoming, or B-series becom-
ing. Presentist becoming and dynamic becoming, on the other hand,
are examples of tensed becoming, or A-series becoming. Absolute,
relational and presentist becoming are static (Parmenidean) forms of
becoming, whereas dynamic becoming is obviously dynamic (Hera-
clitean).8 Once again, what Price (2011) calls real, objective becoming
corresponds here to dynamic becoming.
7 Note that this distinction is completely unrelated to the debate on whether space
and time are absolute or relational in character.
8 These notions will be further explained in the sections §§2.1–2.4 to come.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 77
Unfortunately, these four kinds of becoming are often conflated
in the philosophical literature. As a result, many philosophers of
time and physics talk past each other, muddling an already muddled
debate.9 In what follows, I critically discuss each kind of temporal
becoming (§§2.1–2.4), before gauging their compatibility with the BU
theory of time (§3).
One last remark: in order to keep the discussion focussed, I will
limit myself to a study of temporal becoming in a (special or general)
relativistic setting. That is, I will not analyse the nature of becoming
in quantum mechanics, quantum field theory or theories of quantum
gravity.
￿.￿ Absolute becoming
The notion of absolute becoming has been independently defended
by Savitt (2002), Dorato (2002, 2006), and Dieks (2006) in an attempt to
make room for temporal becoming in the BU. Compared to the other
kinds of becoming, this is by far the most deflated form. The coming
into being of an event, on this account, is nothing but its happening.
“Events come into being by occuring, by happening”, holds Dieks
(2006, 170), “what other coming into being could there be?” Here
then is my definition of absolute becoming (see also Dorato, 2006):
Definition 1. Absolute becoming: Let ÖM,gabã be a relativistic
spacetime, and consider an event a " M.10 To say that a becomes
(or comes into being) at that spacetime point means that a occurs or
happens at that point.
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . The notion of absolute becom-
ing is certainly now new. It originated in Broad’s careful analysis of
McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time (Broad, 1938). Indeed,
9 Price (2011) concurs that his three paths to passage — and, by extension, my four
degrees of becoming — “have not been sufficiently distinguished, either by defend-
ers or critics of the notion of objective passage — a fact which has allowed the two
sides to talk past one another, in various ways.”
10 A general relativistic spacetime is an ordered pair ÖM,gabã whereM is a smooth,
connected, n-dimensional manifold (n ' 2, usually n = 4) and gab is a smooth
Lorentzian metric on all ofM. Each element a ofM represents a spacetime point or
event. Two remarks are in order. First, we are treating events in an idealized way by
restricting our attention to point-events which happen at a spacetime point, rather
than at a spacetime region, and thus have no spatial extension nor temporal duration.
Examples of such idealized point-events include the collision of two particles, the
lighting of a firecracker, the decay of an elementary particle, or an instant in the
history of a photon. Second, it is useful to distinguish between spacetime points and
point-events: spacetime points belong to the manifold M, whereas point-events are
what potentially happens at those points. A point-event, such as the collision of two
particles, can of course occur at different spacetime points. See also the Appendix.
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it was Broad who coined the term ‘absolute becoming’ to convey the
idea that “to ‘become present’ is, in fact, just to ‘become’, in an abso-
lute sense [. . .] or, most simply, to ‘happen’.”
A few years later, Williams, in his paper The Myth of Passage
(1951),11 similarly maintained that “taking place is not a formality
to which an event incidentally submits — it is the event’s very being”
(p. 464). Hence, according to Williams, “there is passage, but it is
nothing extra. It is the mere happening of things” (p. 463). “World
history”, for Williams, “consists of actual concrete happenings”, and
that is all there is to the matter (p. 464).
The quest for anything extra that would capture the true passage
of time — whether that be something active or moving, a dynamic
essence, a transitory aspect, or some other ingredient — would be an
“altogether false start”, according to Williams (p. 102). There simply is
nothing over and above “the spread of events in space-time” (p. 153)
— nothing dynamic, nothing transitory, and nothing flux- or flow-like.
Williams called this “the doctrine of the manifold”.12
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿- ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Far from everyone is convinced by
this deflationary analysis of temporal becoming. In a recent paper,
Leininger (2018, 109) wrote that “this kind of passage is no more
than a clock showing different times at different moments.” Accord-
ing to Earman (2008, 159), absolute becoming is at best “a thin and
yawn-inducing” sense of becoming. Finally, in the words of Pooley
(2013, 326), the “advocates [of absolute becoming] seem to be making
heavy weather of facts that (almost) no one has ever denied.” What is
worse, they divert the “attention from the key challenge [. . .], namely,
that of providing [an] explanation of why we are inclined to take
the ‘becoming more past’ of events as an objective feature of reality”
(p. 326).
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Let me stress that as long as we
consider absolute becoming, “we are abstracting from the spatial and
temporal relations that an event e bears to other events” (Dorato, 2006,
563). As Dorato argues, even in a universe consisting of a single event,
there would be absolute becoming. But as soon as more than one
event is present, we can study the spatiotemporal relations between
them. This brings me to the second degree of temporal becoming —
relational becoming.
11 The Myth of Passage was later reprinted, with minor modifications, in Gale (1968).




The proponents of absolute becoming (referred to above), I maintain,
do not actually endorse the admittedly bare and absolute notion of
becoming, as given in definition 1. Instead, they all go further by
advocating a slightly stronger (but importantly different) notion of
temporal becoming which I claim is more appropriately classified as
relational becoming.
According to Dieks (2006, 171), for example, “becoming is nothing
but the happening of events, in their temporal order” (emphasis added).
Savitt (2002, 157) also maintains that “true and literal passage is the
ordered occurrence of [. . .] events in the manifold” (emphasis added).
Williams (1951, 464), finally, concurs that the passage of time “con-
sists of actual concrete happenings in a temporal sequence” (emphasis
added).13
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Clearly then, the idea behind all this
is that spacetime is not a structureless set of unrelated events, but a
spatiotemporal “network of happenings” (Dieks, 2006, 173). Indeed,
the spacetime manifold has topological structure, affine structure and
metric structure. It is in virtue of this added structure that events
can be temporally related to one another, such that some events are
simultaneous, some are earlier and some later (and some perhaps
unrelated) — yielding a temporally ordered web of events.
The temporal ordering of events is carried out via an asymmetric,
transitive, binary relation such as the earlier-than relation E or the
later-than relation L. Of course, the order thus obtained need not be
total. Classical Newtonian spacetime can be foliated into simultane-
ity hypersurfaces that are totally ordered. But in special and general
relativity, the lightcone structure only imposes a partial order on all
events, such that for any event a " M, all events p in its past light-
cone are earlier than a (pEa), all events f in its future lightcone are
later than a (aEf), and all events o outside the two lightcones are not
temporally ordered with respect to a.
For the proponents of relational becoming, this is all we need to
make sense of the passage of time. Those events which are earlier
than a have already become; those which are later than a have not
13 Most proponents of absolute becoming fail to distinguish absolute from relational
becoming, in the way Dorato (2006) has done, and I do here. For them, relational
becoming is part of the definition of absolute becoming. Consider, for instance,
Savitt (2002, 160) who maintains that “absolute becoming is the ordered occurrence
of [. . .] events” (emphasis added). The accounts of absolute becoming, advocated
by Dieks, Savitt and Williams, thus fall under the category of relational becoming,
which seems to suggest that no one actually defends bare absolute becoming.
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yet become. Here then is my definition of relational becoming (see
also Dorato, 2006):14
Definition 2. Relational becoming: Let ÖM,gabã be a relativistic
spacetime, and consider a pair of events a,b " M. Let B be a two-
place relation of becoming. To say that a has become for bmeans that
a and b are related by B such that aBb.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Typically, the becoming relation B is
taken to be the earlier-than relation E. However, in order for the
earlier-than relation E to exist, and to be used to temporally relate the
web of events, the spacetime under consideration must be temporally
oriented. That is to say, at every point of spacetime, the past-to-future
direction has to be specified. If this were not the case, then there
would be no way to tell for any pair of timelike separated events a,
b "M whether aEb or bEa. That is, without a temporal orientation,
a and b cannot be temporally ordered.15
In short, since relational becoming assumes there to be a temporal
order, it must assume spacetime to be temporally oriented. Nothing
new is being said here. Yet, it is surprising how little attention this
well-known fact has received in the philosophical literature. It is an
open question, after all, whether all temporally orientable spacetimes
come equipped with a temporal orientation. All too often, a temporal
orientation is merely postulated without explaining where it comes
from.16
￿- ￿￿￿ ￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . One exception is Maudlin, who
has stressed the need of a temporal orientation for relational becom-
ing in terms of the B- and C-series of McTaggart (1908).17 In the
A-series, it will be recalled, events are ordered as past, present and
future.18 In the B-series, events are ordered as earlier-than, later-than
and simultaneous-with.19 In the C-series, finally, no such temporal
asymmetry is posited, and events are ordered via a ternary between-
14 Note that what Skow (2015) calls “anemic” passage is actually very close (if not
identical) to relational becoming as defined here (see also Leininger, 2018). Indeed,
Skow (2018a, 1823) subscribes to the definition of anemic passage as given in Deasy
(2018) according to which “the passage of time is anemic iff the following is true: if
there is a time later than this one, then in virtue of this fact time is passing”.
15 Without an orientation, one could, at most, say that a and b are timelike, rather than
spacelike or lightlike, separated.
16 I will briefly return to this point in §3 and at length in Chapter 3.
17 McTaggart’s paper The Unreality of Time later reappeared as chapter 33, Time, in his
1927 volume The Nature of Existence (McTaggart, 1927).
18 Events are said to possess intrinsic, monadic temporal properties of being present,
or being past or future to differing degrees. See also the Introduction.
19 Whereas the A-properties are constantly changing (at least on the standard view),
the B-relations are eternal.
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ness relation, rather than via the binary earlier-than or later-than re-
lation. Hence, what makes the C-series fundamentally unlike the
A- and B-series is that it lacks a temporal orientation.20 Hence, in
developing his account of relational becoming, Maudlin (2007b, 126)
argues:
The theory of time’s passage I defend focuses on the B-
series: all events are ordered by a transitive, asymmet-
rical relation of earlier and later. [. . .] Any theory that
denies a fundamental asymmetric relation of earlier than
(or later than), and hence denies an intrinsic direction of
time, ought not to be called a B-series theory but rather a
C-series theory. So I am not arguing for an A-series theory
over a B-series theory, I am arguing for a B-series theory
over a C-series theory.
Two types of relational becoming can thus be distinguished: B-
theoretic versus C-theoretic relational becoming. Whereas C-theoretic
relational becoming requires spacetime to be temporally orientable, B-
theoretic relational becoming requires the spacetime to be temporally
oriented. To the best of my knowledge, no one currently advocates the
C-theoretic version. Even Dieks, Savitt and Williams above assume
spacetime to be temporally oriented. So if no one actually subscribes
to either absolute becoming (as argued above, see also footnote 13) or
C-theoretic relational becoming, then B-theoretic relational becoming
would seem to be the weakest form of temporal becoming currently
taken seriously in the literature.
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿? Before we continue, let us briefly take
stock of what we have seen so far by considering the pair of events
a,b "M in Figure 16. Absolute becoming says that:
1. Since a occurs at ⌧0, it becomes at ⌧0;
2. Since b occurs at ⌧1, it becomes at ⌧1.
Relational becoming (of the B-theoretic type) additionally says that
3. Since ⌧0 < ⌧1, a occurs before b; hence, a has become for b.
In short, aEb º aBb. All of these facts can of course be repre-
sented in a traditional spacetime diagram, such as Figure 16.
To most proponents of temporal becoming, however, the above ac-
count is still too modest and weak. Where, they will ask, is “the whiz
20 To put it differently, whereas the B-series is anisotropic, the C-series is isotropic. The





Figure 16: Diagram of time-oriented Minkowski spacetime ÖM,⌘ab,  ã
with two events a,b "M and their respective lightcones.
and go” (Savitt, 2002, 162)? How can a static representation, such as
Figure 16, capture the dynamic unfolding of our world?
Savitt (2002, 163) responded (correctly in my opinion) that one
should not confuse a “static representation with a representation of
stasis.” That is, “we do not need an animated picture to have a pic-
ture of animation.” Dieks (2006, 172) concurs that “the fact that the
block diagram [. . .] does not ‘flow’ is irrelevant for the status of what
is being depicted.” Maudlin (2007b, 140), finally, joins forces in noting
that “mathematical objects are, in their own nature, ‘static’.” Hence, it
is only natural that we find them inadequate to represent the passage
of time, but in Maudlin’s opinion this “apparent inadequacy must be
an illusion” (p. 142).
￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿? The worry nonetheless re-
mains that the mere presence of a temporally ordered set of events
is not sufficient to capture the passage of time. After all, a stack of
papers can be ordered too (e.g. a book with pages running from 1 to
some higher number), but surely, dixit Dieks (2006, 170), “the papers
do not come into successive existence by virtue of this.” Likewise,
events can be spatially ordered, but this does not seem sufficient to
justify the existence of spatial becoming (or the ‘flow’ of space).
So, how is a temporally ordered set of events different from a spa-
tially ordered one, or from a linearly ordered stack of papers? Here,
the answers by the advocates of relational becoming diverge. For
Dieks (2006), the answer lies in the fundamental difference between
space and time. Even in relativity theory, where “space by itself, and
time by itself, are doomed to fade away into mere shadows” (Lorentz
et al., 1952, 75), the three spatial dimensions remain distinct from the
temporal one. This is made explicit, for instance, in the ( ,+,+,+)
signature of the metric tensor which assigns a + to the three spatial
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coordinates and a   to the temporal coordinate (see the Appendix).21
Dieks’s earlier quote thus misses the mark: a stack of papers does not
become because they are stacked in space; a temporally ordered set
of events, in contrast, does become because they are ‘stacked’ in time.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿? Maudlin (2007b, 109) likewise con-
cedes that “the passage of time connotes more than just an intrinsic
asymmetry” (emphasis added). There is more to the passage of time,
in Maudlin’s view, than the mere presence of a temporal orientation.
For Maudlin (2007b, 110), there is the additional aspect of “one state
‘coming out of’ or ‘being produced from’ another”. Earlier states pro-
duce later ones; not the other way round. There is, in other words, an
important asymmetry in our explanatory scheme:
The [. . .] final state is accounted for as the product of an
evolution from a [. . .] initial state in a way that the initial
state cannot be explained as a product of evolution from
a [. . .] final state. (Maudlin, 2007b, 133)
Although this is in line with Maudlin’s primitivist view of laws, it
does run against the more traditional Humean account of laws. The
doctrine of Humean superveniencewas first established by David Lewis
(1986, x):
Humean supervenience is named in honor of the greater
denier of necessary connections. It is the doctrine that
all there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of
fact, just one little thing and then another. [. . .] We have ge-
ometry: a system of external relations of spatio-temporal
distance between points. Maybe points of spacetime itself,
maybe point-sized bits of matter or aether fields, maybe
both. And at those points we have local qualities: per-
fectly natural intrinsic properties which need nothing big-
ger than a point at which to be instantiated. For short: we
have an arrangement of qualities. And that is all. All else
supervenes on that.
Reality, according to the Humean view, is a distribution of stuff
throughout space and time, called the Humean mosaic. The laws of
nature are nothing but patterns in this mosaic; they merely describe
the regularities in nature. This is also called the regularity view of laws.
The laws of nature, in other words, supervene on the Humean mosaic.
21 Alternatively, one might choose to use a metric whose signature is (+, , , ).
Which signature is selected, is a matter of convention. What is important is that
in both cases the signature clearly differentiates the spacelike from the timelike di-
rections.
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They are humankind’s attempt to understand the world, which itself
is a lawless place.
Maudlin’s view, in contrast, is anti-Humean. The laws of nature
do not describe, but prescribe. They determine, govern, control, rule
and dictate; they tell nature what to do. The “laws of nature”, writes
Maudlin (2007a, 1), “stand in no need of ‘philosophical analysis’; they
ought to be posited as ontological bedrock.” They are prior to the
Humean mosaic. Or, to put it yet differently, the Humean mosaic
supervenes on the laws, not the other way round.
Corresponding to Maudlin’s primitivism about laws of nature is
also a primitivism about the arrow of time, as I explain in Chapter 3.
However, even if one were to endorse Maudlin’s primitivist approach,
it is not clear whether this would satisfy everyone’s appetite for real,
robust becoming. Now those who remain unconvinced that relational
becoming fully captures the transitory aspects of time should look
for ways to expand the notion. This will lead to the next two degrees
of temporal becoming: presentist becoming and dynamic becoming.
Before I look at these notions, however, let me conclude this section
by considering two examples of relational becoming. The first one
was proposed, a long time ago, by Stein (1991) (§2.2.1); the second
one is currently endorsed by Maudlin (2002, 2007b) (§2.2.2).
￿.￿.￿ Steinian becoming
At first sight, the theory of special relativity seems rather hostile to the
idea of temporal becoming. Indeed, Gödel (1949) famously argued
against temporal becoming on the basis of the relativity of simultane-
ity (see also §2.3). Rietdijk (1966), Putnam (1967) and Maxwell (1985)
independently reached much the same conclusion. Call this the RPM
argument against becoming (see also Chapter 1). An important coun-
terargument, however, was developed by Stein (1968, 1991), and was
further generalized by Clifton and Hogarth (1995).22 Call this the
SCH argument for becoming.
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . In essence, RPM argue for the BU theory
of time, according to which the future is ontologically determinate
(fixed, actualized); SCH argue that the future is ontologically indeter-
minate (open, potential). Since the passage of time supposedly turns
an indeterminate future into a determinate present, temporal becom-
ing requires an open future. Hence, RPM (indirectly) argue against
temporal becoming, whereas SCH argue for temporal becoming. To
be specific, SCH showed that time-oriented Minkowski spacetime is
compatible with an objective notion of becoming.
22 Stein (1968) was a direct response to Rietdijk (1966) and Putnam (1967), whereas
Stein (1991) was provoked by Maxwell (1985).
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￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Stein considers the beefed-up structure
of time-oriented Minkowski spacetime, denoted M = áR4,⌘ab,  ç,
with   the temporal orientation. He then introduces a binary (two-
place) relation B among the elements of M, where B stands for ‘has
become for’. Then aBb is shorthand for ‘event a has become for event
b’. Stein furthermore requires B to satisfy five (natural) assumptions,
which he deems necessary for a notion of objective becoming:
1. B is definable from time-oriented metrical relations;
2. B is reflexive, i.e. a has already become for a (aBa);
3. B is transitive, i.e. aBb 0 bBc º aBc;
4. B is non-universal, i.e. for any point b, there is a point a such
that ¬aBb;
5. aBb holds whenever a is in the causal past of b, i.e. aJ b º
aBb.23
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Requirement 1 ensures the objectivity of the becoming
relation by demanding that B remains invariant under all automor-
phisms of M preserving the temporal orientation  . Requirements
2 and 3 should be self-explanatory. Requirement 4 demands that
B be different from the universal relation U. After all, the idea of
becoming is that for any event b, some events have become (constitut-
ing the determinate past), whereas other events have not yet become
(constituting the indeterminate future). Since U holds between any
pair of events, no event would be indeterminate for b; there would
be no open future, and thus no becoming. Hence, by requiring B to
be non-universal, Stein’s theorem does not actually prove that there is
temporal becoming; it merely shows temporal becoming to be compat-
ible with Minkowski spacetime (Dorato, 1996). Requirement 5, finally,
can be rewritten in terms of the relation of past causal connectibility
p, such that apb º aBb.
￿￿￿￿￿ ’￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . On the basis of this, Stein (1991) proceeds to
prove the uniqueness of the becoming relation B. To be specific, Stein
shows that if B satisfies all of the constraints above, then B reduces
to (is co-extensional with) the relation of past causal connectibility p.
This, then, is Stein’s theorem:
Theorem 2. Let B be a binary relation among the elements of time-oriented
Minkowski spacetime M = áR4,⌘ab,  ç, where B stands for ‘has become
for’, and where B satisfies the constraints 1 to 5 above. Then for any pair of
events a and b inM, the following holds:
aBb ø apb.
23 J+ (p) and J  (p) denote the causal future and past of an event p "M. For more on






Figure 17: The past, present and future for b as per Steinian becoming.
That is, a has become for b iff a is in the causal past of b. t
This shows, contra RPM, that “at each stage, the entire history of the
world is separated into a part that has already become [. . .] and a
part that is not yet settled” (Stein, 1991, 148). Indeed, according to
theorem 2, all events in and on the past lightcone of b have become
for b and are therefore fixed and determinate; all events outside the
past lightcone of b have not yet become for b and are therefore open
and indeterminate (Figure 17).
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ . As I observed in Chapter 1, Clifton
and Hogarth (1995, 356) argue that “Stein’s proof has settled the issue
[. . .] in favour of the possibility of objective becoming” in a special
relativistic setting. Indeed, “the idea that Stein conclusively refuted
Putnam et al [. . .] seems to have achieved the status of conventional
wisdom”, writes Callender (2000, S592). These statements have to be
tempered in two respects.
First, Stein’s notion of objective becoming aspires to be a form of
relational becoming. The becoming relation B, after all, fails to meet
requirements 2 and 3 referred to in §2. That is, Stein’s becoming
relation fails to pick out a distinguished present. For any arbitrary
spacetime point b " M, Stein’s relation tells you which events have
become relative to b, and which have not. But it does not tell you
which event is present now. Second, there is nothing dynamic or
flow-like in Stein’s account of becoming. In sum, to the extent that
Stein indeed proved “the possibility of objective becoming”, this only
applies to relational becoming, not to the stronger forms of presentist
and dynamic becoming.
Second, even as a form of relational becoming, Stein’s becoming
relation is problematical for various reasons. Callender (2000, 2017)
and Bigaj (2008) have raised important objections, as described in
Chapter 1, but I want to draw the reader’s attention to yet another
one. In their study of relativistic becoming, SCH assume Minkowski
spacetime to be temporally oriented. That is, instead of working with
Minkowski spacetime áR4,⌘abç as such, SCH consider the beefed-up
structure áR4,⌘ab,  ç. However, as I have argued before, it is far from
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clear whether all temporally orientable spacetimes come equipped
with a temporal orientation. This is an important issue, to be taken
up in Chapter 3.
￿.￿.￿ Maudlinian becoming
In his book review of Skow’s Objective Becoming, Maudlin (2018, 1813)
admits regarding himself (and being regarded by others) “as holding
an extremely strong view about [. . .] the passing of time”. “I think
that time passes”, he writes (p. 1808). “I think that the passage of
time is a fundamental characteristic of it: if something does not pass,
then that thing is not time.”24
The question of interest here, however, is which form of temporal
becoming Maudlin has in mind when speaking of the passage of time.
For Maudlin (2007b, 109), “The passage of time is deeply connected to
the problem of the direction of time, or time’s arrow.” When speaking
of the direction of time, Maudlin (2007b, 109) means “an irreducible
intrinsic asymmetry in the temporal structure of the universe” (see
also Chapter 3). Indeed, according to Maudlin (2017, 78):
The essence of time is successiveness, one thing happen-
ing after another in a fixed order. Newton took the or-
dered entities to be moments of universal time, each one
spread out over all of space. Relativity takes them instead
to be events, and the order to be a partial order. But the
primary notion of successiveness and asymmetrical order-
ing remains.
I think this quite clearly puts Maudlin in the camp of (B-theoretic)
relational becoming. In a special relativistic setting (with a temporal
orientation), events occur in successive order along timelike world-
lines. For Maudlin (2017, 78-9) the passage of time does not get more
dynamical than this: “The temporal aspect of space-time is dynam-
ical: events along a single worldline occur in successive temporal
order. Even in relativity, time passes.”
Nowhere does Maudlin mention a distinguished present (“I’m sure
I’m no sort of presentist!” exlaims Maudlin, 2018, 1809), which
thus suggests he does not subscribe to presentist becoming. Finally,
Maudlin (2018, 1811) is also very sceptical about the possibility of a
temporal flow or flux of time (and rightly so, I think) as this would
require the introduction of a second-order time or metatime (see §2.4):
“to attribute [a flow or flux] to time is to force the postulation of the
second-order time.” But such a notion would quickly lead to vicious
24 Maudlin (2018, 1809) regards the passage of time as criterial of time: “time is exactly
that aspect of physical reality that passes.”
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circularity or vicious regress. Hence, Maudlin (2018, 1808) concludes:
“I do not believe in any meta-time or hyper-time or second-order
time.” This suggests he does not subscribe to a form of dynamic
becoming either.
￿.￿ Presentist becoming
At the beginning of §2, I outlined three requirements for a full-blown
account of objective becoming. The more requirements are met, the
stronger the resulting form of becoming. So far, I only introduced the
first requirement, namely the presence of a temporal orientation. The
second requirement is the presence of an objectively distinguished
present. I will speak of presentist becoming when such a present exists.
Definition 3. Presentist becoming: Let ÖM,gabã be a relativis-
tic spacetime. To say that there is presentist becoming means thatÖM,gabã is endowed with a temporal orientation, and that there is
an objectively distinguished present.
According to Leininger (2018, 111), it is the postulation of a now that
differentiates A-theories from B-theories. Hence, since both absolute
becoming and relational becoming lack an objectively privileged now,
they are B-theories. Presentist becoming, on the other hand, is an A-
theory, since it postulates the existence of one, and only one, moment
that is privileged as being the present moment or now. Leininger
(2018, 111) calls this the A-Present Thesis. According to presentist be-
coming, reality is tensed in the sense that each event is either past,
present or future. Hence, any description of reality will remain in-
complete, on this view, as long as we fail to specify which time is
present.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . By far the most popular account of
presentist becoming is presentism. On this (ontologically austere) view,
only those events constituting the present moment are singled out as
being real. Past events were real but are no longer; future events
will become real but are not yet. The presentist, as a consequence,
takes the world to be three-dimensional (but see Chapter 1). Some
prominent advocates of presentism are John Bigelow, Thomas Crisp,
Peter Ludlow, Ned Markosian, Trenton Merricks, Arthur Prior and
Dean Zimmerman (Sullivan, 2012).
Usually, on such presentist accounts, time is assumed to pass: as
future events come into existence, present events disappear into the
past, leading to a succession of present moments or a moving now.
However, this is a separate claim, not logically entailed by the belief
in an objective present. Leininger (2018, 111), for instance, refers to
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this as the A-Change Thesis, to draw the contrast with the A-Present
Thesis referred to above.
Here, I do not (yet) want to assume this dynamic aspect of time.
After all, as soon as we set the now in motion, we are no longer
dealing with presentist becoming, but with dynamic becoming, to be
discussed in the next section. For the moment, then, I will assume
the present to be static. That is, I will assume that the state of the
world does not change with time. Or, to put it yet differently, I will
assume that the A-Present Thesis obtains, but not the A-Change Thesis.
Price (2011, 211) refers to this position as presentism-without-change.
Monton (2006, 264) calls it Parmenidean presentism, contrasting it with
(the more natural) Heraclitean presentism.
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . But Parmenidean presentism is not
the only possible account of presentist becoming. Another example
of presentist becoming (albeit a less popular one) can be found in a
particular version of the moving spotlight (MS) theory of time.25
The MS theory of time combines ideas from both the BU theory
and the A-theories of time. Like the BU theory, it holds that all past,
present and future events are real. The world, as a consequence, is
four-dimensional. This view is called eternalism and finds a natural
representation in the BU (see Chapter 1). Unlike the BU theory, these
events do not coexist on an equal ontological footing. The present
moment “glows with a special metaphysical status” (Skow, 2009, 666),
as if being illuminated by a spotlight.
Usually, the spotlight is assumed to move from earlier to later times,
such that which moment is being illuminated changes. Broad (1923,
59) likened it to the spotlight “from a policeman’s bulls-eye traversing
the fronts of the houses in a street.” But here again, I do not (yet)
want to assume this dynamic aspect. Our focus here, then, is on
the stationary spotlight (SS) theory, not on the moving spotlight theory
(Wilson, 2018). Price (2011, 212) calls this frozen-block presentism.
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . How plausible are Parmenidean presentism
and the stationary spotlight theory of time? For a start, neither theory
has ever been seriously entertained. Two problems might explain this
fact:
1. The problem of how to identify the present moment;
2. The problem of keeping the present moment stationary.
25 The growing block theory of time provides yet another account of presentist becoming,
but will not be discussed in this doctoral dissertation. Advocates of the growing
block theory include Robert Adams, C. D. Broad, Peter Forrest, and Michael Tooley
(Sullivan, 2012).
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Let us tackle these in turn, starting with the first problem. The flow of
time has typically been associated with a succession of global nows.
Each such cosmic now extends across the entire Universe, and groups
all simultaneous events into one global hypersurface of simultaneity.
However, in view of the relativity of simultaneity, observers moving
with different (uniform) velocities relative to one another, each have
their own set of universal nows. Given the principle of relativity, no
observer is privileged. Hence, there is no objectively preferred way
of foliating spacetime into spacelike hypersurfaces. Gödel (1949, 558)
notoriously argued along these lines:
Change becomes possible only through the lapse of time.
The existence of an objective lapse of time, however,
means (or, at least, is equivalent to the fact) that reality
consists of an infinity of layers of “now” which come into
existence successively. But, if simultaneity is something
relative in the sense just explained, reality cannot be split
up into layers in an objectively determined way. Each ob-
server has his own set of “nows”, and none of these var-
ious systems of layers can claim the prerogative of repre-
senting the objective lapse of time.
Gödel’s problem is only aggravated by the conventionality thesis of
simultaneity, according to which the notion of distant simultaneity
loses its objective meaning even for one and the same observer (see
Chapter 1). That is, which spacelike separated events an observer
deems to be simultaneous with her here and now depends on a
convention (such as the choice of the Reichenbach synchronisation pa-
rameter ", with 0 < " < 1).
As if the situation is not already bleak enough, there is the addi-
tional fact that certain relativistic spacetimes (such as Gödel’s infa-
mous rotating Universe) do not even admit a foliation into spacelike
hypersurfaces. This then is the final nail in the coffin of an already
floundering attempt at establishing global becoming.
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . One way out of this problem is by giving up the
notion of global becoming altogether, and postulating a form of local
becoming to make it compatible with relativity theory.26 This view has
26 There are other ways out. First, as to Gödel’s rotating Universe, one might hold that
such exotic spacetimes are logically and mathematically possible, but not physically.
Second, even though Minkowski spacetime does not posit a preferred foliation, there
are (highly symmetric) general relativistic spacetimes which do admit a natural foli-
ation. Third, in quantum mechanics a folitation seems required in order to account
for the observed violations of Bell’s inequality. Finally, a notion of absolute simul-
taneity might be added to special relativity, as in the neo-Lorentzian interpretation.
See Chapter 1.
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been developed by Dieks (1988, 2006) in particular. The trouble with
global becoming is that it relies on a preferred foliation, which yields
a total temporal order, as in classical Newtonian (or neo-Newtonian)
spacetime. But in relativistic spacetimes, the temporal order is only
partial.
Dieks’s proposal then is to reformulate the notion of becoming in
a way that does not make reference to a universal now. This can
be done, in a first step, by restricting our attention to the history
of a single particle along its worldline. The proper time imposes a
total order among the events on this worldline. By singling out one
event as now, the history of the particle is thus divided in a past,
present and future part. This assignment of a local now should now
be carried out for every particle in the Universe, taking care however
that the now of one particle is never inside the past lightcone of any
other particle.
One problem remains though. According to Dieks (1988, 459), “it is
not possible to single out any particular moment as the ‘now’ on the
basis of the laws of physics.” Notice that this problem also applies
to global becoming. Even if we could agree on a preferred foliation,
the question remains how to single out one of these hyperplanes as
representing the now.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ . The problems keep piling up. Sup-
posing for a moment we successfully generalized the pre-relativistic
notion of a universal now to properly apply in a relativistic setting,
and assuming that we found a way to single out the distinguished
now in an objective way, yet another problem remains.
Both the stationary spotlight theory and Parmenidean presentism
postulate a stationary present. But in doing so, we seem to have
“thrown out not just the baby, but almost the entire bathroom”, writes
Price (2011, 212). “It is as if we’ve built just one house in ‘Broad
Street’.” That is, “we seem to have lost the materials for a realist view
of passage, change, or temporal transition.” What is missing here, in
other words, is an element of flux; we want the now to move from
one instant to another. But for this we have to climb yet another rung
up the temporal becoming ladder.
￿.￿ Dynamic becoming
According to most proponents of robust becoming, one crucial ele-
ment is still missing, namely Price’s third requirement that there be
“something objectively dynamic, flux-like, or ‘flow-like’ about time”
(see §2). Adding such an element to our account of temporal becom-
ing yields dynamic becoming.
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Definition 4. Dynamic becoming: Let ÖM,gabã be a relativistic
spacetime. To say that there is dynamic becoming means that ÖM,gabã
is endowed with a temporal orientation, a distinguished present, and
a dynamic flow.
In dynamic becoming, both the A-Present Thesis and the A-Change
Thesis, referred to in §2.3, obtain. That is, not only is there a distin-
guished present or now, but what moment is now changes, leading
to a succession of nows. It is this changing now, above anything
else, that is supposed to capture the fact (referred to at the start of
§2) that events become ever more past. Allow me to reiterate the
point that this change in now is not perspectival; it is not a conse-
quence of our own subjective perspective. Rather, as Norton (2010,
24) stresses, “the fact of passage obtains independently of us;” it is a
mind-independent process.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . The account of dynamic becoming pre-
ferred by most is Heraclitean presentism. Like its stationary analogue,
Parmenidean presentism, it holds that only present events are real.
Unlike Parmenidean presentism, it maintains that the present does
not abide, but constantly shifts, leading to a succession of presents.
This is in line with the Heraclitean aphorism panta rei, everything flows.
Or in the words of Heraclitus himself (as translated by Wheelwright,
1959, 29):
Everything flows and nothing abides; everything gives
way and nothing stays fixed. You cannot step twice into
the same river, for other waters are continually flowing
on.
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . The moving spotlight (MS) theory of time
was first articulated by Broad (1923), and is considered one of the
most obscure accounts of dynamic becoming, combining (as we saw
in §2.3) elements from both the A- and B-theories of time.27 As the
spotlight moves, different regions of the spacetime manifold light up
and become present. However, unlike Heraclitean presentism, the
change in what time is present is not accompanied by a change in
what exists (on the eternalist MS view, after all, all events exist). My
aim here is not to enter into any more detail with regard to either pre-
sentism or the MS theory of time, except to briefly raise two (familiar)
worries with respect to the moving now conception.
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ . The first worry is about the rate at
which the now moves. It seems that time passes at a rate of one sec-
27 Skow’s Objective Becoming takes the MS theory as its focus, see Skow (2015). For
another book-length treatise on the MS theory, see Cameron (2015).
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ond per second (or one hour per hour, or one year per year). To some,
such as Price (1996) and Tallant (2016), this answer in nonsensical; to
others, such as Maudlin (2007b, 2017), there is nothing objectionable
about this answer.28
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . The second worry is the notorious ‘two times’ objection
(Pooley, 2013). Ordinary movement is defined as change in spatial po-
sition with respect to time. But for time itself to move, it seems there
should be some second-order time (or metatime, or hypertime) with re-
spect to which we could measure its movement. On the MS view, for
instance, which moment in ordinary time is being illuminated by the
spotlight, depends on which metatime it is. That is, at each point T
of metatime, only one time t is now. Furthermore, at later metatimes
T
¨ > T , the now will have moved to later times t ¨ > t.29
Whether or not one is prepared to bite the bullet and postulate a
second temporal dimension, the worry remains that “the multiplica-
tion of times will not stop at two” (Maudlin, 2018, 1811). After all,
in asking ourselves how fast metatime flows, one might be forced to
postulate a third temporal dimension (a metametatime). But this of
course threatens to generate an infinite regress, without an obvious
way of halting it.
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
Some, if not most, assume the BU theory of time to be incompatible
with temporal becoming. The static block, it is said, fails to cap-
ture the dynamic passage of time (Earman, 2008). Others, such as
Maudlin, do not see such problem. Still others propose a variety of
ways to make the block compatible with becoming. The goal of this
section is to offer some clarification by gauging the compatibility of
the BU with each of the four degrees of temporal becoming discussed
in §§2.1–2.4. Two forms of compatibility need to be considered here:
1. Compatibility of becoming with the BU ontology as such;
2. Compatibility of becoming with a broadened BU ontology.
In the former case, the BU ontology already comes built-in with some
form of becoming. That is, the BU package (and the spatiotemporal
structure posited by it) already contains becoming as an ingredient.
In the latter case, the BU ontology is too thin to account for becoming.
Here, the BU package first has to be expanded before room can be
made for becoming. For lack of better terms, I will henceforth speak
28 See Prosser (2016) for more references on this topic.
29 Notice that one is forced to assume metatime to be temporally oriented as well.
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of becoming being (respectively) BU-compatible and BU+-compatible.
As a first step, then, let us briefly unpack the BU ontology.
￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . The BU ontology posits a four-dimensional
manifoldM of events, along with a spatiotemporal metric gab.30 Al-
though the resulting spacetime ÖM,gabã is assumed to be temporally
orientable, no temporal orientation is provided (see §2.2). All events
are ontologically on a par; no time is metaphysically privileged. In
particular, there is no distinguished present or now, let alone an ad-
ditional time dimension.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Given its deflationary character, it should
come as no surprise that absolute becoming is BU-compatible. After
all, the proposal is to equate the coming into being of an event with
its happening. Hence, argues Dieks (2006, 170), “since everything
that happens is recorded in the block universe diagram, ‘coming into
being’ is also fully represented. There is no need to augment the
block universe in any way.” Indeed, “the four-dimensional picture
already contains becoming” (Dieks, 2006, 174, emphasis in original).
One important caveat is to be noted though. As I have argued
in §2.2, what Dieks and others have in mind when discussing the
relative merits of absolute becoming, is actually a form of relational
becoming. And while Dieks is perfectly right to maintain the BU-
compatibility of absolute becoming, this need not necessarily hold
true for relational becoming too.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . In Maudlin’s opinion, there is no question
about the BU-compatibility of (B-theoretic) relational becoming. “I
believe in a block universe”, writes Maudlin (2007b, 109). “But I also
believe that time passes, and see no contradiction or tension between
these views.” Indeed, “the four-dimensional universe is a single en-
tity of which the passage of time [. . .] is an ingredient” (emphasis
in original).31 Stein (1991, 148) similarly concurs that “a notion of
‘real [i.e. relational] becoming’ can be coherently formulated in terms
of the structure of Einstein-Minkowski spacetime.” Stein (1991, 147)
thus regards his becoming relation B as “uniquely appropriate to the
special theory of relativity.”
However, relational becoming requires a temporal orientation, and
while I agree with Maudlin (2007b, 118) that “the admission of an
orientation to space-time is not, per se, wildly at odds with present
30 In the case of special relativity, for instance,M = R4 and gab = ⌘ab, the Minkowski
metric.
31 Or again: “The belief that time passes, in this [relational] sense,” writes Maudlin
(2007b, 108), “has no bearing on the question of the ‘reality’ of the past or the future.”
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physical theory”, the question is whether such an orientation is built
into the BU package, or has to be added to it. That is, the question is
whether relational becoming is BU- or BU+-compatible.
Most proponents of relational becoming remain suprisingly silent
on this issue. Stein (1968, 1991), Clifton and Hogarth (1995), for in-
stance, simply assume the BU to be temporally oriented. But not ev-
eryone agrees on this point. Horwich (1987), for example, maintains
that “time itself is intrinsically symmetric.” Price (1996) likewise ar-
gues that the BU is not intrinsically directed.
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ . The big exception here is Maudlin
(2002, 2007b). Maudlin holds a minority position in this debate, cham-
pioning the view that the past-to-future direction is distinguishable
from the future-to-past direction, and that this distinction is primi-
tive. That is, according to Maudlin (2017, 78), the direction of time is
“a metaphysically fundamental characteristic that cannot be further
analyzed [. . .] into simpler or more basic components.”
Spacetime, for Maudin, comes hardwired with an arrow of time.
This makes Maudlin the staunchest promotor of what Earman (1974,
20) has called The Time Direction Heresy— the view that the “temporal
orientation is an intrinsic feature of space-time which does not need
to be and cannot be reduced to nontemporal features”.
Notice that this also explains why Maudlin is able to subscribe
to both a BU ontology and the passage of time. “I believe I am
committed to both a block universe and robust passage”, writes
Maudlin (2018, 1809), where ‘robust passage’ should be interpreted
as B-theoretic relational becoming.
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . When it comes to the compatibility of presen-
tist and dynamic becoming, both can be treated together. For a start, it
should be clear that Parmenidean and Heraclitean presentism are in-
compatible with the BU, since they postulate a fundamentally differ-
ent ontology according to which only present events are real, whereas
in the BU both past, present and future events are real.
The question, therefore, is whether the stationary and moving spot-
light theories of time are compatible with the block. Given that the
BU theory does not postulate a distinguished present nor a super-
time, both the SS and MS theory are BU-incompatible. Of course,
many have claimed that they can be made BU+-compatible, via the
addition of, say, a preferred foliation and/or a second-order time, but
those are topics for another time.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . In this chapter, I distinguished four degrees or forms
of temporal becoming: (1) absolute becoming, (2) relational becoming,
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(3) presentist becoming and (4) dynamic becoming. The higher the
degree, the stronger the form of becoming and, I argued, the less
compatible with the BU ontology.
I am of the same mind as Earman (2008, 159), who finds absolute
becoming too “thin and yawn-inducing” to be worthy of the name
becoming. This fact, I believe, also explains why even the proponents
of absolute becoming (such as Dieks, Savitt and Williams) actually
endorse a stronger relational form of becoming. When it comes to
presentist and dynamic becoming, the barren landscape of absolute
becoming makes way for a mine-field of problems, too big in my
opinion to be convincingly overcome. In view of all this, the prospects
for temporal becoming in a BU ontology are pretty bleak. There is,
after all, only one form remaining of temporal becoming, namely
relational becoming.
I showed that relational becoming is either BU- or BU+-compatible,
depending on whether the temporal orientation is intrinsically given.
That will become the question at the heart of Chapter 3. For the
moment, it suffices to say that according to Maudlin’s primitivist and
anti-Humean approach, the temporal orientation of our world is prim-
itive. This renders (B-theoretic) relational becoming BU-compatible,
and explains why Maudlin can uphold both the BU theory of time
and the passage of time. Skow’s view on robust passage, on the other
hand, corresponds to a form of dynamic becoming which is clearly
BU-incompatible.
Chapter 3
FOUR GROUNDS FOR THED IRECT ION OF T IME
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
This third chapter is concerned with the problem of the direction of
time. I start by distinguishing the notions of temporal orientability
and temporal orientation, and highlight the importance of a global
arrow of time for temporal becoming. I subsequently ask where the
temporal orientation comes from, and look at four possible ways of
grounding the direction of time in more fundamental facts. After dis-
cussing their relative merit, I conclude that the Time Direction Heresy
is by far the most promising avenue, and I thereby indirectly defend





The problem of the direction of time (or the arrow of time) is one of
the most controversial questions in philosophy of physics.1 We can
trace its origin to the intuitive asymmetry between past and future.
We remember the past, but not the future. We consider the past fixed,
but the future open. We feel as if we can influence the future, but not
the past. We may fear the future, or await it with excitement, but not
the past (Sklar, 1974, Dainton, 2010).
Most processes around us moreover occur in one direction only. I
see my espresso and milk turning into cappuccino every morning,
but never the other way around. I get a little older every day, but
sadly never younger. Finally, we all share the impression that time
‘flows’ from past to future, as discussed in the previous chapter. In
short, we all experience time as being fundamentally directed. This
temporal asymmetry is so deeply rooted in our (tensed) language and
personal experiences that it seems difficult to deny its existence.
The problem of the direction of time, then, is to find a physical
correlate for these temporal experiences. Surprisingly, fundamental
physics has great difficulties distinguishing past from future.2 It is
not clear, in other words, whether fundamental physics can pick out
a preferred direction of time. Indeed, the temporal terms ‘past’ and
‘future’ do not figure in the vocabulary of modern physics, despite
being so profoundly ingrained in common parlance.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿? At this point, some may object
that the vocabulary of modern physics does contain temporally asym-
metric expressions, such as the distinction between initial and final
boundary conditions, or between the past and future lightcone sheets.
But as Castagnino et al. (2003b) correctly remark, such distinctions are
1 The literature on the problem of the direction of time is vast and ever expanding. The
reader may consult Reichenbach (1956), Grünbaum (1973), Sklar (1974), Horwich
(1987), Albert (2000), Dainton (2010) and Callender (2016, 2017) by way of general
introduction to the topic.
2 The problem, more precisely, is the following: the dynamical equations of funda-
mental physics (e.g. the Hamiltonion equations of classical mechanics, the Maxwell
equations of electromagnetism, the Einstein field equations of relativity theory, the
Schrödinger equation of quantum mechanics and the field equations of quantum
field theory) are all time-reversal invariant. Accordingly, if f (t) is a solution of the
dynamical equations, then so is T f (t), with T the time-reversal operator which per-
forms the transformation t    t. Both solutions, f (t) and T f (t), are physically
allowed. This suggests that the laws of physics cannot distinguish between both
temporal directions. Many physicists and philosophers, therefore, have attempted
to solve the problem by taking recourse to non-fundamental laws, which are not
time-reversal invariant, such as the second law of thermodynamics, or the infamous
collapse postulate of orthodox quantum mechanics. I will return to this in due
course.
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merely conventional, not substantial. The two lightcone sheets, for ex-
ample, are formally identical: if one were to interchange both sheets,
the entire lightcone would remain unchanged.3 The assignment of
two different names (past and future) to the two lightcone sheets is
thus purely conventional. The distinction would be substantial only if
it involved the (conventional) naming of two objects that are formally
distinct.4
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ . With that in mind, the problem of the
direction of time may be reformulated as the problem of finding a
substantial difference between the two temporal directions. Before
we continue, it bears emphasizing that we cannot presuppose the
arrow of time from the start as this would amount to a petitio principii.
We need to avoid begging the question by assuming the truth of our
conclusion at the outset, no matter how deeply ingrained the arrow of
time may be in our mindset. Instead, we need to adopt an atemporal
perspective, or what Price (1996) calls the “view from nowhen”. We
have to stand outside the block universe, as it were, in order to find
a substantial criterion by which we can pick out the direction of time
(whether we then conventionally label it past-to-future or future-to-
past).
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . My interest in the problem of the direction
of time is also guided by a desire to gauge the prospects for temporal
becoming in the block universe. As I argued in the previous chapter,
even the weakest form of temporal becoming worth its salt, namely re-
lational becoming, requires the block to be temporally oriented. That
is, in order for relational becoming to be BU-compatible, the tempo-
ral structure of the world should be such that one can objectively
distinguish between the past-to-future and future-to-past direction.5
Following Price (2011) and my discussion of temporal becoming
in the previous chapter, I assume the passage of time to be global,
universal and unidirectional. Consequently, I will also require the
3 Another example of formally identical objects are the two spin eigenstates of spin
1/2 particles, which are commonly denoted as ‘spin up’ and ‘spin down’.
4 The authors offer the following example to clarify their point: “the difference be-
tween the two poles of [. . .] a magnet is conventional since both poles are formally
identical”. However, “the difference between the two poles of the Earth is substan-
tial because [at] the north pole there is an ocean and [at] the south pole there is a
continent (and the difference between ocean and continent remains substantial even
if we conventionally change the names of the poles)” (p. 2489).
5 Notice that such an intrinsic directionality or asymmetry of time is not to be found
in space. There is no universal, objective left or right in space; neither is there an
up or down. In the words of Maudlin (2012, 166): “The past-to-future direction of
time is fundamentally unlike the future-to-past direction in a way that has no spatial
analog.”
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direction of time to be global, universal and unidirectional. I will, that
is, presume the direction of time to be the same everywhere.6 One
precondition for the existence of a global temporal orientation is that
the relativistic spacetime under consideration be temporally orientable.7
Temporal orientability, in other words, is topologically required in
order to establish a temporal orientation.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . This then is the plan of the current chapter: I begin by
briefly distinguishing the notions of temporal orientability versus
temporal orientation in §2 and §3 respectively. Readers already famil-
iar with this distinction may skip these sections. In §4, I ask whether
Minkowski spacetime, the arena of SR, is endowed with a temporal
orientation, and if so, where the time orientation comes from.
Drawing on the work of Weingard (1977), I subsequently look at
four ways of grounding the direction of time in more fundamental
facts. After discussing their relative merit, I conclude in §5 that
The Time Direction Heresy is by far the most promising avenue. I
thereby indirectly defend Maudlin’s view on relational becoming, as
expounded in the previous chapter.
One last remark: in order to keep the discussion focussed, I will
limit myself to a study of the direction of time in a special relativistic
setting, despite some occasional excursions to the domain of general
relativity.
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
Let ÖM,gabã be a relativistic spacetime, and consider any point
p " M. The lightcone L (p) at p is an open submanifold of M,
consisting of three parts: the spacetime point p itself, and two con-
nected components or lightcone sheets (see Figure 18). Let us denote
the upper sheet by L  (p) and the lower sheet by L⇤ (p).
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ , ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Now consider any 4-vector
⌧ at p. If ⌧ points outside L (p), then ⌧ is said to be spacelike; if it lies
on L (p), it is null or lightlike, and if ⌧ is inside L (p), it is timelike. The
6 The requirement for a global direction of time was first advanced by Earman (1974)
and figures prominently in the works of Price (1996, 2011) and Castagnino et al.
(2003, 2003a, 2003b, 2004, 2009). I use the globality requirement when discussing
Reichenbach’s work on the direction of time in §4.2.2.
7 Castagnino et al. (2003, 888) write that the “temporal orientability of space-time is a
precondition for defining a global arrow of time, since if space-time is not temporally
orientable, it is not possible to distinguish between two temporal senses for the
universe as a whole.” Grünbaum (1963) and Earman (1974) were probably among
the first to emphasize the importance of temporal orientability for the problem of





Figure 18: The lightcone L (p) of p consists of an upper sheet L  (p) and a
lower sheet L⇤ (p).
lightcone structure at p thus divides all 4-vectors into three classes.
However, there is an important structural difference between these
classes of vectors.
Spacelike vectors can be continuously rotated into one another
without ever becoming lightlike or timelike. Lightlike and timelike
vectors, on the other hand, are further partitioned into two disjoint
classes. That is, although any (null or timelike) ‘up-pointing’ vector
can be smoothly transformed into any other (null or timelike) ‘up-
pointing’ vector, an ‘up-pointing’ vector can never be turned into a
‘down-pointing’ vector, and vice versa, without becoming spacelike
at some point. There thus is, in the words of Maudlin (2018, 1810)
“a basic distinction between two sorts of timelike directions and two
sorts of null directions, and no corresponding distinction among the
spacelike directions.” This is perhaps one of the most fundamental
differences between space and time.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . In all relativistic spacetimes that are
taken seriously from a physical point of view, the distinction between
the two sorts of timelike and null directions is global. That is, as
soon as you have labelled the lightcone sheets of one event, there is a
unique way of labelling the lightcone sheets of all other events.
Consider, by way of example, the three-dimensional Minkowski
spacetime áR3,⌘abç in Figure 19 — the arena of special relativity (in
three dimensions).8 Consider any two spacetime points p and q, and
start by labelling the two lobes of p’s lightcone L  (p) and L⇤ (p) in
an arbitrary way. Now pick a timelike 4-vector ⌧ at p that lies inside
L  (p), and imagine moving ⌧ from p to q along path I via continuous
timelike transport. That is, imagine moving ⌧ in a continuous manner
along path I, taking care to keep ⌧ timelike at all times, never allowing
it to become lightlike or spacelike. When ⌧ finally arrives at q, it will
point in one of the two lobes of L (q). Call that lobe L  (q), and call
the other lobe L⇤ (q).









Figure 19: After arbitrarily labelling the lobes of L (p), the labelling of the
lobes of L (q) is path-independent. Figure adapted from Wein-
gard (1977, 124).
It turns out that as long as ⌧ is kept timelike, no matter which path
you take from p to q, you will always end up labelling the lobes of
L (q) in the same manner. If, for instance, you had moved ⌧ along
path II, the result would have been the same. The labelling of the
lobes of L (q) is thus path-independent, and this ensures that the la-
belling is globally consistent. For this reason, the spacetime is said to
be temporally orientable. Following the definition by Weingard (1977,
123):
Definition 5. Temporal orientability: A relativistic spacetimeÖM,gabã is temporally orientable iff the lightcone a timelike vector
⌧ points in after being transported by continuous timelike transport
from p to q, is independent of the path of transport between p and q
(p and q being arbitrary spacetime points).
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Minkowski spacetime ÖM,⌘abã, as
just explained, is temporally orientable. However, this property need
not necessarily carry over to general relativistic spacetimes. Although
the metric of a general relativistic spacetime can be reduced to the
Minkowski metric of special relativity for small regions of spacetime,
it is unlikely that the spacetime will be flat on a global scale due to the
presence of gravitational effects. As a result, very different topologies
are compatible with the Einstein field equations.
Some of these spacetimes are temporally non-orientable and
causally pathological. In such spacetimes, a timelike ‘up-pointing’
vector can be transformed into a ‘down-pointing’ one by continuous
timelike transport (e.g. by following a spacelike path along a Moebius
band). Clearly then, the past-future distinction cannot be made on a
global scale in such spacetimes, and so a global notion of temporal
becoming cannot be introduced. My focus here, however, is on the
time orientable Minkowski spacetime of SR, not on the pathological
spacetimes of GR.9
9 Sklar (1974, 395) notes that “philosophical discussions about the direction of time
have usually taken place in the context of simply assuming that spacetime is time-
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￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . If a relativistic spacetime is temporally ori-
entable, then there is a unique and globally consistent way of la-
belling all the lightcone sheets by moving a timelike vector around
via continuous timelike transport.10 Two lightcone sheets are then
said to be co-directional when they are both labelled   or both ⇤.11
This relation of co-directionality is reflexive, symmetric and transi-
tive. It is, in other words, an equivalence relation on the set of all
lightcone sheets. The quotient set of this relation has two elements,
the equivalence classes L  and L⇤. Each class contains exactly one of
the lightcone sheets at every spacetime point:
L  ⇥=⌫
p
L  (p) , æp "M; (19a)
L⇤ ⇥=⌫
p
L⇤ (p) , æp "M. (19b)
The lichtcone structure L is thus an open submanifold of M with
two components: L = L  <L⇤. Or, to put it more simply, the set of all
lightcone sheets is divided into two classes, denoted L  and L⇤.
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
The labelling of one class as future-directed, and the other as past-
directed, amounts to choosing a temporal orientation or direction of time.
Suppose, for instance, that we decided (by convention) to label L  as
future-directed and L⇤ as past-directed. Then since this past-future
distinction is global, we can use it locally at each spacetime point to
define the past and future. After all, for any spacetime point p "M,
L  (p) L L  and L⇤ (p) L L⇤. Hence, L  (p) corresponds to the future,
and L⇤ (p) to the past for p.
Definition 6. Temporal orientation: A relativistic spacetime ÖM,gabã
is temporally orientable iff the lightcone structure L has two compo-
nents. A relativistic spacetime ÖM,gabã is temporally oriented iff one
component is labelled future-directed and the other past-directed.12
orientable. In fact, it is usually not even noticed that such an assumption is be-
ing made at all.” Earman (1974, 18), however, begins his paper with the question:
“Can any nontemporally orientable space-time be ruled out a priori as an arena for
physics?”
10 Another way of putting this is that there exists a continuous nonvanishing vector
field on M which is timelike with respect to gab (Earman, 1974). I will return to
this definition in §4.3.
11 When two lightcone sheets are co-directional, then their set-theoretic intersection
is always another lightcone sheet. For example, L  (p) = L  (q) = L  (s) with
p,q, s "M.
12 A formally equivalent definition can be found in Castagnino et al. (2003, 889-890)
and is worth repeating here (with minor changes of notation): “A space-time
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Notice, however, that a temporally orientable spacetime ÖM,gabã can
always be oriented in one of two ways. In the above example, for
instance, we might just as well have labelled L  as past-directed and
L⇤ as future-directed, in which case the arrow of time would have
pointed in the opposite direction. No orientation is objectively right
or wrong. To make clear which orientation is chosen, I will denote
these temporally oriented spacetimes as ÖM,gab,  ã and ÖM,gab, ⇤ã,
respectively, with   or ⇤ referring to which equivalence class L  or L⇤
is taken to be future-directed.
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Clearly then, although the temporal orientability
of a relativistic spacetime ÖM,gabã is a necessary condition for that
spacetime to be temporally oriented, it is not a sufficient condition
(Price, 2011). Since the metric gab cannot distinguish between future-
directed and past-directed timelike 4-vectors, the choice of a temporal
orientation amounts to the addition of extra structure to the relativistic
spacetime under consideration.13 Yet, all too often, and particularly
in the debate on temporal becoming, this extra structure is merely
postulated without explaining where it comes from.
In a recent paper defending the objectivity of temporal becoming,
for example, Savitt (2018, 2) acknowledges that the “radical difference
between the past and the future” is a basic feature of the passage of
time. But Savitt has “little to say about this feature”. He thus simply
assumes “that spacetime is represented by an orientable manifold
and that this manifold has, somehow, acquired an orientation” (emphasis
added). Again, in an attempt to explain the passage of time from a
B-theoretical perspective, Dieks (2012b, 112) just accepts the temporal
“asymmetry [between the past and the future] as given.” Finally, in
his Precis of Objective Becoming, Skow (2018b, 1788) writes that on the
BU theory of time, “at the very least some spacetime points are later
than others, so that among the relations spacetime points bear to each
other are temporal relations.”
Notice that in their study of relativistic becoming, Stein, Clifton
and Hogarth similarly assume Minkowski spacetime to be temporally
oriented (see Chapter 2). Indeed, instead of working with Minkowski
spacetime áR4,⌘abç as such, SCH consider the beefed-up structureÖM,gabã has a global direction of time iff: (i) ÖM,gabã is temporally orientable, (ii) for
some p "M, ÖM,gabã has a direction of time at p, that is, there is a non-arbitrary
way of choosing the future lobe L  (p) of the null cone L (p) at p, and (iii) for all
p,q "M such that ÖM,gabã has a direction of time at both p and q, if the timelike
vector ⌧ lies inside L  (p) and the timelike vector µ lies inside L  (q), then ⌧ and µ
have the same direction, that is, the vector resulting from parallel transport of µ to p
lies inside L  (p)” (emphasis in original).
13 Again, this is made notationally explicit by denoting a non-temporally oriented rel-
ativistic spacetime as ÖM,gabã and a temporally oriented one as ÖM,gab,  ã orÖM,gab, ⇤ã.
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áR4,⌘ab,  ç. After all, argue Clifton and Hogarth (1995, 359), a “min-
imal distinction between the past and the future is needed before one
has any hope of driving an ontological wedge between them.” Stein
(1991, 148) similarly maintains that “since our issue is the coherence
of a notion of becoming, we must, of course, postulate a distinguished
time-orientation” (emphasis in original).
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿? The presupposition that all
temporally orientable spacetimes are, as a matter of course, also tem-
porally oriented, is however not as innocent as these authors make it
sound. As Earman (1974, 19) points out, it remains an open question
whether our world is equipped with a temporal orientation or not.
Price (1996), for instance, has argued that it is not. According to
him, time is not endowed with an intrinsic direction or arrow at all
(see also Price, 2011). Horwich (1987, 12) likewise maintains that
“time itself has no intrinsic directionality or asymmetry” (emphasis in
original). The structure of time, for Price and Horwich, is symmetric
and isotropic, and without privileged direction. Such a view is of
course not new. Boltzmann (1964, 446), in his Lectures on Gas Theory
of 1896, already played with the idea that “the two directions of time
are indistinguishable, just as in space there is no up or down” (see
also §4.2).
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ . In order to forestall any immediate
objections, the time-symmetric view of Price and Horwich does not
imply that they also reject the existence of, say, the thermodynamic
arrow or the causal arrow. Here, it is important to clearly distinguish
between the asymmetry of time (the subject of our concern) from
the asymmetries in time (such as the thermodynamic and causal ar-
rows).14 The asymmetry of time refers to a property of time itself; an
asymmetry in time refers to a property of the arrangement of things
in time (Castagnino et al., 2003). Even a world without intrinsic asym-
metry of time can thus exhibit various asymmetries in time.
Note, however, that in a world without asymmetry of time, one
would no longer have the right to assume that entropy, for instance,
increases rather than decreases (Price, 1996, 48). “What is objective”,
says Price, “is that there is an entropy gradient over time, not that
the universe ‘moves’ on this gradient in one direction rather than the
other”.15
14 Davies (1994, 120) makes this point explicit. Dolev (2018, 589) refers to the distinc-
tion between the asymmetry of time and the asymmetries in time as the distinction
between internal and external directionality respectively.
15 Or again: “In saying that the sun moves from east to west or that the hands of a clock
move clockwise, we take for granted that the positive time axis lies toward what we
call the future. But in the absence of some objective grounding for the convention,
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We will return to the relation between the asymmetry of time and
the asymmetries in time, and which of the two is more fundamental,
in due course. For now, it suffices to say that if Price and Horwich
are right that time is not intrinsically directed, then “the whole idea
that time ‘passes’ at all” is of course “some sort of illusion” (Maudlin,
2012, 168). After all, in order to account for the passage of time in rela-
tional terms, the spacetime under consideration has to be temporally
oriented.
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
Anyone willing to entertain the possibility of relational becoming has
to assume that spacetime is equipped with a temporal orientation.
He or she consequently has to come up with a reasonable answer to
the following two questions:16
1. Ontic question: Where does the temporal orientation come from?
2. Epistemic question: How can one tell time is temporally oriented,
and how do we know which of the two possible orientations is
the actual one?
I will not deal with the second worry that the temporal orientation
might be epistemically opaque and inaccessible.17 Instead, I want
to focus on the ontic question: what grounds the direction of time?
In this section, I consider four possible answers to this grounding
question, taking the illuminating paper by Weingard (1977) on Space-
Time and the Direction of Time as my starting point, but rephrasing
his ideas in terms of metaphysical grounding, and adding the Time
Direction Heresy to the list. Let me begin with the briefest primer on
metaphysical grounding.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . According to the metaphysical doc-
trine of grounding, reality is composed of different levels which are
structured in a hierarchy, with the more derivative levels on top, and
the more fundamental ones below. Each level is grounded in the level
directly below. Since there cannot be turtles all the way down, there
must be a most fundamental level, which is itself ungrounded (this is
called metaphysical foundationalism).
Following Audi (2012), I will use a subscripted arrow, ∫g, to
denote the grounding relation. Then p ∫g q is shorthand for ‘p
grounds q’ (or ‘p is metaphysically prior to q’, or ‘q depends on p’).
I will take the grounding relation to be irreflexive (nothing grounds
there isn’t an objective fact as to which way the sun or the hands of the clock are
‘really’ moving” (Price, 1996, 13). See also Maudlin (2007b, 114-115) in that respect.
16 Questions 1 and 2 here correspond to questions P5 and P6 in Earman (1974).
17 An answer to these epistemological worries is given in Maudlin (2007b, 120-26).
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 107
itself), asymmetric (non-circular), transitive, and well-founded (in the
sense that at the end of a grounding chain, a fact is reached which is
itself ungrounded). As such, the grounding relation induces a strict
partial ordering on reality, from the most fundamental to the more
derivative, in the form of a grounding chain.
￿.￿ Tensed grounding
Weingard (1977) distinguishes tensed from tenseless theorists. Tensed
theorists subscribe to dynamic becoming (in the sense defined in
Chapter 2). They take the moving now to be an objective, irreducible,
primitive, fundamental fact about our world. It is the moving present,
they claim, that imposes a direction or arrow on time, endowing
spacetime with a temporal orientation (Weingard, 1977, 119). That
is to say, according to the tensed theorist, the direction of time is
grounded in the moving now: at any spacetime point p " M, the
arrow of time points in the direction into which the present moves.
Temporal relations such as the earlier-than relation E and later-than
relation L are, in turn, explained in terms of the arrow of time. Con-
sider two events p,q "M. Then p is earlier than q (pEq) iff the arrow
of time points from p to q. Alternatively, q is earlier than p (qEp) iff
the arrow of time points from q to p.18 In summary, the grounding
chain for the tensed theorist is as follows:
moving now∫g direction of time∫g temporal relations. (I)
The moving now is the ungrounded fact grounding the direction of
time and (by transitivity) the temporal relations among spacetime
events. The tensed theorist thus accounts for relational becoming and
the direction of time in virtue of dynamic becoming and the moving
now. However, as I explained in Chapter 2, it is far from clear if any
sense can be made of the moving now. For one thing, the tensed
theorist is still faced with the problem of metatime, which seems to
be required in order to account for the movement of the now. And
for another, the existence of a metaphysically privileged now may be
in tension with our best science.
￿.￿ Tenseless grounding
The tenseless theorist rejects the idea of a moving now, and so cannot
ground the direction of time in the moving now. According to Wein-
gard (1977), most tenseless theorists therefore ground the direction of
time in the temporal relations between spacetime points. There thus
is an intersting inversion of the grounding relation as compared to
18 p and q are simultaneous iff p and q are co-present.
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the tensed theorist. The tensed theorist grounds temporal relations
in the direction of time (see above); the tenseless theorist grounds the
direction of time in temporal relations.
The temporal relations between spacetime points, however, are not
primitive either. They are themselves grounded in some other phys-
ical relation R, which is taken to be fundamental. The earlier-than
relation E thus holds between two spacetime points p,q "M iff the
physical relation R obtains. That is, pEq ø pRq.19 The grounding
chain for the tenseless theorist thus looks as follows:
physical relation R∫g temporal relations∫g direction of time. (II)
The choice of R has varied among tenseless theorists (Weingard, 1977,
120). Some have taken R to be the relation of past causal connectivity
p, while others have taken it to be the relation of increasing entropy
S. Irrespective of the choice of R, the asymmetry of time thus obtains
in virtue of there being an asymmetry in time.20
The tenseless project, I want to argue, fails at two levels: not only is
it impossible to ground temporal relations in a physical relation R (at
the lower level), it is furthermore impossible to ground the direction
of time in temporal relations (at the higher level). Let us take both
obstacles in turn, starting at the lower level with the notions of causal
grounding (§4.2.1) and entropic grounding (§4.2.2), and then moving
to the higher level (§4.2.3).
￿.￿.￿ Causal grounding
Causality is a notoriously tricky notion to define. “The quest for a
definition has haunted philosophers and empirical scientists for cen-
turies”, write Leuridan and Lodewyckx (2018). Yet two features are
commonly considered essential to causality. First, causal relations are
asymmetric: if an event c causes another event e, then e cannot cause c.
Second, effects never (or at least very rarely) occur before their causes
(Price, 1992).
If our project is to explain temporal relations in terms of causal
relations, then the second feature obviously puts the (temporal) cart
before the (causal) horse, as it relies on the temporal relation “before”
for its definition. Luckily, the second feature can be rewritten in an
atemporal way, without invoking time. Asymmetric causal relations,
19 In the words of Earman (1974, 19), “whenever E ( , ) obtains (or fails to obtain) it is
in virtue of the obtaining (or the nonobtaining) of a nontemporal relation R ( , ).”
20 In this chapter, I only focus on the causal and entropic asymmetries; I do not con-
sider fork asymmetries, or the asymmetries of explanation, knowledge, deliberation,
action and experience (Dainton, 2010). Most, if not all, of these asymmetries are in-
terrelated, but there is disagreement about which is to be taken as fundamental, and
which as merely derivative. Most attention, however, has been paid to the causal
and entropic asymmetries, and so this is where I direct my attention, too.
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after all, can be represented by a directed graph with arrows pointing
from the causes c to their effects e.21 The second feature then says that
all causal arrows point in the same direction; they are fully (or at least
strongly) aligned.
We are thus faced with two asymmetries (a temporal one and a
causal one) and two arrows (the arrow of time and the causal arrow).
Both arrows, moreover, seem to line up with one another, as in most
cases causes indeed occur before their effects.22 We can explain this
connection in three ways (Frisch, 2013):
1. By grounding causal relations in temporal relations;
2. By grounding temporal relations in causal relations;
3. By grounding causal and temporal relations in a third relation.
The first approach gives rise to time-first accounts of causation; the
second approach to causality-first accounts of time (Leuridan and
Lodewyckx, 2018). Our focus here is on the latter approach, but it
is worth briefly considering the former approach as well. I discuss
the third approach in the next section on entropic grounding (§4.2.2).
￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . The Scottish Enlightenment
philosopher David Hume famously explained causality in terms of
temporal priority (Hume, 1978a,b, 1974). “Priority in time”, he wrote,
“is [a] requisite circumstance in every cause” (Hume, 1978a, 650).23
Hume’s regularity account, however, is often said to be too strong, as
it disallows both simultaneous and backward causation. Newton’s
second law F = ma, for example, when causally interpreted, suggests
an instantaneous cause-effect relationship between forces and accel-
eration, which is impossible on Hume’s account. The same holds
true for backward causal influences where effects temporally precede
their causes, contrary to Hume’s temporal priority requirement.
Notice that the same worry not only arises for the Humean account,
but for all accounts of causation that start from a time-symmetric no-
tion of causal connectedness, and then distinguish cause from effect
on the basis of temporal priority (Frisch, 2013).
21 Formally, a directed graph (or digraph) is an ordered pair G = (N , E) consisting of
a set N of nodes (or vertices), and a set E of directed edges (or arrows), which are
ordered pairs of nodes.
22 Tooley (1999, 128) identifies no less than four structural similarities between the rela-
tions of temporal priority and causal priority. Both relations are irreflexive, asymmet-
ric, and transitive. Finally, for each relation, one direction has a special significance:
“it is the direction of time, or the direction of causation” (emphasis in original).
23 Hume did not really offer an explanation for the asymmetry of causality; he merely
provided a definition. That is, given two events which are causally related, Hume
defined the earlier one as the cause, and the later one as the effect, by semantic
convention. Referring to the causal asymmetry, for Hume, “is just an oblique way of
referring to the temporal asymmetry”, write Price and Weslake (2009, 414).
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￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ . Could the opposite project,
of explaining temporal relations in terms of causal relations, be more
successful? Following Frisch (2013), it is worth distinguishing two
kinds of projects: the ambitious project and the less ambitious one.
Whereas the former attempts to reduce all temporal relations to causal
relations, the latter merely tries to ground the temporal asymmetry in
the causal asymmetry. In the former project, the aim is to recover the
topology of spacetime from causal relations; in the latter project, the
four-dimensional spacetime manifold is taken for granted, but the
spatiotemporal relations between events are symmetric, and so the
aim is to distinguish past from future by grounding the direction of
time in the causal asymmetry.
Frisch (2013, 285) cashes out the difference between both projects
in terms of asymmetries in and of time. In his opinion, the ambitious
project attempts to explain the asymmetry of time, whereas the less
ambitious one tries to offer an account of the asymmetries in time. I
think Frisch is mistaken. Although the former project is indeed more
ambitious in its attempt to explain the topological structure of space-
time in terms of causal connectedness, both projects have in common
that they appeal to the causal asymmetry to ground the temporal
asymmetry. Both projects, that is, seek to explain the asymmetry of
time in terms of the causal asymmetry in time. My concern here is
with what the projects have in common, namely their attempt to offer
a causal account of the arrow of time.24
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ . Hans Reichenbach famously attempted
to reduce temporal order to causal order by means of his causal theory
of time order. One can distinguish between an early formulation and
a later formulation of his theory. The former was developed in his
Axiomatik der relativistischen Raum-Zeit-Lehre (1924/1959) and in The
Philosophy of Space and Time (1928/1958); the latter appeared in his
posthumously published monograph on The Direction of Time (1956).
In his attempt to ground the temporal asymmetry in the causal
asymmetry, Reichenbach (1958, 136) held that “if E2 is the effect of E1,
then E2 is called later than E1” (emphasis in original).
25 Reichenbach,
24 The more ambitious project was pioneered by Reichenbach (1928, 1958, 1956), and
was further developed by Grünbaum (1963, 1973), and van Fraassen (1970) who
wrote his doctoral dissertation on the causal theories of time under Grünbaum’s
supervision.
25 Notice that an event E2 can be later than E1 without E1 necessarily being a cause
of E2. Reichenbach’s definition of time order, however, is easily generalizable to
include all pairs of events that are causally connectible. In that case, E2 is later than
E1 if and only if it is physically possible for there to be a chain s1, s2, . . . , sk such
that for each i, from 1 to k  1, si is a cause of si+1; and such that E1 coincides with
s1 and E2 with sk (van Fraassen, 1970, 173).
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however, was well aware of the difficulty of his project, given how
natural it is to slip back to the Humean way of thinking:
In the experiences of everyday life we take it for granted
that the cause-effect relation is directed. We are convinced
that a later event cannot be the cause of an earlier event.
But when we are asked how to distinguish the cause from
the effect, we usually say that of two causally connected
events, the cause is the one that precedes the other in time.
That is, we define causal direction in terms of time di-
rection. Such a procedure is not permissible if we wish
to reduce time to causality; and we therefore must look
for ways of characterizing the cause-effect relation with-
out reference to time direction (Reichenbach, 1956, 27).
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Reichenbach attempted to distinguish cause
from effect with the help of his so-called mark method. “If E1 is the
cause of E2”, Reichenbach (1958, 136) wrote, “then a small variation
(a mark) in E1 is associated with a small variation in E2, whereas small
variations in E2 are not associated with variations in E1” (emphasis in
original).
But as Mehlberg (1935, 1937) and Grünbaum (1963) convincingly
showed, Reichenbach’s mark method relies implicitly on temporal re-
lations, and so his program ends up being circular. Reichenbach uses
the asymmetry of causal order to ground the asymmetry of temporal
order, but needs the temporal order in his mark method to distin-
guish cause from effect.
Yet, this early effort set an important precedent and basis for later
formulations by Reichenbach (1956) himself, as well as by Grünbaum
(1963, 1967) and van Fraassen (1970), among others. Shortly after
the publication of van Fraassen, however, Earman (1972) presented
a devastating critique of the causal theory of time. It is not my aim
here to review the tangled history of the causal theories of time, as
I could not do them justice in this short chapter (see Wüthrich, 2015
for more information). Instead, I want to raise three general worries
that should be of concern to all causal theories of time. In view of
these worries, I contend that the prospects for any causal theory of
time are rather bleak.
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ . My first worry was already mentioned in
relation to Hume’s time-first account of causation, but applies equally
well to the causality-first accounts of time. It is that any causal theory
of time renders backward causation (or retrocausation) impossible.
After all, if the temporal arrow is grounded in the causal arrow, how
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then can an effect be temporally prior, but not causally prior, to its
cause?26
Perhaps this worry can be remedied. Frisch (2013), for example,
suggests to allow for divergences from the dominant causal orienta-
tion. The temporal arrow in a particular spacetime region would then
be given by the orientation of the majority of causal relations. Back-
ward causal relations would be temporally opposite to the majority
of causal relations. Price and Weslake (2009) agree that one “should
explain the fact that the causal arrow is typically — though perhaps
not necessarily— aligned with the temporal arrow” (emphasis in orig-
inal).
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ’￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ . Others have questioned the entire project on the
grounds that one is trying to explain a problematic notion (the nature
of time) in terms of an even more problematic notion (the nature of
causation). According to Norton (2018a), “a theory that reduces the
less problematic to the more problematic seems to me to be most
problematic.” Wüthrich (2015, 2) echoes this worry, claiming that
“the causal theory attempts to illuminate the obscure with the truly
impervious”.
Clearly, if our aim is to elevate causation to a primitive and physi-
cally irreducible notion, we’d better have a clear understanding of it.
Yet, “the proliferation of different accounts of causation and the flour-
ishing literature of counterexamples suggests no general agreement
even on what it means to say something is a cause”, dixit Norton
(2003, 6).
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ . Price and Weslake (2009) worry that the
project of Reichenbach conflicts with physicalism. I here interpret
physicalism as the thesis that everything is physical, or equivalently,
that everything supervenes on the physical. On this view, causality
should supervene on the physical. Or to put it differently, “if the
world is causal, that is a physical fact to be recovered from our sci-
ence” (Norton, 2003, 2).
The problem, according to Price and Weslake, is that fundamental
physics appears to be time-symmetric; its dynamical laws are time-
reversal invariant.27 How then, wonder Price and Weslake (2009, 371),
“could time-symmetric physics yield something as time-asymmetric
as the cause-effect distinction?”
In response to this, physicists sometimes take causality to be time-
symmetric as well. Hawking (1994, 346) thus argues that “if state A
26 Notice also that, metaphysically, backward causation seems to require a static or
eternalist account of time (Faye, 2018).
27 If the dynamical laws allow a process in one temporal direction, they also allow that
process in the opposite temporal direction.
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evolved into state B, one could say that A caused B. But one could
equally well look at it in the other direction of time, and say that B
caused A.”
But the physicalist worry, in my opinion, goes deeper than
that. Whether or not physics, and by extension causation, is time-
symmetric, I believe there is no place for causality in a physicalist
view of the world. The notions of cause and effect do not belong to
the ontological furniture of our world. Mature physical theories, af-
ter all, have no need for causal principles. The dynamical laws plus
initial and/or boundary conditions exhaust all there is to say about
the world. The notion of causality, therefore, is physically empty and
dispensable.
Such skepticism and eliminativism about causal fundamentalism is
certainly not new. Bertrand Russell (1917, 132), more than a century
ago, already made the point:
All philosophers, of every school, imagine that causation
is one of the fundamental axioms or postulates of science,
yet, oddly enough, in advanced sciences such as gravita-
tional astronomy, the word ‘cause’ never occurs [. . .]. The
law of causality, I believe, like much that passes muster
among philosophers, is a relic of a bygone age, surviv-
ing like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously sup-
posed to do no harm.
We could of course supplement our ontology with causal notions, but
this would be tantamount to postulating something beyond physics.
Although causation would be a real and fundamental feature of the
world, it would not supervene on the physical. Price and Weslake
(2009, 372) call this the hyperrealist view of causation, and I share their
worry that it would make causality “both epistemologically inaccessible
and practically irrelevant” (emphasis in original).
In view of this, it may be better to treat causality as a meaningful
and useful heuristic, but to forego all claims for causal fundamental-
ism — a position which has also been endorsed by Norton (2003).
￿.￿.￿ Entropic grounding
The attempt to ground temporal relations in the entropic features of
our world does not fare much better. The aim here is to read off
the past-to-future direction of time from the direction of the entropy
gradient of the universe. Simply put, the idea is that for any two
events p,q "M, p is earlier than q iff the entropy at p is lower than
at q: pEq ø S (p) < S (q). In other words, the temporal arrow
derives from the entropic arrow (which itself finds its origin in the
second law of thermodynamics).
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The project of identifying the direction of time with the direction
of increasing entropy was most famously developed by Reichenbach
(1956) in his seminal work on The Direction of Time.28,29 More than one
reading is possible, however, of Reichenbach’s project (Earman, 1974).
In what follows, I distinguish between a global and a local reading:
1. Global reading: Consider the global entropy of the Universe as a
whole at two different times, t1 and t2. If S (t1) < S (t2), then
t1 is in the past and t2 in the future, and the direction of time
points from t1 to t2.
2. Local reading: Consider the local entropy of a subregion of the
Universe at two different times, and use it to determine the
local arrow of time in that region. Then extrapolate that arrow
to apply to the Universe as a whole.
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . The local reading leads to an immediate problem.
The statistical nature of entropy implies that the entropy of a system
cannot always and everywhere increase. In the long run, entropy is
just as likely to decrease. But if the entropy of a system can both
increase and decrease, then the arrow of time can point both one
way and the other. And so the arrow of time may well point one
way in one subregion of the Universe, and the other way in another
region of the Universe. The direction of time, in other words, could
be ‘simultaneously’ opposite in different parts of the Universe.
The following analogy may be helpful in this regard. Just as the
up-down distinction depends on the local direction of the gradient
of the gravitational field, so the past-future distinction depends on
the local direction of the gradient of the entropy curve. And just as
the up-down direction here in Belgium is opposite to the up-down
direction in New Zealand, so the past-future direction will not be the
same everywhere.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . The above problem can be made more
explicit with the help of the Principle of Precedence (PP) as introduced
by Earman (1974, 22):
Assuming that space-time is temporally orientable, contin-
uous timelike transport takes precedence over any method
(based on entropy or the like) of fixing time direction;
28 The project, in all earnesty, began with Boltzmann. But as Sklar (1981, 111) notes,
Reichenbach turned Boltzmann’s “sketchy remarks” into a “highly complex and
subtle account of the entropic theory of time order.” Other contributions were made
by Grünbaum, Watanabe, Costa de Beauregard and Davies, among others.
29 To be specific, Reichenbach identifies the direction of time in a particular region of
spacetime with the direction of increasing entropy of the majority of almost isolated
(branch) systems in that region.
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that is, if the time senses fixed by a given method in two
regions of space-time [. . .] disagree when compared by
means of transport which is continuous and which keeps
timelike vectors timelike, then if one sense is right, the
other is wrong.
Notice that PP does not enable us to fix a temporal orientation. As
Castagnino et al. (2003, 889) observe, PP “comes into play only after
we already have a given method: PP works as an adequacy criterion
to which any method must fit.” The idea is the following. Let R1 and
R2 be two regions of the Universe. Next, use the direction of increas-
ing entropy to locally fix the direction of time in both regions. Finally,
check by means of continuous timelike transport if both directions
coincide or not.
As I emphasized above, given the local character of Reichenbach’s
method, it is very probable that the temporal directions in R1 and R2
will be opposite. And since continuous timelike transport takes prece-
dence over the entropic method, Reichenbach now faces a dilemma:
“either (i) neither time sense is right or wrong or else (ii) one is right
and the other is wrong” (Earman, 1974, 22). On the latter view, the
entropic program fails; on the former view, one is forced to conclude
that there is no global, fundamental direction of time. Rather, the
past-future distinction may vary from place to place, just as the up-
down distinction varies from place to place. And just as the up-down
direction in Belgium is no more ‘real’ than the up-down direction in
New Zealand, so the past-future direction in R1 is no more ‘real’ than
the past-future direction in R2.
Not surprisingly, Reichenbach endorsed the latter view. He thus
claims that “the alternation of time direction represents no absurdity”
(Reichenbach, 1956, 128). According to Reichenbach, the question
of the direction of time should be posed in exclusively local terms.
That is, one should treat the past-future direction as indexical to a
particular spacetime region (see also Matthews, 1979). But this runs
against our project of defining a global arrow of time for the entire
Universe.30 The local reading of the entropic project thus leads to a
dead end. Reichenbach can define the direction of time locally, but
not globally.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . In view of this, the global reading
referred to above may seem more promising. But even on the global
level, the statistical nature of entropy rears its head, and threatens to
30 Recall that we assumed the arrow of time to be global in order to make sense of
temporal becoming. In the words of Price (2011, 11), “if there is a direction of time
of a kind relevant to the passage of time, it had better be a global notion” (emphasis
in original).
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throw a spanner in the works. Ludwig Boltzmann, the father of sta-
tistical mechanics, became all too aware of this looming threat when
in the late nineteenth century he was forced to deal with Loschmidt’s
reversibility objection and Zermelo’s recurrence objection:
1. Reversibility objection: If the entropy of a system in non-
equilibrium is overwhelmingly likely to increase in the future
temporal direction, then because the laws of physics are time-
reversal invariant, the entropy is overwhelmingly likely to in-
crease in the past temporal direction as well.31
2. Recurrence objection: According to the recurrence theorem of
Poincaré, a system will always return to a state arbitrarily close
to its initial state after some finite time. As such, the entropy
of a system cannot be a monotonically increasing function of
time.32
Both objections can be summarized in slogan form as ‘no asymmetry
in, no asymmetry out.’ Loschmidt’s paradox is typically solved in
one of two ways:
i By imposing a special low-entropy boundary condition (i.e. the
Past Hypothesis,33 see Albert, 2000);
ii By introducing time-reversal noninvariant laws of nature.
Both methods explicitly break the time-symmetry, and thereby aim
at establishing a substantial difference between both temporal direc-
tions.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ’￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . But Boltzmann (1897) came up with a
third solution (even though it resembles the Past Hypothesis locally).
Contrary to the former two methods, Boltzmann argued that in reality
“the two directions of time are indistinguishable” since the universe
is in “thermal equilibrium as a whole and therefore dead”. However,
whenever there is a fluctuation away from thermal equilibrium and
maximal entropy, the direction of time is locally determined by the
direction of increasing entropy (Figure 20):
31 In other words, due to time-reversal invariance, Boltzmannian statistical mechan-
ics predicts that typical microstates corresponding to non-equilibrium will evolve to
higher entropy states, but also retrodicts that they have evolved from higher entropy
states in the past (Callender, 2016). Irreversibility at the macroscale cannot be de-
duced from reversibility at the microscale (i.e. from time-symmetric dynamics).
32 Notice that Poincaré’s recurrence theorem only applies to systems subject to some
constraints, such as the requirement that all particles are bounded to a finite volume.
33 Feynman et al. (1964) asserts that “[f]or some reason, the universe at one time had
a very low entropy for its energy content, and since then entropy has increased. So





Figure 20: According to Boltzmann’s entropic theory, time passes in the di-
rection of increasing entropy. Hence, if c represents a fluctuation
away from thermal equilibrium and maximal entropy, then the
past-to-future direction of time is from right-to-left for a, and
from left-to-right for b.
There must then be in the universe, which is in thermal
equilibrium as a whole and therefore dead, here and there
relatively small regions of the size of our galaxy (which we
call worlds), which during the relatively short time of eons
deviate significantly from thermal equilibrium. Among
these worlds the state probability [entropy] increases as
often as it decreases. For the universe as a whole the two
directions of time are indistinguishable, just as in space
there is no up or down. However, just as at a certain place
on the earth’s surface we can call “down” the direction
toward the centre of the earth, so a living being that finds
itself in such a world at a certain period of time can define
the time direction as going from less probable to more
probable states (the former will be the “past” and the lat-
ter the “future”) and by virtue of this definition he will
find that this small region, isolated from the rest of the
universe, is “initially” always in an improbable state. This
viewpoint seems to me to be the only way in which one
can understand the validity of the second law and the heat
death of each individual world without invoking an uni-
directional change of the entire universe from a definite
initial state to a final state (Boltzmann, 1897, as translated
in Boltzmann, 1966, 242).34
Boltzmann treated the observable part of our universe as a statistical
fluctuation away from thermal equilibrium, and as part of a much
larger multiverse (Carroll, 2010). Importantly, even though the arrow
of time can be defined on the level of our universe, it does not exist
on the multiverse level, which is time-symmetric. The strongest advo-
cate of the ‘no direction option’ today is Price (1996, 2011). According
to Price (2011, 13), “the right answer [to the question of the direction
34 Boltzmann (1964) makes the same suggestion in his Lectures in Gas Theory of 1896–
1898.
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of time] is that there is no answer.” It is not because spacetime is tem-
porally orientable, Price argues, that it has to be temporally oriented.
Reichenbach (1956, 127-128), too, must have had this option in mind,
as he writes:
We cannot speak of a direction for time as a whole; only
certain sections of time have directions, and these direc-
tions are not the same. [. . .] There is no logical neces-
sity for the existence of a unique direction of total time;
whether there is only one time direction, or whether time
directions alternate, depends on the shape of the entropy
curve plotted by the universe.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . But even Boltzmann’s Copernican view is not without
its problems. First of all, if the direction of time is grounded in the
entropic arrow, as Boltzmann and Reichenbach want us to believe,
then the entropy of the universe could never be observed to decrease,
in contradiction with the sayings of statistical mechanics. Maudlin
(2007b, 129) puts it as follows: “Entropy could go up and down like
the stock market [as in Figure 20], but since the ‘direction of time’
would obligingly flip along with the entropy changes, entropy would
still never decrease”.35
Secondly, Boltzmann introduces a global entropy for the universe
at a time. This raises two worries: (i) Boltzmann’s entropic approach
assumes that the spacetime under consideration can be partitioned
into a set of spacelike Cauchy hypersurfaces on which the entropy
of the universe can be defined. Boltzmann, that is, assumes there to
be a universal entropy function S (t), where the variable t plays the
role of cosmic time. Although this is certainly the case for Minkowski
spacetime, not all general relativistic spacetimes admit a partitioning
into time slices, and not all spacetimes come equipped with a cosmic
time on which the entropy function S (t) can be defined (Castagnino
and Lombardi, 2004).
(ii) Boltzmann’s entropic approach assumes that the second law
can be meaningfully applied to the universe as a whole. It remains a
matter of controversy, however, whether the notion of entropy can be
transferred from the field of thermodynamics to the field of cosmol-
ogy. It may not be possible to define a global entropy for the universe
as a whole, as its domain of application may be restricted to smaller
subsystems of the universe (Castagnino et al., 2003).36
Finally, classical thermodynamics is a phenomenological theory
dealing with macroscopic variables such as temperature, pressure,
volume and entropy. Is it not a little strange to ground something as
35 A similar remark can be found in Maudlin (2018, 1808).






Figure 21: Cylindrical spacetime with two events p and q on a closed time-
like curve (CTC). Notice that p is both earlier and later than q.
fundamental as the arrow of time in something as non-fundamental
as thermodynamic magnitudes?37
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Despite the efforts by Boltzmann and Reichenbach, the
entropic theory of temporal direction remains controversial. “To
some it seems obviously true in broad outline, whatever details still
need filling in”, writes Sklar (1981, 111). “To many others the very
idea of the program seems prima facie absurd.” I belong to the second
camp. As I just explained, in order for the entropic program to even
get off the ground, the spacetime under consideration should first be
‘splittable’ in global time slices. I thus strongly agree with Castagnino
et al. (2003b, 2495) that “the geometric structure of spacetime has con-
ceptual priority over the entropic features of the Universe.” I will
return to this point in §4.4.
￿.￿.￿ Closed timelike curves
Putting aside the difficulty of explaining the temporal relations in
terms of a more fundamental physical relation R (be it causal or en-
tropic), there is the additional difficulty of grounding the direction of
time in the temporal relations, as suggested by the grounding chain II.
As Weingard (1977) observes, temporally orientable spacetimes that
contain closed timelike curves (CTCs) admit of a temporal orientation,
even though the asymmetric earlier-than relation E breaks down.
Consider, by way of example, the cylindrical spacetime in Figure 21
where two-dimensional Minkowski spacetime has been compactified
in the timelike direction. Taking circular cross-sections of the cylinder
37 Assuming that the arrow of time coincides with the arrow of becoming, yet another
objection may be voiced. Whereas the arrow of becoming tells the present in which
direction to move, the entropic arrow shows the direction in which entropy increases.
Not only are both arrows clearly distinct, they are also logically independent. In a
world without becoming (e.g. a static block universe), for example, there could still
be an entropy gradient. Contrariwise, in a world without entropy gradient (e.g. a
world that forever remains in a state of maximal entropy), time could still pass.
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yields CTCs. Since the spacetime is temporally orientable, a temporal
orientation can be added to it, as indicated by the arrows in Figure 21.
However, the earlier-than relation E no longer holds: for two events
p and q on a CTC worldline, it follows that pEq, but also that qEp.38
Clearly then, the earlier-than relation is of no use in determining the
temporal orientation.
￿.￿ The time ordering field
If the above-mentioned criticisms are all correct, then the tenseless
theorist seems to be in trouble — at least according to the grounding
chain II above. How then can the tenseless theorist divide the set of
lightcone sheets into a future- and past-directed class, L  and L⇤, in
a non-relational way?
Weingard (1977) offers a potential solution by taking Earman’s def-
inition of temporal orientability in footnote 10 at face value, and by
introducing an everywhere continuous timelike vector field, which
he dubs the time ordering field (TOF). To each spacetime point p "M,
the TOF assigns a vector, which is directed into the future lightcone
of p. It is, in other words, the TOF that helps us bridge the gap from
a temporally orientable spacetime ÖM,gabã to a temporally oriented
one, such as ÖM,gab,  ã.
According to Weingard, all other physical fields and processes are
coupled to the TOF. So, for Weingard, the TOF is the master arrow
that explains all other arrows. This leads to the following grounding
chain:
time ordering field∫g direction of time∫g temporal relations. (III)
Many questions remain, however. How reasonable is it to postulate
the existence of a TOF? Weingard (1977, 130) obviously maintains
that this is “nothing unusual in the practice of physics”. Just think of
the electric and magnetic vector fields for example. But Sklar (1981,
123) objects that “we have no reason whatever to believe that in this
world there is any such field”.39 Callender (2016) calls Weingard’s
TOF a “speculative thesis” on the grounds that Weingard has failed
to elaborate on how exactly the TOF couples to other asymmetric
processes. As long as this challenge is not satisfactorily met, argues
Callender, the TOF theory will remain “interesting but embryonic”.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ . According to Callender (2016), Weingard also
fails to introduce an asymmetry of time. Just as the asymmetric dis-
tinction between up and down here on Earth is due to the presence of
38 Since E is an asymmetric relation it should follow from pEq that ¬qEp.
39 Sklar’s paper has been republished in Sklar (1985), Chapter 12.
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a gravitational potential, and not to an intrinsic asymmetry of space,
so Callender maintains, the asymmetric distinction between future
and past in our Universe is due to the presence of a time potential,
and not to an intrinsic asymmetry of time.
Callender hereby raises an important question: What exactly would
it take to say that there is an asymmetry of time, or that time itself is
intrinsically directed? In the above three grounding cases, we were
able to tell the future and the past apart via different asymmetries in
time, such as the moving now, the causal or entropic arrow, or the
TOF. But does the existence of such asymmetries in time in any way
indicate that time itself is anisotropic? That is, do the asymmetries in
time confer anisotropy upon time?
The analogy with space may be helpful once again. Before the dis-
covery of Earth’s gravitational pull, it only seemed natural to ascribe
the up-down asymmetry to an asymmetry of space itself, rather than
to an asymmetry in space. Indeed, according to Aristotelian physics,
all bodies move toward their natural place: down, toward the center
of the cosmos, for the elements earth and water, and up, toward the
celestial spheres, for the elements air and fire. As Christensen (1993,
198) observes, it is “interesting that we should so naturally take some-
thing which is extrinsic to space to be a part of its own character.” Are
we not committing the same mistake with time?
Horwich (1987, 46) indeed maintains that “we should not assume
that every time-asymmetrical phenomenon is symptomatic of time’s
anisotropy”. Price (2011, 20) concurs that the “content of time —
i.e. the arrangement of physical stuff — might be temporally asym-
metric, without time itself having any asymmetry. Accordingly, we
need to be cautious in making inferences from observed temporal
asymmetries to the anisotropy of time itself.” Mehlberg (1962, 104),
finally, agrees that on “presently available evidence time’s arrow is
[. . .] a gratuitous assumption.”
It bears repeating at this point that if Horwich, Price and Mehlberg
are right that time has no objective direction, then temporal becoming
cannot be an objective feature of reality either.40 “Indeed, the whole
idea that time ‘passes’ at all”, writes Maudlin (2012, 168), would be
“some sort of illusion” if time were not intrinsically directed.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ . But are Horwich, Price and Mehlberg right?
I am of two minds about their claims. On the one hand, I agree that
asymmetries in time may not be evidence for the asymmetry of time.
40 Here, Horwich is in full agreement. The “problem of finding out which of the two
possible orientations is the actual one”, Horwich (1987, 49) maintains, “can concern
only those who are in the grip of a ‘moving now’ conception of time” (emphasis in
original).
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On the other hand, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.41
That is, even if the asymmetries in time do not confer anisotropy upon
time, this does not mean that there can be no asymmetry of time.
But what would it then take to say that time is intrinsically directed?
The answer, in my opinion, would have to be geometrical in nature.
Just as an ordinary arrow is intrinsically directed, because its head
and tail are geometrically different, so the arrow of time would be in-
trinsically directed because its two temporal senses are geometrically
distinct.42 This brings me to the fourth, and final, way of grounding
the direction of time.
￿.￿ The time direction heresy
I argued in §4.2 and §4.3 that the tenseless theorist cannot ground
the direction of time in temporal relations or the time ordering field.
What option remains? As I alluded to above, the only remaining
option is to take the direction of time as constituting the fundamental
level, which is itself ungrounded. Or, perhaps more correctly, the
direction of time is to be grounded in the geometrical properties of
spacetime itself.
Earman (1974, 20) refers to this position as The Time Direction Heresy
— the view that the “temporal orientation is an intrinsic feature of
space-time which does not need to be and cannot be reduced to non-
temporal features”. The idea, in other words, is that the past-to-future
and future-to-past directions can be distinguished solely in terms of
the geometrical, spatiotemporal features of spacetime, independently
from any causal or entropic considerations. Earman confesses that he
is “not at all sure that The Time Direction Heresy is correct”, but he
is “certain that a failure to consider it, if only for purposes of contrast,
will only lead to further stagnation” (p. 20).
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . The Time Direction Heresy is currently championed by
Maudlin (2002, 2007b). As Maudlin (2007b, 108) notes:
Earman himself does not unequivocally endorse the
Heresy, but does argue that no convincing arguments
against it could be found, at that time, in the very exten-
sive literature on the direction of time. Over three decades
later, I think that this is still the case, and I want to pos-
41 Of course, neither is it evidence of presence. The maxim “absence of evidence is not
evidence of absence” was originally coined by the cosmologist Martin Rees, in the
context of the search for extraterrestrial intelligence, and was later popularized by
Carl Sagan.
42 The analogy with an ordinary arrow was first made by Castagnino et al. (2003). See
also Castagnino and Lombardi (2009).
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itively promote the Heresy. [. . . My] chapter can be seen
as a somewhat more aggressive companion piece to [Ear-
man’s].
Maudlin (2007b) thus considers the direction of time to be an “in-
trinsic asymmetry in the temporal structure of the universe” (p. 109).
This intrinsic asymmetry, in his view, is “a fundamental, irreducible
fact” (p. 107). Like Aristotle’s unmoved mover, the direction of time
is the ungrounded grounder for all other asymmetric processes in
the world. The causal arrow, for example, “is itself parasitic on a fun-
damental asymmetry of time”, dixit Maudlin (2012, 166). The same
holds true for the thermodynamic arrow, which according to Maudlin
(2012, 167) “presupposes a time direction”.43
In summary, for Maudlin the arrow of time is the master arrow
which explains all other arrows. It is the asymmetry of time that ex-
plains the asymmetries in time, not the other way round. The ground-
ing chain for Maudlin thus looks as follows:
direction of time g temporal relations g causal/entropic arrow. (IV)
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . For Maudlin (2007b, 109), the “passage of time is deeply
connected to the problem of the direction of time, or time’s arrow.”
Maudlin thus employs the irreducible character of time’s direction to
argue for the irreducible character of time’s passage. The passage of
time, writes Maudlin (2007b, 110), is not to be “explicated by means of
any other more primitive notion.” It is “a metaphysically fundamen-
tal characteristic that cannot be further analyzed [. . .] into simpler or
more basic components.” Temporal becoming, in short, is in no need
of further justification or explanation.
Maudlin’s primitivist view (when properly adapted to a relativistic
setting) is thus no different from Newton’s, who claimed that “time,
of itself, and from its own nature, flows equably without relation to
anything external” (Newton, 1934). It also explains why Maudlin can
uphold the compatibility between the block universe and temporal
passage, as I explained in the previous chapter.
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Despite holding a minority position,44 Maudlin
is certainly not the only advocate of The Time Direction Heresy. Many
philosophers of time, while perhaps not fully endorsing the Heresy,
43 In his paper On the Passing of Time, Maudlin (2007b) also shows how the time rever-
sal invariance of the laws of physics, far from questioning the asymmetry of time,
actually presupposes it. The same, Maudlin suggests, applies to the boundary con-
ditions, which need to be invoked along with the laws of physics.
44 As Maudlin (2007b, 107) himself observed, a brief exposition of his views are usually
sufficient “to convince my interlocutors that whatever it is I believe in, it is something
that they do not.”
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do flirt with the idea. Savitt (2002, 164), for example, maintains that
“the happening of events is so fundamental a notion that it cannot be
explained in terms of simpler or more basic ideas.” That is, Savitt
seems to take the passage of time as an irreducible primitive, which
may suggest that he also takes the direction of time to be primitive.
Another possible example comes from Sklar (1974, 411), who writes:
[I]f we are to have any epistemic access into the world at
all, then at least some [. . .] relations must be knowable to
us “directly” and not in terms of inferability from other
“directly observable” relations. Just as the theory of spe-
cial relativity assumes that the coincidence and noncoin-
cidence of events is directly apprehensible by us, [. . .] so
we may suppose that at least some relations of temporal
priority are also among the directly inspectable features of
events.
A full-fledged Heretic is Christensen (1993), who traces the asymme-
tries in time back to the asymmetry of time. “Surely there must be
some common reason [. . .] for the existence of the various asymme-
tries in time”, argues Christensen (1993, 211) — “what else might it
be if not the asymmetry of time itself?”
That being said, neither Maudlin nor Christensen elaborate on how
precisely the asymmetry of time gives rise to the asymmetries in time.
It also remains unclear on both primitivist accounts what intrinsic
structure of spacetime is supposed to yield the temporal orientation
of spacetime.
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ . The staunchest promotors of The Time
Direction Heresy to date are Castagnino et al. (2003, 2003a, 2003b, 2004,
2009). “If the arrow of time reflects a substantial difference between
both directions of time,” write Castagnino et al. (2003b, 2492), it is
only “reasonable to think that it is an intrinsic property of time, or
better, of space-time, and not a secondary feature depending on a
phenomenological property.” They thus characterize their approach
as global and non-entropic.45
Among the necessary conditions for defining a global, non-entropic
arrow of time, Castagnino et al. emphasize the temporal orientability
of spacetime, as I did in §2, as well as the presence of a global time
function, which allows spacetime to be foliated in hypersurfaces of
simultaneity, and the folia to be labeled by the cosmic time t. With
these conditions satisfied, the two temporal directions can at least be
45 Global because their aim is to define a global arrow of time. Non-entropic because
entropy is a phenomenological property that is less fundamental than, and in some
ways even dependent on, the geometrical properties of spacetime itself.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 125
conventionally distinguished. But how do they establish a substantial
distinction?
It is here that the approaches by Maudlin and Castagnino begin
to diverge. Whereas Maudlin simply posits the arrow of time as a
fundamental and irreducible fact, Castagnino et al. seek to ground it
in the time-asymmetry of spacetime itself.46 Despite the time-reversal
invariance of the Einstein field equations, Castagnino et al. (2003a)
show that almost all spacetime models in which a cosmic time can be
defined, are globally time-asymmetric. When translated to the local
level, this time-asymmetry takes the form of a local non-spacelike
energy flow towards the future (see also Aiello et al., 2008 and Bartels
and Wohlfarth, 2014).
The details should not concern us here. For our purposes, it suf-
fices that both approaches are grounding the temporal arrow in the
geometrical facts of spacetime itself, and do not need to take recourse
to any other non-temporal facts. As such, Maudlin and Castagnino et
al. have provided a physical basis for Earman’s Time Direction Heresy.
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
I began this chapter arguing for the need of a global direction of
time for temporal becoming. After distinguishing the notions of tem-
poral orientability and temporal orientation, I showed that temporal
orientability is a neccessary but not sufficient condition for temporal
orientation. Hence, even though Minkowski spacetime is temporally
orientable, it remains an open question whether it is also temporally
oriented. Despite this fact, many philosophers of physics, especially
those concerned with the prospects of temporal becoming, simply as-
sume the spacetime manifold to be endowed with a time direction,
without explaining where the arrow comes from.
I thus looked at four possible ways of grounding the direction of
time in more fundamental facts, be it the moving now, the causal or
entropic arrow, the time ordering field, or the geometrical properties
of spacetime itself. The grounding problem is traditionally analyzed
in a tenseless manner, by grounding the asymmetry of time in the
asymmetries in time. However, in view of the objections raised above,
I ended up defending Earman’s Time Direction Heresy which inverses
the grounding relation and thus grounds the asymmetries in time
in the asymmetry of time. I am thus of the same mind as Maudlin,
Christensen and Castagnino et al. who take the direction of time to
be an intrinsic, irreducible, geometrical property of spacetime. This
46 Spacetime is time-asymmetric when no hypersurface of simultaneity exists that splits
the spacetime in two halves such that one is the temporal mirror image of the other.
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also renders relational becoming BU-compatible, and explains why
Maudlin can uphold both the BU theory of time and the passage of




Human freedom is in tension with nomological determinism, block
determinism and statistical determinism. The goal of this chapter is
to answer all of these challenges. Four contributions are made to the
free will debate. First, we propose a classification of scientific theories
based on how much freedom they allow, and take into account that
indeterminism comes in different degrees and that both the laws and
the boundary conditions can place constraints. A scientific worldview
pulls towards one end of this classification, while libertarianism pulls
towards the other end of the spectrum. Second, inspired by Hoefer,
we argue that an interval of boundary conditions corresponds to a
region in phase space, and to a bundle of block universes. We thus
make room for a form of non-nomological indeterminism. Third, we
combine crucial elements from the works of Hoefer and List, and
we attempt to give a libertarian reading of this combination. On our
proposal, throughout spacetime, there is a certain amount of freedom
(equivalent to setting the initial, intermediate or final conditions) that
can be interpreted as the result of agential choices. Fourth, we focus
on the principle of alternative possibilities throughout and propose




For centuries, humans have wondered whether we possess free will.
We certainly feel as if we are in charge. We deem ourselves to be the
thinkers of our own thoughts, the authors of our actions. But is this
really true? Or could free will be an illusion? Perhaps we are but
witnesses of our own lives, prisoners of the strict laws of cause and
effect.
The deceptively simple question “Do we have free will or not?” has
occupied some of the greatest minds in philosophy, theology and
science. But despite their heroic efforts, the question remains as insis-
tent today as it was back in the days of the Greek stoics.1 For many,
a satisfactory answer to the question of free will hinges on another
question, namely “Is the world deterministic or not?”
The latter question, however, can be read in at least two ways. As
I indicated in the first chapter, a distinction has to be made between
nomological determinism and block determinism. Traditionally, the
free will debate has mostly revolved around the tension between the
freedom of will and nomological determinism. But when the problem
is considered from a block universe perspective, an altogether new,
and surprisingly underexplored, tension arises between the freedom
of will and block determinism.
In this chapter, we will assume both forms of determinism. Our
framework, in other words, will be a four-dimensional block universe
that is both completely determined (in the nomological sense) and
fully determinate (in the block sense). Relaxing determinateness, but
retaining nomological determinism, yields multiple possible block
universes, as we will see in §2.2
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Most philosophers
today lean towards compatibilist free will. Still, our focus will be on
libertarian free will.2 The reason for doing so is that libertarianism is
often considered as demanding more of free will than compatibilism.
In that sense, we are pushing the debate to its limits by considering
the worst case scenario (a fully determined and determinate block
universe) and gauging how much room is left for the strongest form
of free will. The accounts of libertarianism that will be considered
1 John Searle (2007, 37) laments this lack of progress, and calls it a real “scandal” for
philosophy.
2 For an overview of the free will debate, and the differences between compatibilism
and libertarianism, see the Oxford Handbook of Free Will, and the introduction by
(Kane, 2011). The conversation between Robert Kane, John Martin Fischer, Derk
Pereboom and Manuel Vargas in Four Views on Free Will (Fischer et al., 2007) provides
another introduction to the different views that are currently on the philosophical
market.
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here, however, will never involve a rejection of physicalism. No non-
physical minds or immaterial souls will be postulated. Instead, we as-
sume the closure of physics throughout and remain firmly grounded
in a naturalist outlook on the world. One important requirement for
libertarian free will is that an agent could have acted otherwise under
exactly the same conditions.3 Following Frankfurt (1969), we call this
ability to do otherwise the principle of alternative possibilities.4,5
Definition 7. Principle of alternative possibilities (PAP): The action
of an agent is free only if the agent could have acted otherwise under
exactly the same conditions.
Libertarian free will is challenged in at least two ways:
1. Challenge from determinism;
2. Challenge from indeterminism.
We look at both of these challenges in turn, with particular attention
to the tension with PAP (and variants thereof), and gauge whether
they can be dealt with in a satisfactory way. The ultimate goal of this
chapter is to develop an account of libertarian free will that answers
both of these challenges. Although the challenge from determinism
can be read in two ways, as indicated above, our initial focus will be
on the traditional challenge from nomological determinism. Still, in
formulating our answer to that challenge, the block universe view of
time will have to be invoked (§2.4). Towards the end of the chapter,
the challenge from block determinism also surfaces.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . We begin by addressing the challenge from determinism
in §2. We take our cue from three contemporary authors, viz. Daniel
Dennett, Christian List and Carl Hoefer, who have emphasized the
importance of level dependence and boundary conditions. Although
Dennett and Hoefer, in particular, lean towards compatibilism, we
3 Not everyone agrees with this requirement. Source incompatibilists, for instance,
argue that as far as moral responsibility is concerned, the ability to do otherwise is
irrelevant (Frankfurt, 1969, Vihvelin, 2018). What is required for moral responsibility,
in their view, is that an agent is the ultimate source of her actions. Leeway incompat-
ibilists, in contrast, do take PAP to be crucial for free will (see also Pereboom, 2003).
In this chapter, we do not aim to defend PAP as an important ingredient for free
will: our analysis starts from the assumption that it is. For those who disagree, the
subsequent analysis may be irrelevant.
4 In fact, the original term is ‘alternate’ possibilities. Although PAP was originally
formulated in the context of discussions on moral responsibility, this is not our focus
here.
5 PAP is a necessary but not sufficient condition for libertarian free will. Most authors
writing on libertarian free will include one or more additional principles as crucial
for free will. List (2019), for instance, identifies three principles: (1) intentional
agency, (2) alternative possibilities, and (3) causal control. Nonetheless, the sole
focus of our discussion below will be PAP.
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show how their ideas can make room also for libertarianism. Before
doing so, however, we discuss the challenge from indeterminism in
§3. We propose a more fine-grained classification of indeterminism
in scientific theories and analyze which options can accommodate a
libertarian notion of free will. We combine these insights into our
proposal in §4, and briefly conclude in §5.
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
In what follows, we adopt Earman’s definition of determinism in
terms of possible worlds (Earman, 1986; Roberts, 2006, see also the
Appendix). Let W be the class of possible worlds and consider the
subclass of physically possible worlds W L W . These are the worlds
in which the same laws of physics apply as in our world.
Definition 8. Determinism: The world w "W is deterministic if and
only if for any wì " W and any time t, if w and wì agree on the
complete physical state at t, then they agree on the complete physical
state at all other times t ¨.6
Note that Earman’s definition does not say why the world is deter-
ministic. It does not specify the mechanism by which determinism is
supposed to work. You might subscribe to determinism because you
believe in an omniscient God, for whom the past, present and future
is already known, and therefore settled. In that case, you are a sup-
porter of theological determinism. Or perhaps you believe that the state
of the world at time t, along with the laws of Nature, determines the
state of the world at all other times t ¨. In that case, you are subscrib-
ing to nomological determinism. Or maybe you feel as if every event
has been caused by a unique chain of prior causes. In that case you
are defending causal determinism.7
The point is that in each of these cases you are saying something
over and above the mere thesis of determinism. Theological determin-
ism combines determinism with divine foreknowledge; nomological
determinism unites determinism with nomological necessity; causal
determinism merges determinism with causalism. But determinism
itself is mute about the way it gets implemented in the world. In this
chapter, though, we silently assume nomological determinism.
6 If w and wì only agree on the complete physical state at the times t ¨ > t, then w is
said to be futuristically deterministic. Likewise, if w and wì only agree on the com-
plete physical state at the times t ¨ < t, then w is said to be historically deterministic.
7 Although nomological and causal determinism are often taken to be synonymous,
we prefer to keep them separate. The reason for doing so is the ambiguous nature of
causation. We agree with Earman (1986, 5) that causal determinism “seeks to explain
a vague concept — determinism — in terms of a truly obscure one — causation.”
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The jury is still out on whether our world is deterministic or not.
Observe that it is a metaphysical thesis rather than a physical one: it
requires a comparison across (physically) possible worlds, whereas
experiments only tell us results about the actual one.8
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Assuming that the world is de-
terministic, proponents of libertarian free will face the challenge from
determinism (List and Menzies, 2017). That is, assuming nomological
determinism and a full description of the physical world at a given
time t, possibly before you were born, it is fully determined what the
state of the world will be at any other point in time t ¨, including those
during and after you made your choices. In other words, if you could
replay the tape of your life, and go back to a previous moment of
decision (making sure the state of the universe is exactly the same as
before), you cannot decide differently. So, PAP is incompatible with
determinism. In summary, the challenge from determinism reads:
Challenge from determinism
(P1) Libertarian free will requires PAP;
(P2) Nomological determinism rules out PAP;
(C) Free will and nomological determinism are incompatible.
The argument purports to show that there is no room for libertarian
free will in a deterministic world.
The challenge from determinism is often taken to indicate that the
freedom of will requires an element of indeterminism. This suggests
that the underlying physical theory needs to be indeterministic. Such
a theory exists: orthodox, Copenhagen quantum theory. However,
there exist deterministic formalisms that are empirically equivalent
with quantum mechanics (such as Bohmian mechanics). Moreover, a
future theory beyond quantum mechanics (such as one for quantum
gravity) may turn out to be deterministic. So, based on the current
state of physics, we cannot rule out that we may be living in a world
that is best described by a deterministic physics at the fundamental
level.9
Hence, quantum theory is not an obvious escape from the challenge
from determinism after all. Is there then a way to rebut the argument
directly? In §2.1 to §2.3, we review the work of three contemporary
8 Observe also that determinism is an ontic thesis, whereas predictability is an epistemic
one. Determinism is therefore compatible with practical unpredictability: even in a
deterministic world, we may not be able to practically carry out the retrodictions or
predictions (because we do not know the laws of nature, for instance, or because we
fail to attain complete knowledge of the state of the world at a certain time).
9 In fact, we will not be able to do so conclusively at any point. As we already men-
tioned, determinism is a metaphysical thesis, which lies beyond the scope of experi-
ment. We will return to this in the context of emergentism in §2.3.
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authors who have tried to make the case for compatibilism of agen-
tial freedom with an underlying deterministic theory. The authors
in question are Daniel Dennett, Christian List and Carl Hoefer. We
also show how their accounts can be combined into an even stronger
answer to the challenge from determinism. (We return to indetermin-
ism in §3.)
￿.￿ Dennett creates some elbow room
A cellular automaton is a set of rules for how patterns of cells on a
grid evolve over time. These cells can be squares on a game board or
pixels on a computer screen. In the simplest version, the cells can be
‘on’ or ‘off ’ and the rules for their evolution are nomologically deter-
ministic. Despite the simplicity of the code, some cellular automata
show wonderful complexity in their output.
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ . A famous example was called the Game of Life
by its creator, mathematician John Conway, who was looking for a
simple set of rules that could produce surprising patterns that looked
alive. He settled on four rules that govern whether an individual cell
will be on or off at the next instant.
The Game of Life is a two-dimensional cellular automaton. At a
given time-step, the individual cells in the square grid can be either
on or off. The cells evolve according to the following rules. An off cell
with exactly three neighbours that are on switches to on (‘birth’). An
on cell with two or three neighbours that are on stays on (‘survival’).
In all other cases, a cell remains or switches to off (‘loneliness’ or
‘overcrowding’).
A typical pattern that the Game of Life produces is called a ‘glider’:
it consists of a recurrent pattern, that moves along a diagonal (see
Figure 22). The individual cells do not move: all they can do is switch
between on and off. Yet, for a particular starting configuration of five
on cells surrounded by off cells, the same pattern recurs in four time-
steps, displaced by one step along a diagonal. It is hard for a human
observing a simulation of the Game of Life not to track that pattern
through time and to consider it as one entity.
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ . Dennett (2003) has used the Game of Life to reflect
on freedom in a world with fixed dynamical rules.10 He offered this
cellular automaton as an illustration of a possible (compatibilist) rec-
onciliation between deterministic physical laws and human freedom.
Dennett proposed that sheer complexity allows us to abstract away
10 See also Dennett’s previous works on free will, in particular his book Elbow Room
(2015), first published in 1984, which laid the foundation for his compatibilist project.
The title of this section is a reference to his book.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ 133
Figure 22: In the Game of Life, a glider is a specific pattern of five on cells.
When surrounded only by off cells, the initial configuration is re-
peated after four steps of the automaton, except now it is trans-
posed along a distance of one along a diagonal.
from the automaton rules (which he called the physical level) and to
talk about the emerging patterns instead (which he called the design
level). Dennett (2003, 40) wrote: “whereas at the physical level, there
are absolutely no exceptions to the general law, at the design level
our generalizations have to be hedged: they require ‘usually’ clauses”.
Usually, gliders glide on, but occasionally they bump into other pat-
terns and are destroyed.11 This may be quantified, leading to stochas-
tic laws at the design level.
Gliders and other emergent patterns in the Game of Life have no
agency though and are unable to change the rules of their simulated
world. So it may well be that the model falls short to address the
questions we set out to answer. Indeed, Dennett used the example
of the Game of Life to argue for compatibilism, not libertarianism.12
Still, we think it is instructive to compare the seminal ideas of Dennett
to those of List and Hoefer, whose ideas we will discuss in more detail
below. There are two key ideas that are very clear in the context
of cellular automata and which might create more elbow room for
free will than Dennett himself envisaged: (1) the level dependence of
determinism and (2) the role of boundary conditions. Both ideas are
intimately connected, as we will show further on.
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . The idea of level dependence refers to the exis-
tence of different levels. Dennett emphasized that while the physical
level may be deterministic, the design level need not be. This idea
has recently been developed by List, who also explicitly linked this
to the problem of human freedom (see §2.3).
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . The idea concerning boundary conditions is
to consider them as an additional source of freedom, besides what is
offered by the laws, as proposed by Hoefer (2002) (see §2.4). The
11 Another pattern in the Game of Life is called an ‘eater’ which can ‘eat’ gliders. When
a glider collides with any other pattern, this may or may not produce another glider.
12 In the preface to the new edition of Elbow Room, Dennett (2015, ix) likens libertarian
freedom and agent causation to mermaids and leprechauns who “don’t, and can’t,
exist [even though] some philosophers still take them seriously”.
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rules of a cellular automaton constrain how things change from one
moment to the next, just like we imagine the laws of nature do. Yet,
even if these constraints are (nomologically) deterministic, leaving no
freedom for how one thing leads to another, they do not constrain
how things are at a given instant. The reason for this is that the
rules of the Game of Life do not constrain which starting patterns are
allowed: any combination of on and off cells is allowed.
In other words, if we consider the world to be nomologically deter-
ministic — like a cellular automaton such as the Game of Life — we
need boundary conditions in addition to the dynamical rules to pick
out a unique evolution. We tend to think of the boundary conditions
as fully specified initial conditions. This makes sense in the case of a
cellular automaton, which is typically initialized by us. But in reality,
we find ourselves and our actions in medias res. We know most about
the current situation, in which we find ourselves choosing and acting,
so why don’t we take this more seriously? Instead of a past boundary
condition, we can add the current condition to the dynamical rules
and regard it as a constraint on the past and future. This is exactly
what Hoefer (2002, 221) proposed: “the direction of determination
(and, for most free actions, correct explanation) is from your choices
to the ways the physical world can be — both toward the past and
the future.”
In order to present the ideas of List and Hoefer more fully, we need
to introduce some basic notions of statistical mechanics. Readers who
are familiar with that formalism may skip the next subsection.
￿.￿ Review of statistical mechanics
There is no unified and generally accepted formalism of statistical
mechanics; instead there are two: the Boltzmannian approach and the
Gibbsian approach. For our purposes, the Boltzmannian approach is
the most useful one.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Consider a dynamic system S of N point-particles.
The system can be in a number of states which evolve over time. The
set of all possible states of S is called the state space of S . In the case
of Boltzmannian statistical mechanics, the state of S is provided by
the (fine-grained) microstate x = (q,p), which specifies the positions
q = q1, . . . ,q3N and momenta p = p1, . . . ,p3N of all the particles, and
the state space is the 6N-dimensional phase space   .
The change of the system’s microstate over time is governed by the
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with H (q,p) the Hamiltonian of the system. This induces a phase
flow  t ⇥  ∫   on the phase space, with  t a one-to-one mapping.
For example, if the system starts out in the microstate x(0) "   at
time t = 0, it will trace out a trajectory in phase space under the
Hamiltonian dynamics, and be mapped to  1 0(x) = x(1) "   at time
t = 1. What is important for our purposes is that the Hamiltonian
dynamics, which maps an initial state to its final state, is perfectly
deterministic.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . The temporal path of the system through phase space
is called its history. Formally, the history of S is a map h from the
reals (time) into the system’s phase space, assigning to each instant
of time t a corresponding microstate x (t) of   :
h ⇥ R     ; t( x (t) . (21)
If the system S starts out in a different microstate, it will trace out a
different trajectory in   , yielding a different history h ¨ for S .
Notice that the different possible trajectories in   represent differ-
ent possible block universes, or possible worlds in the terminology of
our definition for determinism, satisfying the same Hamiltonian laws
of evolution. Due to the Hamiltonian dynamics, each of these block
universes is completely deterministic. Which one of these possible
block universes gets actualized depends on the boundary conditions
(i.e., on which microstate is selected as the initial — or final, or inter-
mediate — state, see further).
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ’￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . The phase space   is further endowed with
the Lebesgue measure µ. According to Liouville’s theorem, the Lebesgue
measure is preserved under the dynamics of the system. That is, the
dynamic evolution of a system will preserve the volume of its initial
phase space region:
µ (R) = µ ( t (R)) , (22)
for all regions R N   . The shape of R, on the other hand, can change
quite dramatically over time.13 In summary, the mathematical frame-
work of Boltzmannian statistical mechanics is the triple Ö  , t,µã.
13 This is the case in particular for systems with chaotic dynamics. Informally, deter-
ministic chaos occurs for systems that have regions in their phase space such that
nearby points evolve to points that are far removed. This is related to the property
of sensitive dependence on initial conditions and the rate of separation is made nu-
merically precise by the Lyapunov exponent. Werndl (2009b) has argued that chaos
is best defined in terms of mixing on a subset of the phase space. (Here, mixing
is a mathematical notion inspired by the physical notion: see Werndl’s paper for
the precise definition.) Werndl concludes that “for predicting any event at any level
of precision " > 0, all sufficiently past events are approximately probabilistically
irrelevant.”
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￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Now, let M denote the set of all (coarse-grained)
macrostates Mi (i = 1, . . . ,m) of the system. Each macrostate specifies
the state of the system at a macroscopic level of grain, but not the mi-
croscopic configuration of all the point-particles. There is therefore a
many-to-one mapping   from   intoM, such that for every microstate
x in   there is exactly one corresponding macrostate   (x) =M (x) in
M, but where a given macrostate Mi in M can be realized by more
than one microstate x in   .
Every macrostate Mi picks out a particular macroregion  Mi in
phase space:
 Mi ⇥= {x "   ∂ M (x) =Mi} , (23)
such that the different  Mi form a partition (or coarse-graining) of   .
In other words, the different Mi do not overlap and jointly cover   :




 Mi =   . (24b)
With the help of the supervenience mapping   from microstates to
macrostates, we can turn every fine-grained history h into a coarse-
grained history h, with
h ⇥ R  M; t(M (t) =   (x (t)) .14 (25)
￿.￿ List raises level dependence
List (2014, 2015) grants that the free-will sceptic might be correct in
concluding that, at the level of deterministic fundamental physics,
there are no alternative possibilities. The mistake, according to List,
is to claim that there are no alternative possibilities at all. To sub-
stantiate this claim, List begins by arguing that free will is a higher-
level concept, belonging to the domain of the special sciences. “Free
will is not a physical phenomenon,” writes List (2014, 174), “but a
higher-level phenomenon on a par with other familiar higher-level
phenomena such as beliefs, desires, and intentions.”
As such, we should look for free will (and the ability to do oth-
erwise) at the macroscopic agential level, and not at the microscopic
14 In statistical physics, the supervenience mapping from micro- to macrostates is also
crucial to define entropy: the Boltzmann entropy of a microstate depends logarith-
mically on the number of microstates ‘in’ (that is, consistent with) the corresponding
macrostate. To be specific, the Boltzmann entropy of a macrostate M is defined as
SB (M) = kB log [µ ( M)], with kB the Boltzmann constant.
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physical level. “If we are searching for free will at the level of funda-
mental physics,” List (2014, 174) conjectures, “we are simply search-
ing in the wrong place.” This is similar to Dennett’s approach, though
List aims to achieve more than compatibilism.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ . List (2015) therefore contends
that the challenge from determinism involves a category mistake due
to a mixing of different levels. Premise (P2), after all, is a thesis about
physical possibility, not agential possibility. Yet, when discussing free
will, we are interested in agential possibility. The challenge from de-
terminism should thus be modified to read:
Challenge from determinism*
(P1) Libertarian free will requires PAP;
(P2) Agential determinism rules out PAP;
(C) Free will and agential determinism are incompatible.
In this modified form, the challenge from determinism shows that
libertarian free will requires indeterminism at the agential level, but
not necessarily at the physical level. This opens up a potential new
avenue for libertarian free will. But for this, List has to show that
determinism at the physical level is compatible with indeterminism
at the agential level. In order to demonstrate this, List (2014) intro-
duces the notion of an agential state to denote the state of the agent
as described by the relevant higher-level (macroscopic, psychologi-
cal) theory, and to contrast it with the physical state as described by
the lower-level (microscopic, physical) theory. Crucially, the agential
state is (1) fully determined by the physical state and (2) more coarse-
grained than the physical state. List calls (1) supervenience and (2)
multiple realizability.
Definition 9. Supervenience: no variation in the agential state is pos-
sible without a variation in the physical state.
Definition 10. Multiple realizability: typically, more than one phys-
ical state corresponds to a particular agential state; hence, not every
variation in the physical state will give rise to a variation in the agen-
tial state.
At this point, the link with Boltzmannian microstates and macrostates
is easily made.15 To be precise, let the agential states correspond to
the macrostates Mi and the physical states to the microstates x =
15 Although List does not expound his theory in these terms, it can be easily adopted
to a statistical mechanics framework. To the best of our knowledge, List only makes
the link with statistical mechanics in the conclusions of his 2014 paper (p. 174): “This
echoes the way in which statistical mechanics accounts for the emergence of stochas-
ticity in a deterministic Newtonian world.”
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Figure 23: In these two diagrams, microstate x is represented as a one-
dimensional, continuous variable and time t (running from top
to bottom) is taken to be discrete. Microstates are indicated by
small circles, macrostates by larger ellipses. Histories are indi-
cated by lines between instantaneous states. The diagram at the
top shows micro-level determinism; the diagram at the bottom
shows that this is compatible with macro-level indeterminism.
(q,p). (1) The macrostates in M supervene on the microstates in   .
In other words, you cannot change Mi without changing x. And,
(2) to each microstate corresponds exactly one macrostate, but many
distinct microstates can correspond to the same macrostate: this is
multiple realizability.
￿.￿.￿ PAP from multiple realizability
As List (2014) observed, the multiple realizability of macrostates by
microstates makes it possible for the supervenience mapping   to be
such that determinism at the micro-level is mapped to indeterminism
at the macro-level.16 This is illustrated in Figure 23.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . In the top part of Figure 23, every circle
represents a possible microstate x "   of the system at a particular
time t. At the start, t = 0, the system can be in one of multiple
microstates: for definiteness, we have indicated three of them. Each
16 In the context of physics, List is not the first to consider this idea. Werndl (2009a) has
given examples of observationally equivalent systems that can be modelled by deter-
ministic and stochastic equations. See also Butterfield (2012) for a terminologically
distinct account of how micro-level determinism can be compatible with macro-level
indeterminism.
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of these evolves in time, tracing out a trajectory through phase space,
as indicated by the various lines connecting the dots. Each trajectory
represents one of the three possible histories hj (j = 1   3). All
histories are deterministic, since no branching occurs at the micro-
level.
The macro-level supervenes on the micro-level. That is, to each
microstate x corresponds a macrostate M (x), as represented by the
ellipses in the bottom diagram. Specifically, all microstates lying in
the same x-interval are mapped to the same macrostate (multiple re-
alizability), with the ellipses representing the different macroregions
 M(x). To every history hj at the physical micro-level corresponds a
coarse-grained history hj =    hj⌥ at the agential macro-level. In this
case, however, branching points do occur, leading to indeterminism.
For instance, although the three histories are the same initially, they
diverge at t = 1. Clearly then, indeterminism at the macro-level is
consistent with determinism at the micro-level, given supervenience
and multiple realizability. Call this emergent indeterminism.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . For List, PAP is the requirement
that branching points are present, not in the micro-level histories,
but in the macro-level histories, since free will is a macro-level phe-
nomenon. In view of the above, it should be clear that alternative
possibilities might be available to the agent after all, as required by
libertarian free will.
List (2015) calls his account of free will compatibilist libertarianism.
It is compatibilist because it takes nomological determinism to be
compatible with free will, just like other compatibilist accounts of
free will. It is libertarian because it takes free will to require agen-
tial indeterminism to allow for alternative possibilities, unlike other
compatibilist accounts of free will.
Like gliders in the Game of Life, which can either glide on or get
eaten, humans in Real Life are faced with multiple possible futures.
Indeed, replaying the tape of life at the level of gliders or humans,
does allow for different outcomes, because the macro-level descrip-
tion underdetermines the underlying micro-physical state. In other
words, the source of List’s agential indeterminism is the multiple real-
izability of a macrostate by microstates: multiple physical microstates
can realize one and the same psychological macrostate. Notice that
each of these microstates corresponds to a different boundary condi-
tion on which the deterministic laws can act (see §2.4).17
17 Of course, if a full specification of the glider would be provided at the physical level
in terms of on and off cells, its future would be uniquely determined. Likewise for
humans: if we consider them in combination with a fully specified micro-physical
state of a supposedly deterministic universe, then no alternatives remain. We return
to this tension in §4.1.
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By introducing level-dependence, List (2014, 2015) has found some
elbow room for free will at the agential level. However, List does not
explain how the agent can use this scope to act freely in a deterministic
world. List (2019) discusses agential causation, but he does not really
specify how it is supposed to work. For this, we turn to Hoefer (2002),
who emphasized the selection of boundary conditions by the agent.
￿.￿ Hoefer points out boundary conditions
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . According to Eugene Wigner (1995, 699),
Isaac Newton’s greatest accomplishment was “the sharp distinction
between initial conditions and the laws of nature”.18 Given that the
initial conditions are often “quite arbitrary”, the “prime focus” of
physics has been the discovery of new laws of nature. But it is the
laws of nature together with the boundary conditions of the system
which determine the behavior of that system. The laws alone are not
sufficient. The boundary conditions, after all, describe the state of
the system at a definite time. Without a specification of the initial
positions and velocities of the planets, for instance, Newton’s laws
are mute.
At the start of §2, we have seen why determinism seems to preclude
free actions. But Hoefer (2002) has reminded us that although the
laws of nature may be deterministic, they do not determine their own
boundary conditions.19 In that sense, they still allow a lot of freedom
and the same laws of nature are compatible with multiple temporal
evolutions. Hoefer, in other words, finds freedom not in the laws of
nature, but in the boundary conditions.
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . At first sight, it is not clear how
Hoefer’s suggestion is supposed to work. After all, there were no
humans around at the time of the Big Bang to influence the initial
conditions by their own free actions. Notice that this is also a key
assumption in Peter van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument (1975; 1983;
1989) against free will. In his Essay on Free Will, Van Inwagen (1983,
16) formulated it as follows:
If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences
of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is
not up to us what went on before we were born; and neither
18 To the initial conditions and laws of nature, Wigner also added invariance principles,
which he regarded as metalaws (laws which the laws of nature have to obey).
19 Hoefer published his ideas in a relatively obscure paper, which have therefore sadly
been neglected in the free-will literature, despite their originality and novelty. In
her book How Physics Makes us Free, Ismael (2016) has reached similar conclusions
independently from Hoefer.
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is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the
consequences of these things (including our own acts) are
not up to us. (emphasis added)
￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿ . The mistake, according to Hoefer, is the
customary view that past events determine present choices, which
Hoefer thinks is a natural consequence from a deeply ingrained A-
series view of time.20 Whether one subscribes to presentism, the
growing block theory of time or the moving spotlight theory of time,
the present on these A-series views is singled out as a metaphysically
privileged moment of time which we call now. The now moreover
is typically assumed to ‘move’ into the future, with present events
disappearing into the past as future events come into being (or start
to glow with metaphysical significance). Given this ‘movement’ of
the now from past to future, it is only natural to assume that the
determination arrow similarly points from past to future.
But physics “seems to describe the world entirely in B-series terms,”
writes Hoefer (2002, 203), and has “no need of A-series concepts”.
The B-series of time, however, is a ‘static’ conception of time, without
a privileged now that is constantly ‘changing’ or ‘moving’. Reality for
the eternalist is not fundamentally three- but four-dimensional, and
finds a natural representation in the block universe (see Chapter 1).
Importantly, all events in the block are equally real, “those in your far
future no different from those in your past” (p. 205). “The key idea”
then, according to Hoefer (2016), “is that once we free ourselves from
[these A-series based] misconceptions about time and physical law,
we can correctly regard ourselves as the sources and determiners of
our own free actions”.
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . So far, we have used the terms ‘boundary
conditions’ and ‘initial conditions’ interchangeably. For dynamic laws
that govern the evolution of a state of a system in time, it is custom-
ary to use the initial conditions as the boundary condition: a full
specification of the dynamical variables of the system at the start of
the experiment, or in any case in the past of the current moment,
together with the laws of nature, determine all future states of the
system. This is practically relevant for beings like us: we remember
and have records of the past, and want to predict future states. It is
also practically relevant for simulations, as we saw in the example of
cellular automata. This practical relevance, however, does not imply
that the initial states are ontologically prior or absolutely preferred
over final conditions or intermediate conditions.
20 The term ‘A-series’ originated in McTaggart (1908), where it refers to the distinction
between past, present, and future events, as opposed to the B-series, which merely
encodes earlier-than and later-than relations between events. See the Introduction.
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Hoefer refers to the ‘unholy marriage’ of determinism and the A-
series view of time. The view that the past determines the future is
A-series based. However, from the B-series view of time (or eternal-
ist block universe perspective), there is no fundamentally correct way
of drawing the determination arrows in the block. The block simply
is. As Hoefer (2002, 208) emphasizes, determinism gives us “logical
relations of determination, not a unique temporal relation of determi-
nation” (emphasis in original). In that sense, one is free to choose
where to draw the determining slice. “Determinism tells you that the
state of the world at a time determines all the rest, past and future,
but it doesn’t tell you which slice, if any, explains or determines all
the rest”, writes Hoefer (2002, 206).
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ . Most philosophers and physi-
cists, in Hoefer’s opinion, are guilty of privileging the past to future
determination. But by placing the boundary conditions in the future,
one might just as well think of future to past determination. Even
more to the point, one could see the present as determining both the
past and the future. Hoefer thus finds freedom, not in the determin-
istic laws, but in the boundary conditions. Hoefer believes our free
actions in the present moment partly determine how the past and
future will be. This is what Hoefer (2002, 207) calls ‘freedom from the
inside out’:
The idea of freedom from the inside out is this: we are
perfectly justified in viewing our own actions not as deter-
mined by the past, nor as determined by the future, but
rather as simply determined (to the extent that this word
sensibly applies) by ourselves, by our own wills. [. . .] We
can view our own actions, qua physical events, as primary
explainers, determining — in a very partial way — physi-
cal events outside ourselves to the past and future of our
actions, in the block. We adopt the perspective that the de-
termination or explanation that matters is from the inside
(of the block universe, where we live) outward, rather than
from the outside (e.g. the state of things on a time slice 1
billion years ago) in. (emphasis in original)
We agree that one is free to think about determination from the
present to the past and future. However, this inside-out determina-
tion should not be privileged above past to future or future to past
determination. Just as most philosophers and physicists are guilty
of privileging past to future determination (as Hoefer happily points
out), we should avoid making the opposite mistake by privileging
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the inside-out determination.21 The reason for this is simple. Since
there were no human agents to make free choices at the Big Bang, nor
(presumably) in the distant future, Hoefer is forced to draw his deter-
mining slice in the middle of the block. But this should not prevent
someone else from drawing the determining slice at the Big Bang,
and reasoning from then on forward in time. From that perspective,
the initial conditions at the Big Bang predetermine everything, includ-
ing all our thoughts, intentions and actions. So, the challenge from
determinism still applies.
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Even if we would privilege the
inside-out determination, this would not be enough to allow free-
dom at different points in time. We try to reconstruct Hoefer’s view
on this and elaborate on it. First, he remarks that relativity theory
has taught us that local events do not influence spatially removed
events instantaneously. Instead, there are finite domains of depen-
dence. This allows us to think of determining events (free actions)
spread out across the bulk of the block universe, rather than all lo-
cated in one temporal slice or Cauchy hypersurface.22 As such, it is
consistent to associate at least part of the information in the ‘bound-
ary conditions’ with agents’ free choices that happen in the course of
the dynamical evolution that is governed by a deterministic law.
On this view, freedom is on a strict budget: there is only a sparse
amount of free choices available — the equivalent of one three-
dimensional hypersurface — compared to the bulk of events in the
four-dimensional volume of the block universe. This is unavoidable
if all the freedom has to come from the boundary conditions. How-
ever, these free choices would be scattered within the block, yielding
a starry sky of free choices in the middle of the block. We will return
to this in a moment.
So far, it is not yet clear how agents are able to use their free will to
determine the boundary conditions in the block. It is here that Hoe-
fer relies on statistical mechanical reasoning, and that the distinction
between the micro- and the macro-level becomes crucial. It is also
at this point, therefore, that Hoefer’s account resembles List’s, and a
combination of both becomes plausible: we return to this in §4.
21 Hoefer (2002) is clearly aware that past to future or future to past determination are
possible as well, but he nevertheless advocates the inside-out one: “One can equally
view a set of events in the middle as determiners of both past and future events.
This is exactly what we should do” (p. 205). “We are free to adopt these perspectives
because, quite simply, physics — including our postulated deterministic physics —
is perfectly compatible with them” (p. 207-8). On the other hand, Hoefer does admit
that “physics does not pick any one out as more important than the others” (p. 208).
22 A Cauchy hypersurface is an achronal set ⌃ LM whose Cauchy development D (⌃)
isM (see Appendix).
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￿.￿.￿ Counterfactual beliefs
According to Hoefer, when an agent makes a free choice — for in-
stance, the choice to type the letter ‘t’ on her laptop — she thereby
selects a particular macrostate, say Mt, corresponding to this coarse-
grained action. There is usually an enormous number of microstates
x corresponding to each macrostate (multiple realizability). So, which
x will be realized by freely choosing Mt? “When I freely choose to
type the ‘t’,” says Hoefer (2002, 211), “I do not thereby choose to actu-
alize a particular microstate!” (emphasis in original). The best we can
say is that “some one of this enormous number of microstate-types
shall be, and that is all” (p. 210). This sounds reasonable. After all,
when we say that we feel free, we do not mean to imply that we have
the power to influence every single atom by our free actions. We
merely intend to say that we have the power to shape the world in a
very coarse-grained way.23
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . According to Hoefer, PAP is at “the
heart of the issue” (p. 214). In order to be truly free, one should
be able to act otherwise. What is really interesting about Hoefer’s
account of free will is that it leaves room for such counterfactual beliefs.
That is the sense in which we take Hoefer’s account to be “much more
robust” than other compatibilist accounts (p. 203). “When I type the
letter ‘s’ I may think that I could have chosen to type a ‘z’ instead [...].
And I think I could have done so, with the past being, macroscopically,
just the way I know it to be” (p. 214, emphasis in original).
Here is what we take Hoefer to mean. Consider again Figure 23.
When you choose to type the letter ‘t’ at t = 0, you thereby selected
the macroregion  Mt . A particular microstate x (0) "  Mt was thereby
realized at random, or at least beyond your control. Now, under the
Hamiltonian dynamics, x (0) will deterministically evolve to x (1) at
t = 1. And as it turns out x (1) "  Ms , where  Ms is the macroregion
corresponding to you typing the letter ‘s’.
However, even though it was predetermined that you would type
an ‘s’ after you typed the letter ‘t’, you still have the feeling that you
23 The mechanism by which one freely selects one or the other macrostate is left un-
derspecified by Hoefer. Hoefer is skeptical about strong reductionism and does not
subscribe to the idea of causal completeness with upward causation from the micro-
physical to the macrophysical. Instead, Hoefer endorses the perspective of downward
causation from the macrophysical to the microphysical. Thus “my intention to type
the letter ‘t’ causes the particular motions experienced by all the atoms in my left
forefinger as I type it [. . .] rather than (for example) the immediately preceding mo-
tions of other nearby atoms, or any other such particle-level events” (p. 201, emphasis
added). That is, our choices, thoughts and intentions are primary explainers of our
physical actions (p. 207). It thus seems Hoefer is assuming a form of non-reductive
physicalism.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 145
could have typed a ‘z’ instead. What grounds this belief, according
to Hoefer, is that there is indeed another microstate x ¨ (0) "  Mt
which could have been realized instead of x (0), and which evolves to
x
¨ (1) "  Mz at t = 1 with  Mz the macroregion corresponding to you
typing the letter ‘z’.24
Hoefer, like List, thus finds freedom in the multitude of microstates
realizing the same macroscopic present, but leading to different fu-
tures and world histories. Whereas List modified the interpretation
of PAP, such that it can apply in a deterministic world, Hoefer ex-
plained why PAP appears to (but does not actually) apply in such a
context.
So far, we have seen that the attempts by List and Hoefer to escape
the challenge from determinism have common elements as well as
complementary features. We will continue our evaluation of their
attempts and offer our own proposal that combines crucial features
of both in §4. The aim is a model of libertarian free will that answers
the challenge from determinism. However, even if this succeeds, we
still have to consider the challenge from indeterminism: this is the
focus of the next section.
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
In the previous section, we discussed the challenge from determin-
ism, which purports to show that nomological determinism is in-
compatible with PAP. We considered two common responses: one
points to microphysical theories that are indeterministic, like quan-
tum mechanics, whereas the other aims to argue that microphysical
determinism is compatible with indeterminism at the agential level.
Both strategies have in common that they regard indeterminism as
indispensable for PAP and thus for free will. After all, in an inde-
terministic world, the state of the world at time t is compatible with
multiple states at time t ¨. This seems to allow alternative possibili-
ties, and hence to save PAP. But does it open up enough degrees of
freedom to allow libertarian free will?
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ . Hard incompatibilists, such as Pereboom
(2001, 2005), defend the view that libertarian free will is neither com-
patible with determinism nor with indeterminism. Indeterminism (or
randomness), they claim, is not the same as deliberate choice. The
problem, in the words of Eddington (1939), is that there is no ‘half-
way house’ between determinism and randomness. Either the world
24 Hoefer emphasized that “we are not concerned with the actual past history of the
world in all its microscopic detail; that does, of course, determine the present” (p. 216,
emphasis in original).
146 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
is deterministic, in which case we are prisoners of a deterministic
chain. Or the world is indeterministic, in which case everything de-
pends on sheer chance and fluke events.
This traditional challenge from indeterminism goes back to Hume
(1888) who considered it “impossible to admit of any medium betwixt
chance and absolute necessity”. Hume’s fork targets the principle of
agential causation. Even if the world is indeterministic, it is not clear
how an agent can use this indeterminism to gain freedom. Although
we do not dismiss this worry, it is not the target of our current dis-
cussion. Here, we want to focus on a different kind of challenge from
indeterminism, which challenges PAP but has received comparably lit-
tle attention in the literature.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Indeterminism im-
plies that there are alternatives, in the sense of multiple allowed fu-
ture states consistent with a present state. Although this yields PAP,
we claim it is not yet sufficient for a strong sense of libertarian free
will. To explain this, we propose strengthening PAP to PAP*:
Definition 11. Principle of alternative possibilities (PAP*): The ac-
tion of an agent is free only if the agent could have acted otherwise
under exactly the same conditions, unbounded by probabilistic con-
straints.
To motivate this move, suppose we accept quantum mechanics or
statistical mechanics as the source of indeterminism in the physical
world. These forms of indeterminism carry a very limited sense of
freedom: they come with a preset collection of alternatives associated
with stable statistical properties (such as predictable averages). In
other words, they present us with a form of statistical determinism.
While PAP was challenged by determinism, PAP* is challenged by
statistical determinism. In summary, the challenge from statistical
determinism reads:
Challenge from statistical determinism
(P1) Libertarian free will requires PAP*;
(P2) Statistical determinism rules out PAP*;
(C) Free will and statistical determinism are incompatible.
The argument purports to show that there is no room for libertarian
free will in a probabilistic world. Libertarian free will and (probabilis-
tic) indeterminism are incompatible notions.
￿￿￿￿￿￿ , ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . The view that
statistical regularities may threaten free will stems from the nine-
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teenth century, although it has remained a minority position.25 As
discussed by Hacking (1983), the Belgian scientist and pioneer of sta-
tistical methods in the social domain, Quetelet, already commented
on the predictability of the numbers of yearly births and deaths and
on the terrifying exactness of how crime rates are reproduced. This
view extended to the moral domain, leading to a view of social deter-
minism. Although Quetelet did not deny the existence of free will,
other authors did. The English historian Buckle (1865) defended his-
torical determinism: he regarded the existence of stable statistics in the
context of the social sciences as incompatible with human free will.
William James (1890), in his Principles of Psychology, came closest
to the challenge from statistical determinism (although his comment
is also related to the traditional challenge from indeterminism). As
James observed, a brain exploiting some form of indeterminism in
its decision-making process would be “like dice thrown forever on a
table.”
Unless they be loaded, what chance is there that the high-
est number will turn up oftener than the lowest? [. . .] Can
consciousness increase its efficiency by loading its dice? Such
is the problem. Loading its dice would mean bringing a
more or less constant pressure to bear in favor of those
of its performances which make for the most permanent
interests of the brain’s owner; it would mean a constant in-
hibition of the tendencies to stray aside. (p. 140, emphasis
in original)
After the advent of quantum mechanics, some authors developed a
similar view of statistical determinism in relation to this microphysi-
cal theory. For instance, Koch (2012, 104) writes:
Given our current interpretation of QM [namely one that
assumes collapses happen], a Popper-Eccles mind could
exploit this idiosyncratic freedom. The mind would be
powerless to change the probabilities, but it could decide
what happens on any one trial. The mind’s action would
always remain covert, sub rosa, for if we considered many
trials, nothing out of the ordinary would take place: only
what is expected from natural law. Conscious will would
act in the world within the straightjacket of physics. It
would be indistinguishable from chance.
Given that both determinism and statistical determinism are incom-
patible with PAP*, it may seem that we have ruled out libertarian free
25 See Mueller (2017) for a recent review and Saka (manuscript, and references therein)
for a contemporary defense.
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will entirely, from the armchair. However, we have not yet explored
all possible forms of indeterminism. So far, we have silently equated
indeterminism with probabilism, as is customary in the literature, but
this is not the only option. To broaden the discussion, we propose to
consider not just two, but four classes of theories.
￿.￿ Classification of theories
We propose a classification of theories, as shown in Figure 24.26,27
Class I theories are deterministic and Class II theories are proba-
bilistic. Our main observation is that the latter only covers a subset of
all indeterministic theories. In probabilistic theories, all possible out-
comes are (assumed to be) known and all possibilities have specific
probabilities associated with them. This specification is already sug-
gestive of additional classes of theories, which allow more freedom
than Class II. Class III theories allow for probability gaps (i.e., possi-
ble outcomes without associated probabilities; Hájek, 2003),28 but no
possibility gaps (i.e., cases in which even the list of possible outcomes
is acknowledged to be incomplete), whereas Class IV theories also
allow for the latter.
This fourfold classification resembles that of the ‘Johari window’
technique (Luft and Ingham) with (I) known knowns, (II) unknown
knowns, (III) known unknowns, and (IV) unknown unknowns.29 To
clarify our proposal, we give examples for each of the classes.
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Newtonian physics is traditionally taken to be
the paradigm example of a deterministic Class I theory. If we un-
derstand Newtonian physics as including a condition or a postulate
that ensures initial value problems have unique solutions, then it does
indeed serve as an excellent example for a Class I theory.
26 The proposal to classify scientific theories into four classes, as illustrated in Figure
24, came from Sylvia Wenmackers.
27 For now, the classification only applies to candidate (micro-)physical theories, at the
most fundamental level. We will broaden its application to other levels in §4.
28 The economist John Maynard Keynes, in his Treatise on Probability (1921), argues
that numerical probabilities are the exception rather than the rule. In most cases,
probabilities are non-numerical and non-quantifiable because they are either unmea-
surable or incomparable. There are even situations where probability judgements
are not possible at all.
29 Class I and Class II theories both spell out which possibilities exist (knowns) and,
provided sufficient boundary conditions, they single out a single possibility (known)
or provide probabilities over multiple possibilities (which of those will pertain is
unknown), respectively. Class III and Class IV theories both deal with multiple
possibilities (unknowns), but the possibilities themselves may all be known or not,
respectively.
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Figure 24: Our proposed classification of physical theories.
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Quantum mechanics is often held as the
paragon of a probabilistic Class II theory. As already remarked at
the start of §2, this is only acceptable if we consider the Copenhagen
interpretation or a spontaneous collapse interpretation. Also statisti-
cal mechanics fits in this category, at least when judged at the macro-
level. Its probabilities, however, can be fully reduced to the determin-
istic micro-level. So judged at that level, it is a Class I theory.
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . A concrete example of a Class III theory is
provided by non-Lipschitz mechanics: that is, Newtonian mechanics
without the constraint that guarantees uniqueness of the solution to
initial value problems. Without this condition of Lipschitz continu-
ity, classical mechanics is “not a paradise for determinism; in fact,
Newtonian worlds provide environments that are quite hostile to de-
terminism” (Earman, 1986).
An example of such an indeterministic system was rediscovered by
Norton (2003), who considered an idealized point mass initially at
rest on top of a frictionless dome of a particular shape. The initial
value problem admits of a singular solution, where the point mass
remains at the apex forever, as well as an infinite family of regular so-
lutions: the mass spontaneously slides down the dome in an arbitrary
direction after an arbitrary period of time. Non-Lipschitz mechanics
does not supply probabilities for the two types of solutions, nor for
the two variables in the family of regular solutions, thus providing us
with a beautifully simple Class III example.30
In the nineteenth century, such examples were discussed as a pos-
sible way for reconciling physical theories with free will (van Strien,
2015). We will return to this in §4. However, even a Class III theory
severely limits the actions of free beings, since they can only choose
options from a predetermined menu without possibility gaps (but see
further).
30 Norton’s (forthcoming) infinite lottery logic model for pocket universes explicitly
rejects the assignment of probabilities and also belongs to Class III.
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￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Class IV theories have possibility gaps. They
allow for radically new possibilities, not specified by the theory, to
be realized. Such theories may specify some possible outcomes, and
even some relative probabilities of a subset of possible events, but
at least under some circumstances they allow for radical openness
regarding possible outcomes. The most radical Class IV theory has
the form: ‘anything can happen’. The other Class IV theories specify
possible outcomes (with or without associated relative probabilities)
for some but not all circumstances. They allow for possibility-gaps,
but only in specific cases, which the theory specifies.
Finding examples for Class IV is harder than for previous classes.
Formalizing a theory that allows for radical uncertainty is a thorny
issue: it does not seem to square well with the notion of a state space
(which has to be specified beforehand). Another way of phrasing the
difficulty is by observing that we are dealing with theories that aim
to state their own incompleteness, which may well be impossible. As
Class IV candidates, we may consider the most speculative theories
from natural science (Kragh, 2014) as well as metaphysical theories
that allow for strong emergence. Strong emergence allows higher
level properties to be incomputable from a full description in terms
of lower level properties, and has been proposed for various phenom-
ena, including chemical reactions, life, and consciousness (O’Connor
and Wong, 2015). Because of the radical openness needed for emer-
gentism, this seems to require a Class IV theory.31
￿.￿ The need for a Class III theory
Hard incompatibilists have claimed that libertarian free will is incom-
patible with both determinism and indeterminism (Pereboom, 2005).
We suggest it is more accurate to call this an incompatibility between
free will on the one hand, and deterministic Class I and probabilistic
Class II theories on the other hand. That is, rather than ruling out
libertarian free will, the challenges from determinism and statistical
determinism push libertarians towards theories with Class III (van
Strien, 2015) or even Class IV indeterminacies. Class III theories
introduce probability gaps; Class IV theories introduce, in addition,
possibility gaps. The question therefore becomes what degree of free-
dom is minimally needed to realize libertarian free will.
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿* ￿￿ ￿￿￿**. In a Class III theory, one can still only
choose from a predetermined menu of alternatives, as encoded by
the state space. At first glance, this may seem insufficient for a strong
31 Depending on the interpretation of levels, however, this may yield a Class IV theory
that does not apply to the microphysical level.
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sense of libertarian freedom which allows creativity and truly unfore-
seeable actions. For example, if you stand in a coffee bar, and you can
only order what is on the menu, then this may make you doubt your
free will. In order to be truly free, you may think, you should also be
able to walk out, or to ask the barista to make you something that is
not on the menu (a filter coffee with added sugar, say). This thought
might motivate a further strengthening of PAP*, which could only be
fulfilled by a Class IV theory.
We argue, however, that this may be asking too much. After all, the
fact that you cannot turn in a seahorse right now should not make
you doubt your free will. So perhaps the requirement is not having
unlimited but sufficiently many possibilities, which are not bounded
by probabilities. We use this additional desideratum to strengthen
the PAP* criterion further:
Definition 12. Principle of alternative possibilities (PAP**): The ac-
tion of an agent is free only if the agent could have acted otherwise
under exactly the same conditions, with sufficiently many alterna-
tives unbounded by probabilistic constraints.
PAP** is satisfied in Class III theories. Historically, Class III theories
have often been invoked by libertarians who hoped to embed their
view in a scientific worldview. We already mentioned non-Lipschitz
mechanics as an example of a Class III theory. The nineteenth cen-
tury Boussinesq was well-aware of the challenges from determinism
and statistical determinism, and therefore focused on non-Lipschitz
mechanics as a possible source of human freedom.32 This is clearly
better than quantum mechanics, which is only Class II and hence
already in conflict with PAP*.
However, since one of our goals is to answer the challenge from
determinism, we should focus on the case where the micro-level laws
remain fully deterministic. But how can we get PAP** if the world is
governed by Class I deterministic laws?
32 Besides advocating a Class III theory to beat the challenge from statistical deter-
minism, Boussinesq also stipulated a non-physical, non-mechanical influence which
he called the principe directeur and which could direct choices, thereby filling the
gap between physical reality and the mathematical description of Class III systems
(Mueller, 2015, Bordoni, 2017). The postulation of a principe directeur ran against
the doctrines of materialism and positivism, and may be explained by Boussinesq’s
sympathy for the spiritualistic philosophy developed by Cousin, Vacherot, Caro and
Janet, among others. According to the spiritualist doctrine, matter and motion are
insufficient to provide a complete description of nature. Boussinesq thus attempted
to save the freedom of will by postulating a spiritualistic metaphysics. The same has
happened in more recent times. As Kane observed, many libertarians have posited
“transempirical power centers, immaterial egos, noumenal selves outside of space
and time, unmoved movers, uncaused causes and other unusual forms of agency
or causation” in order to answer the challenge from physicalism, “thereby inviting
charges of obscurity or mystery against their view” (Fischer et al., 2007, 9).
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Figure 25: Refinement of our classification of theories, now understood as
laws and boundary conditions (BCs). The top row shows how
different classes can be realized due to different kinds of laws.
The bottom row shows how different classes can be realized by
different constraints on the BCs. The diagrams show an exam-
ple with two possible histories, with time running from top to
bottom. In the diagrams, p1 and p2 indicate the presence of
probabilities in the theories; their location indicates whether they
pertain to initial conditions or subsequent branches. Question
marks indicate the lack of probabilities or specification of states
in the theories.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . List and Hoefer have shown us the way in
§2. We follow List in interpreting ‘the same conditions’ at the agen-
tial macro-level. And we take into account Hoefer’s warning that we
shouldn’t forget about the boundary conditions. The indeterminism
does not have to come from the laws; it might come from the bound-
ary conditions. In light of our classification, it is moreover relevant to
observe that boundary conditions (be they interpreted as initial, final
or intermediate) are not necessarily bound by probabilities. This sug-
gests that a deterministic law without a specification of its boundary
conditions is merely a Class III theory. If its boundary conditions are
governed by additional probabilistic equations, it becomes a Class II
theory. And only when a unique boundary condition is fully spec-
ified does it become a proper Class I theory. Hence, the proposal
of Hoefer, regarding ‘freedom from the inside out’, can be seen as
belonging to Class III (but see §4).
In Figure 24, we classified theories into four classes. In the descrip-
tion, we focused on the laws. Now, we take into account the message
of Hoefer that we should pay equal attention to the status of the
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boundary conditions (usually taken as initial values). This leads us
to a refinement of our classification: as shown in Figure 25, it still has
four classes, but for each Class, we make an additional distinction ac-
cording to the origin of the indeterminism. Classes Ia, IIa, IIIa, and
IVa are classified as such due to indeterminism in the laws; Classes
Ib, IIb, IIIb, and IVb are classified as such due to indeterminism in the
initial values.33
For example, the proposal of Boussinesq (1879) had a law with
probability gaps combined with fully determinate boundary condi-
tions. Hence, it is a Class IIIa theory according to our refined classi-
fication. Following Hoefer (2002), we stick to deterministic laws but
consider non-probabilistic constraints on the boundary conditions. In
other words, we are looking for a Class IIIb theory.34
Notice that on this reading, the laws at the micro-level remain
fully deterministic. The freedom of agents relies in their ability
to select boundary conditions at the macro-level. This selection is
bound by possibilities, but not bound by probabilities. Indeed, a
given macrostate is only surrounded by a finite number of other
macrostates, each of which corresponds to a possible future action.
This puts Hoefer’s proposal in Class III. Although this does not al-
low as much freedom as Class IV, maybe this is all we need to be
truly free as we suggested in our motivation for PAP**.
￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿
In this section, we compare and evaluate the proposals by List and
Hoefer, which were introduced separately in §2, in the light of our
proposed classification for theories. Finally, we develop two alter-
native readings that combine elements of both proposals. The first
reading is merely compatibilist and is closer in spirit to Dennett and
Hoefer (see §4.1). The second reading, however, yields a stronger
form of libertarian free will compatible with microphysical determin-
ism and is, in that sense, closer in spirit to List (see §§4.2–4.5).
List used the observation that microscopic deterministic laws are
compatible with macroscopic probabilistic regularities as a starting
point for his libertarian proposal to evaluate PAP in a level-dependent
way. Hoefer proposed to consider the freedom in the boundary con-
ditions to account for a compatibilist notion of free will.
33 For all N,M " {I, II, III, IV}, a theory that is Class Na andMb is Classmax {N,M}
according to the previous classification.
34 Given the results on observational equivalence (cf. footnote 14), the difference be-
tween Class IIIa and IIIb may be insubstantial: from an ontological point of view,
only the classes in Figure 24 may be essential.
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As we have seen, both List and Hoefer are inspired by the notion of
a phase space and other notions from statistical mechanics. Moreover,
we read List and Hoefer as agreeing on the following three points:
1. The question at hand is whether free will is compatible with
microphysical determinism. (Whether or not the latter obtains
is not at stake here.)
2. The world can be described at different levels, including one
that is relevant for microphysics and one that is relevant for
psychological and agential concepts.
3. Libertarian free will requires real alternatives (PAP), which re-
quires branching histories.
￿.￿ Conditional interpretation of PAP
We have seen in §2.3 that macrostates supervene on microstates.
Hence, whenever a macrostate obtains, there is an underlying mi-
crostate. Which microstate? This is hard to answer because
macrostates are multiply realizable. However, Hoefer does assume
that one (and only one) microstate is realized at any given time. But
this implies that the laws are deterministic (Class Ia), and the bound-
ary conditions are fully specified as well (Class Ib). This makes the
theory Class I overall and, as we know, in such a theory, there is
no room for PAP. The indeterminism which emerges at the coarse-
grained macro-level is merely epistemic (like Laplacian chances for
limited beings in a deterministic world).
Indeed, this is also the view of Dennett and Hoefer. In Hoefer’s
view, the agent cannot know the exact microstate, due to multi-
ple realizability, but only its supervenient coarse-grained macrostate.
Hence, for Hoefer, we can only explain our illusion of freedom: as
far as we know, i.e. up to the macrostate, the present is compatible
with multiple futures. But in reality, one (and only one) microstate
obtains at any given time, which is compatible with one (and only
one) possible future history.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ . Notice that for Hoefer
(2002) the past has to remain the same macroscopically, and not “in
all its gory microphysical detail” (p. 215). Otherwise it would indeed
take “a miracle to get the if-had-done-otherwise scenario started.” By
merely keeping the macroscopic past fixed, you “don’t need miracles
to postulate various different actions and their likely future conse-
quences” (p. 215). As a result, Hoefer focuses on what List (2019)
calls the conditional interpretation of PAP:
Definition 13. Conditional interpretation of PAP: If the agent had
tried to do otherwise, then the agent would have succeeded.
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The conditional interpretation relies on a counterfactual claim: if the
agent had been in a different microstate compatible with (and for the
agent indistinguishable from) the agent’s macrostate, then she would
indeed have been successful in reaching a different outcome than the
current one. In terms of possible worlds, the agent was determined to
type ‘s’ in the actual world, but there exists a nearest counterfactual
possible world in which she tries to do otherwise and succeeds in
typing ‘z’ instead.35
Hoefer thus defends a compatibilist account of free will, not a liber-
tarian one. Indeed, Hoefer explicitly calls his account compatibilist,
rather than libertarian: “Freedom and determinism are compatible —
compatible in a much more robust sense than has ever been thought
possible” (Hoefer, 2002, 202-203). The aim of our chapter, however,
was to develop a libertarian account of free will that beats the chal-
lenge from determinism. Neither Dennett nor Hoefer think this is
possible, but List clearly thinks otherwise.
￿.￿ Modal interpretation of PAP
List takes the conditional interpretation to be insufficient for libertar-
ian free will and argues that PAP requires a modal interpretation:
Definition 14. Modal interpretation of PAP: It is possible for the agent
to do otherwise (there are forks in the road).
The agent must have alternative possibilities in the actual world, not
merely in counterfactual situations. We agree with this analysis. In
order to have plenty of genuine alternatives, in the sense of PAP**,
we need a Class III theory, as discussed above. However, because
of supervenience, we need it not only at the macro-level (as List has
shown) but also at the micro-level. That is, we not only require PAP
at the agential level, but also at the physical level.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Class III theories have probability
gaps, which leave room at the physical level for the agential level to
act upon, to have a real (as opposed to an epiphenomenal or illusory)
effect on the microphysical state of affairs. This requires branching
in at least some points in the microphysical histories (Class II or
higher), as well as freedom from statistical regularities to allow these
acts to be truly free (so, at least Class III, as already mentioned).
According to Hoefer, such libertarian ‘freedom from the inside out’
would require that we could have done otherwise starting from the
35 A complication here is that what the agent deems possible need not coincide with
any physically possible world. But the program is to show the plausibility of alterna-
tive possibilities, not the accuracy of the agent’s representation of those possibilities.
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exact same initial micro-conditions. But this is impossible if we as-
sume deterministic Class Ia laws. However, we can introduce Class
III indeterminacy via the boundary conditions (Class IIIb).
Indeed, even if one requires PAP at the physical level, Hoefer’s sta-
tistical mechanical account of compatibilist free will leaves room for a
libertarian interpretation, if we take a bold step: let us, for a moment,
assume that the present is not determined by a single microstate, but
by a bundle of microstates. The suggestion in other words is to in-
terpret the multiple realizability claim ontically, rather than epistemi-
cally. The idea is that a macrostate is not only multiply realizable, it is
multiply realized. Let us now flesh out this proposal. We will do this
in two steps. The first step is merely a ladder, to be kicked away once
the proposal is clear.
￿.￿ Pruning bundles
As remarked before, Hoefer takes there to be an actual microstate (un-
known to the agent), whereas List (2019, 91-92) claims that there is no
privileged microstate ‘within’ an agential state. “[A]t the psycholog-
ical level, there is no fact of the matter as to which precise physical
state obtains. [. . . ] [T]he higher-level state, at any time, does not de-
termine which underlying lower-level state obtains, and so we cannot
treat any one of the lower-level states as the “true” one”.
Although we do not attribute the following view to List, one could
interpret this ontically by considering the macrostate as a common in-
stant in an equivalence class of microhistories. In other words: we can
think of a bundle of histories passing through the given macrostate
at a given time. The alternative possibilities correspond to a partition
of smaller bundles that pass from the current macrostate to multi-
ple future macrostates. Effecting a choice then amounts to pruning
all the other bundles but the chosen one. If the bundle contains in-
finitely many microhistories to begin with, this process may continue
for countably many choices throughout history.
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . To see how this works, consider again the typing
example from §2.4. At t = 0, you choose to type the letter ‘t’. You
thereby select the macroregion  Mt . Since this macrostate is multiply
realized by all the microstates x (0) "  Mt , we have to keep track of
their evolution through phase space. This bundle of trajectories starts
off in  Mt and ends up in the new region  1   Mt⌥ at t = 1. Due to
Liouville’s theorem, µ   Mt⌥ = µ   1   Mt⌥⌥. The phase space region
 1   Mt⌥ however will typically be split over two or more macrostates.
Let us assume that it is spread over  Ms and  Mz .
The situation at t = 1 thus leaves you with two choices: typing ‘s’ or
‘z’. Suppose you freely choose to type the letter ‘s’. You thereby select
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the macroregion  Ms , more specifically, the region  Ms =  1   Mt⌥
corresponding to the overlap between  Ms and  1   Mt⌥. It is as if
your free choice has pruned part of the region  1   Mt⌥, leaving the
subregion  Ms = 1   Mt⌥.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . The presentation in the previous paragraph
was only forward-looking, but we may also reflect on the effect of
pruning on the past bundle. If we take the past parts of non-selected
histories as cut off as well, choices at an intermediate time thin out
the bundle over all of time. This may eventually lead to a thin bundle
or even a single microhistory throughout all of time. There are no
branching points for this history, and it may be presented as ‘the’
block universe, although it was selected from branching points in
bundles of histories — one among many possible block universes.36
To get real freedom in this picture, we have to adopt an ontic view:
the exact microstate is not fixed, only the coarse-grained macrostate
is. That is, the initial conditions (at the time of the Big Bang) were
only partially fixed, and therefore compatible with multiple futures.
Whenever we make a free choice, we add a further constraint which
refines the initial conditions.37 The evolution of our universe does
not correspond to a single trajectory in phase space, but to a bundle
of trajectories, which is increasingly pruned every time a free choice
is made. For a related view, see also Stoica (2012).38
To be clear, this idea is not endorsed by Hoefer. In fact, this mode
of presentation has fallen into the trap of A-theory thinking that Hoe-
fer warned us for. But this need not be a fatal objection, for we can
retell it without the dynamics of pruning on bundles of histories. Do-
ing so effectively regains Hoefer’s idea of freedom from the inside
out, but it now yields a libertarian reading (instead of Hoefer’s own
compatibilist reading).
￿.￿ Against diverging worlds
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Before we kick our ladder
away, a warning is in order. Our bundle theory should be contrasted
36 Recall from §2.2 that each possible history in a phase space corresponds to a possible
block universe.
37 On an epistemic reading, we merely become aware of what we choose: this knowl-
edge may also affect our knowledge of the past. On an ontic reading, affecting
choices could be considered as a form of causation, in which case the proposal in
the second paragraph would be bicausal. In other words, choices would have retro-
causal effects on the past, as well as causal effects on the future.
38 Although Stoica (2012) investigated this idea in the context of quantum mechan-
ics, he did consider the deterministic case explicitly: “A deterministic universe can
have incompletely determined initial conditions, which can be refined by ulterior
choices.”
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with an account of diverging worlds, in which each possibility gets
realized in a different world (i.e., a different block universe), leading
to a block multiverse. The latter would be in tension with free will.
The tension is with a principle that is rarely spelled out, but which
we aim to make explicit here:39,40
Definition 15. Principle of action uniqueness (PAU): When an agent
carries out an action freely chosen out of a set of mutually incompat-
ible alternatives, only the agent’s chosen action is realized.
Multiverse determinism says you could have done otherwise, and did
so (in a parallel branch). So all alternative possibilities were realized.
PAU, on the other hand, requires that you could have acted otherwise,
but didn’t. So only one alternative possibility was realized. We argue
that PAU completes PAP, by stipulating that the agent takes one and
only one action (in the relevant choice moment). The agent could
have, but has not actually, acted otherwise (say, in a parallel world or
a different part of the multiverse).
If we want an account of free will that satisfies both PAP and PAU,
the above proposal for a diverging-worlds theory is ruled out. PAU
requires determinateness of choice outcomes (which are intermediate
boundary conditions), not just relative to a branch (i.e., a block uni-
verse), but absolutely and overall. The principle is reminiscent of the
requirement for definite outcomes in quantum mechanics, which is
used by opponents of the many worlds approach.41 Here, too, PAU
serves as a uniqueness condition that rules out a multiverse or bundle
interpretation.
In other words, PAU requires us to treat the full ensemble of block
universes as merely hypothetical, not actual. Within this hypotheti-
cal bundle, there is only one real history (past and present); this is
similar to the medieval concept of the actual history as a thin red line
(Øhrstrøm and Hasle, 2015).42
￿.￿ Block universe regained
Now we are ready to show how Hoefer’s freedom from the inside
out may be combined with List’s compatibilist libertarianism. Our
proposal in §4.3 (the ladder) was Class Ia and IIIb at the microphys-
ical level, so Class III overall at the microphysical level. Our final
39 Due to multiple realizability, the realization of a macroscopic alternative is compati-
ble with a bundle of real histories rather than a unique real history. For simplicity, in
what follows we assume that unique outcomes for all choices lead to a unique real
history. In principle, this may still be a thin bundle instead.
40 Under the header “The irrelevance of forks”, Saka (manuscript) has reached a similar
conclusion.
41 For instance, the requirement is called ‘determinate outcomes’ by Maudlin (1995).
42 Or, at most, a subset of the full bundle is real: cf. footnote 32.
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proposal is Class I at the microphysical level and Class III at the
agential macro-level.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . We can assume that micro-
physics is fully governed by determinism (Class Ia) and that there
is a unique initial condition (Class Ib). Like Hoefer, however, we
are free to interpret this initial condition as being the net result of
all free choices over the course of history. These choices cannot be
‘seen’ at the level of a single microphysical history, which contains no
branching points (by the assumption of microphysical determinism).
Instead, they are located at the higher level of macrostates of such
microphysical histories: this is a region of the phase space, which cor-
responds to a bundle of hypothetical block universes, which include
the options we do not choose. The macro-, agential histories do have
branching points and hence they do offer real alternatives.
As List and others have shown, higher-level probabilism (Class
II) is indeed compatible with micro-level determinism (Class I). But
List may have overlooked the fact that agential choice need not even
be governed by chance: it may be as free as Class III. The fact that
this is a form of non-probabilistic indeterminism becomes especially
clear if we regard it, as Hoefer does, as stemming from a freedom
equivalent to setting the initial conditions, which is unconstrained
by the dynamics of the equations themselves. The range of these
is fixed (due to the underlying phase space), without an additional
probability distribution over this range. So this is Class III at the
agential level, but not beyond.
In short, the upshot of this reading is that we have something akin
to a Class III theory at the agential level, fully compatible with Class
I at the microphysical level. Now that we have kicked away the ladder
of an actual bundle theory, we are back at a unique block universe,
just like Hoefer. Yet, we have managed to give a libertarian account
of free will within a single deterministic universe, just like List, by
taking into account the hypothetical ensemble or bundle of block uni-
verses.
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
Let us now take stock. In this chapter, we have made at least four
contributions to the contemporary debate on the freedom of will.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . First, we proposed a classification
of theories (Figure 24) based on how much freedom they allow.
This classification makes explicit at least two points that are often
left implicit. It shows that beyond the determinism–indeterminism
160 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
dilemma, there is a wider range of options. Indeterminism comes in
different degrees; we distinguished three. Moreover, our more fine-
grained classification (Figure 25) shows that both the laws and the
boundary conditions can place constraints that allow more or less
freedom. We hope that this classification will help to clarify the de-
bate. In particular, we think it helps to analyze a central tension in the
free-will debate: a scientific worldview pulls towards lower-number
classes, while libertarianism pulls towards higher-number classes.
Usually the question about human freedom is asked in a categori-
cal, all-or-nothing way. However, our analysis suggests, among other
things, that freedom may be a gradable notion rather than a Boolean
on/off switch. In our chapter, we have looked at the spectrum of
theoretical possibilities, hence the title of this chapter: ‘four degrees
of freedom’ (with a nod to its technical meaning in physics). A com-
plementary way to read our proposal is that it exposes a free-will
spectrum of sorts: we hope this viewpoint will inspire future work.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Secondly, taking our cue from Hoefer, we
have given a specific interpretation to the boundary conditions. In
the context of statistical mechanics, an interval of boundary condi-
tions corresponds to a region in phase space. We have made explicit
that this also corresponds to a bundle of block universes. Whereas the
laws specify possible trajectories in phase space, or possible block uni-
verses, they do not determine their own boundary conditions. Hence,
the boundary conditions leave freedom in a direction orthogonal to
that of the laws. This may leave some room for a form of non-
nomological indeterminism within a generally physicalist approach.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ . Thirdly, we aimed to combine crucial el-
ements from the work of Hoefer and List and attempted to give a
libertarian reading of this combination. Our proposal for a combina-
tion is as follows: (1) We assume a deterministic microtheory and an
indeterministic macrotheory, (2) like List and unlike Hoefer, we re-
quire PAP at the agential level, and (3) like Hoefer, we assume agents
can use the macroscopic indeterminism. What we have called the
starry sky of free choices is crucial to make the third element work:
throughout spacetime, there is a certain amount of freedom (equiv-
alent to setting the initial, intermediate or final conditions) that can
be interpreted as the result of agential choices. As such, the totality
of all agential choices in spacetime determines (part of) the boundary
conditions, from the inside out, as Hoefer would call it.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ . Fourth, our chapter focused on one libertarian
principle: the principle of alternative possibilities. In examining PAP
throughout the chapter, we have proposed three ways to strengthen
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it. In PAP*, we added that the alternatives should not be bound by
probabilities, in order to escape statistical determinism. In PAP**, we
added that there should be sufficiently many alternatives, such that
the agent does not feel restricted by a limited menu. (In passing, we
remarked that some libertarians may require even more: that there
is no menu at all, allowing truly novel options to arise. We have not
developed this here.)
Finally, we added the principle of action uniqueness to PAP (or a
strengthened version thereof): PAU stipulates that exactly one of the
alternatives is chosen, which is relevant in the context of multiverse
or actual bundle theories. Combining PAP and PAU brings out a
second central tension in the free-will discussion: the requirement of
real alternatives, at a moment when an agent has a choice, of which
only one is realized subsequently.
This tension has been part of the free-will debate since antiquity
and is closely related to the issue of future contingents. Unsurpris-
ingly, our proposal in the final section of our chapter is also similar to
a medieval suggestion: that of the actual history (past and future) as
a thin red line. Within the formalism of statistical mechanics, this thin
red line can be represented as a privileged trajectory in the sample
space. And this can also be interpreted as one actual block universe
in an infinite bundle of possible block universes.

CONCLUS IONS
The aim of this doctoral dissertation was to closely explore Einstein’s
block universe, in all its dimensions, and to tease out, as best as I can,
what its implications are for the nature of time and human freedom.
Four questions, in particular, were central to this thesis:
1. Does the block universe view of time follow inevitably from the
theory of special relativity?
2. Is there room for the passage of time in the block universe?
3. Can we distinguish past from future in the block universe?
4. Is there room for human freedom in the block universe?
With regard to the first question, it is often claimed that the theory of
special relativity necessitates the block universe view of time (Bouton,
2017). The Rietdijk–Putnam–Maxwell (RPM) argument, in particular,
is commonly advanced as proof for this claim. In his recent book
What Makes Time Special?, Callender (2017, 53) admits that the RPM
argument “has been controversial for over forty years.” Yet, “with a
few i’s dotted, it is utterly convincing”, maintains Callender.
Reality, on the block universe view, is a static, four-dimensional
spacetime manifold in which all events — past, present and future
— co-exist in atemporal fashion. As such, “the block universe gives
a deeply inadequate view of time”, holds Lucas (1989). “It fails to
account for the passage of time, [. . .] the directedness of time and
the difference between the future and the past.” What is more, the
block universe implies a denial of free will. “Since all events are
supposed to be fully determinate”, writes Bouton (2017, 92), “there is
no free will.” Such is the consensus that seems to exist among most
philosophers of time today.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ . In a certain sense, then, the aim
of my dissertation has been to challenge the status quo. By raising
no less than eleven objections to the RPM argument in Chapter 1, I
hope to have convinced the reader that more than a few i’s will have
to be dotted before the argument can be considered conclusive proof
for eternalism and the four-dimensionality of the world.
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By distinguishing four degrees of temporal becoming in Chapter
2, I have shown that the prospects for the passage of time in the
block are indeed bleak, but not quite as bleak as Lucas’s quote above
implies. Provided that the block is equipped with a time orientation,
relational becoming is perfectly compatible with the block universe
view of time. That brings me to the third question.
After exploring four grounds for the direction of time in Chapter
3, I ended up defending Earman’s Time Direction Heresy according to
which the “temporal orientation is an intrinsic feature of space-time
which does not need to be and cannot be reduced to nontemporal
features” (1974). As such, the past and future can be distinguished in
the block, contra Lucas’s view above.
Finally, despite the challenges posed by nomological determinism,
block determinism and statistical determinism, I have argued that
libertarian free will can be made compatible with the block universe if
we identify our freedom with the selection of intermediate boundary
conditions. This can be seen as a dynamic process in which a bundle
of histories is gradually pruned down to a thin red line or what we
call the block universe.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿? Challenging the status quo, how-
ever, has its limits. Indeed, most of the claims above have to be
tempered in more than one way. Although the RPM argument for
eternalism is flawed, no truly convincing arguments for presentism
are to be found either. Indeed, given presentism’s tension with our
best science, the eternalist outlook remains more promising.
Those who take the passage of time to involve a metaphysically
priviliged present that undergoes a dynamical updating will not be
satisfied with the deflated account of relational becoming. And those
who remain unconvinced by Maudlin’s primitivist approach where
the arrow of time is posited as a fundamental and irreducible fact,
may feel more compelled by Price’s ‘no direction’ approach.
Again, in order to make room for libertarian free will in the block,
a host of assumptions had to be made: we had to privilege the inside-
out determination and assume that the determining events are spread
out across the bulk of the block universe; we had to introduce Class
IIIb indeterminacies by assuming non-probabilistic constraints on the
boundary conditions, and were forced to adopt a form of downward
causation from the macrophysical to the microphysical; we also had
to assume that an agential state is not merely multiply realizable, but
multiply realized by its underlying physical states.
Each of these assumptions can be challenged, and by just looking
at the sheer amount of them, the reader would be excused if she took
Chapter 4 as an argument against, rather than for, libertarian free will
in the block universe.
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￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Another moral can perhaps
be distilled from the previous chapters. A number of metaphysical
questions were raised in this dissertation: Are all times real? What is
the dimensionality of the world? Does time pass? Is time anisotropic?
Can a cause succeed its effect in time? Is the world deterministic? Et
cetera.
It is highly questionable that these questions can be answered from
looking at physics alone. Physics at most constrains our metaphysics,
but it certainly cannot settle it. Indeed, “physics by itself doesn’t
rule in or out much”, writes Callender (2017, 66). “The idea that it
does is silly.” What is needed in order to answer these questions, are
additional metaphysical assumptions and presuppositions. Ladyman
(2007, 197) thus observes: “It turns out that when we examine any of
the instances of alleged metaphysical knowledge being delivered by
scientific theories, there are always a number of extra assumptions
needed to derive the conclusion which we can contest.”
Many examples can be given. Returning to the RPM argument, I
showed that its soundness hinges, above all, on our interpretation
of reality, and in particular on the alleged transitivity of the reality
relation R and its intimate link with the simultaneity of events. But
the reality relation does not belong to the formalism of special rela-
tivity. Hence, despite claims to the contrary, in particular by Putnam
(1967) himself, special relativity leaves the debate on the reality and
the dimensionality of our world underdetermined.
Metaphysical inquiry into the nature of time thus quickly outruns
the scope of physics. The underdetermination of metaphysics by
physics also helps to explain the lack of any clear-cut and definitive
conclusions in the previous chapters. Instead, my goal has been to
reveal and highlight some of the metaphysical assumptions that all
too often remain unnoticed, or are simply taken for granted. As such,
I hope to have clarified some of the central debates on the nature of
time and human freedom.

Appendix
SPEC IA L RELAT IV I TYIN A NUTSHELL
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
The objective of this appendix is twofold: (1) to provide a concise but
self-contained introduction to Einstein’s theory of special relativity,
and (2) to introduce the mathematical notation to be used in this doc-
toral dissertation. The block universe perspective is adopted from the
outset. The four-dimensional spacetime manifold is endowed with a
Minkowski metric and its null cone structure is introduced. After the
addition of a temporal orientation, the causal structure of Minkowski
spacetime is briefly discussed. The notion of a Cauchy surface is next
defined to formulate a relativistic version of Laplacian determinism.
The Einstein–Poincaré criterion for simultaneity is then introduced,
and used to derive the relativity of simultaneity. Finally, the order




The goal of this appendix is twofold: (1) to provide a concise but
self-contained introduction to Einstein’s theory of special relativity
(henceforth abbreviated SR), and (2) to introduce the mathematical
notation that is used in this doctoral dissertation.
One of the reasons for writing this appendix is a recent complaint
by Dummett that “philosophers of physics speak a technical language
among themselves, and fail to communicate with other philosophers
in the mainstream” (see Dummett, 2007, 25 and Dummett, 2012, 19).
Dieks (2012b, 103) objects that “[n]o high-brow technical knowledge
is necessary to understand what modern physics has to tell us about
time.” According to him, “the mere tension with immediate intuition
seems sufficient for many philosophers to push this physical picture
aside.” Be that as it may, there certainly is more than a grain of truth
in Dummett’s complaint.
In order to fully engage with the contemporary literature on the
philosophy of physics, a certain acquaintance with the mathematical
framework of modern physics is presupposed. Hence this appendix,
which the reader may consult whenever the need so arises.
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Another reason for writing this
appendix is the geometrical approach taken. By this, I mean that
the block universe perspective is adopted from the very beginning.
Most textbooks on relativity theory start with a ‘classical’ three-
dimensional approach, based on inertial observers, where spacetime
is globally decomposed in space + time. Here, in contrast, I set out
with a four-dimensional approach where spacetime itself takes center
stage. In that sense, the approach adopted here is modern, rather
than historical. This is more in line with the modus operandi of
Minkowski (1908, 1909) as compared to that of Einstein (1905).
For a more detailed account of the concepts to be introduced in
this appendix, I refer the reader to Penrose (1972), Hawking and Ellis
(1973), Naber (1992) and Gourgoulhon (2013).
￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿ . The basic goal of SR is the study of events and the
relationships between them (Naber, 1992). Every event occurs at a
specific point in space and at a particular moment of time. Indeed,
Minkowski (1908) emphasized that “the objects of our perception [. . .]
include places and times in combination. Nobody has ever noticed a
place except at a time, or a time except at a place” (emphasis added).









Figure 26: The four-dimensional spacetime manifold M is a continuum of
point-events a,b, c, . . . The dashed frame should not be mistaken
for a mathematical boundary; spacetime has no boundary in SR.
A total of four numbers are thus required to locate a specific event:
three spatial coordinates, and one time coordinate (see §3).
Notice that I am treating events in an idealized way by restricting
our attention to point-events. Point-events have no spatial extension
and no temporal duration. Examples of such idealized point-events
include the collision of two particles, the lighting of a firecracker, the
decay of an elementary particle, or an instant in a photon’s history.
Moreover, nothing really needs to happen in order for a point in the
spacetime continuum to be called an event. My focus therefore lies
on both actualized and merely potential events.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . The arena in which these physical events take place
is a four-dimensional continuum, called spacetime. Spacetime is the
fundamental spatio-temporal entity of SR. Space and time as such no
longer exist; they have lost their independent existence and are no
longer to be treated as separate entities. To quote Minkowski once
more: “space by itself, and time by itself, are doomed to fade away
into mere shadows, and only a kind of union of the two will preserve
an independent reality” (Lorentz et al., 1952, 75).1
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Let M then denote the abstract set whose elements
a,b, c, . . . are (actual or possible) point-events:2
M ⇥= {a,b, c, . . .} . (26)
1 How a particular spacetime can be decomposed into three-dimensional space and
one-dimensional time is dealt with in §§14–15.
2 There is a slight terminological abuse here. The elements of the setM are not events,
but event locations. The elements of M are not the lighting of a firecracker or the
collision of two particles, say, but the spacetime locations at which these events occur.
It is common parlance, however, to speak of these locations as ‘events’ themselves
(Sklar, 1974, 56).
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At the coarsest level, spacetime is just that: a set of spacetime points
(Figure 26). In most cases, however, this is not enough to do real
physics. That is, more mathematical structure has to be added to the
set M if we want to capture all the facts about spacetime. This can














First, order relations and equivalence relations are defined on M to
produce ordered sets and quotient sets, respectively. In a next step, a
topology O is introduced to yield a topological manifold ÖM,Oã. As
such, ever more structure can be established on the set of spacetime
points. This process ends at the top of the hierarchy, where M is
taken to be a smooth, connected, four-dimensional metric manifold.
To each level in the hierarchy corresponds a transformation group,
denoted G, in accordance with Klein’s Erlanger Programm. The lower
in the hierarchy, the more general the structure, and the larger the
corresponding symmetry group. For instance, if GM and GC are the
transformation groups of the metric and conformal manifold, then
GM L GC (Kroes, 1985, 6).
Each level (or sub-structure) in the hierarchy generates its own set
of philosophical problems. But not all levels are of equal importance.
For a special relativistic spacetime, the order and metrical structure
are by far the most important ones, as they deviate most strongly
from the order and metrical structure of Newtonian spacetime.3 The
metrical properties ofM are defined in §4. A discussion of the order
properties of M will have to await §§14–15. For the moment, let M
be a topological manifold:
3 For a general relativistic spacetime, topological properties play an important role as
well.
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Definition 16. Topological manifold: A topological manifold of dimen-
sion n (or n-manifold) is a set M that resembles Rn locally, but can
differ from Rn globally. t
The plane, cylinder, sphere and torus are examples of manifolds of
dimension 2. Since spacetime fuses the 3 dimensions of space with
the 1 dimension of time, it is represented by a 4-manifold.
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ . To each spacetime point p " M corresponds a
tangent space Tp (M).
Definition 17. Tangent space: Consider a point p "M, whereM can
be any manifold. The set of all vectors at that point constitutes the
tangent space at p, denoted Tp (M). The tangent space is a real vector
space, the elements of which are called the tangent vectors at p. The
set of all tangent spaces ofM is called the tangent bundle T (M). t
For example, ifM is a 2-sphere, the tangent space Tp (M) of a point p
on the sphere will be the plane that tangentially touches the sphere at
p. Luckily, when dealing with SR, one does not need to worry about
tangent spaces. Due to the ‘flatness’ of the spacetime 4-manifold in
SR, the tangent space at each point ofM can be canonically identified
with the spacetime manifold itself. That is, the spacetime manifold
M can be treated as a vector space M in its own right, such that the
tangent vectors can be taken as vectors in spacetime itself. Due to this
fact, spacetime events can be treated as 4-vectors.4
￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Let then {e0, e1, e2, e3} be a basis for M, and let a
denote a 4-vector, which can be written in terms of its components
with respect to this basis:






with ⇥a0,a1,a2,a3  the components of a. In what follows, I will take
the component a0 to be the timelike component of a, and a1, a2
and a3 to be the spacelike components. The spatial components of a
constitute an ordinary 3-vector Ña = (a1,a2,a3).
The basis {e0, e1, e2, e3} forM coordinatizes the vectors a "M and
is therefore called a frame of reference. An observer O who presides
4 Notice that this identification is no longer possible in general relativity (GR). The
curvature of the Lorentzian spacetime manifold prevents us from speaking of space-
time events as 4-vectors. In GR, spacetime events are just points in the spacetime
manifold, and the 4-vectors are elements of the corresponding tangent spaces.
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over this frame of reference can use the basis to determine the spatial
coordinates ⇥a1,a2,a3  and time coordinate ⇥a0  of any event a.
Notational remark
The expression in Eq. (27) can be written more succinctly with the
help of Einstein’s summation convention according to which re-
peated indices imply summation over all the values of those indices:
a = a↵e↵. (28)
Whenever the index is a letter from the Greek alphabet (↵,  ,  , . . .),
the index range is 0 to 3. In contrast, when the index is a letter from
the Latin alphabet (i, j, k, . . .), the index range is 1 to 3. Thus,
a = a0e0 + aiei. (29)
￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
The geometrical structure for the spacetime manifoldM is provided
by the metric tensor g. The metric serves to measure the temporal
duration, spatial distance or spacetime interval between any pair of
events p and q in M. To be specific, the spacetime manifold M
is endowed with a nondegenerate, symmetric, bilinear form g with
signature ( ,+,+,+) such that the scalar product of two 4-vectors a
and b with respect to the orthonormal basis {e0, e1, e2, e3} is given
by the following expression:
a   b =  a0b0 + a1b1 + a2b2 + a3b3. (30)
The previous sentence may need some unpacking:
Definition 18. Bilinear form: A bilinear form on a vector space M is
a bilinear map g ⇥M✓M∫ R from two copies of the vector space
to the field of scalars that associates with any pair of vectors (a,b) a
real number g (a,b), and that is linear in each of its arguments. That
is, for any   " R and a,b, c "M:
g ( a,b) =  g (a,b) ; (31a)
g (a,  b) =  g (a,b) ; (31b)
g (a+ b, c) = g (a, c)+ g (b, c) ; (31c)
g (a,b+ c) = g (a,b)+ g (a, c) . (31d)
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Definition 19. Nondegeneracy: A bilinear form is said to be nonde-
generate when the zero vector a = 0 is the only vector satisfying the
relation
æb "M, g (a,b) = 0. (32)
That is, the zero vector is the only vector orthogonal to all vectors.
Definition 20. Symmetry: A bilinear form is said to be symmetric
when the order of the vectors does not affect the value of the map:
æa,b "M (i.e. æ (a,b) "M✓M) , g (a,b) = g (b, a) . (33)
Notice that with the help of this property, Eq. (31b) follows directly
from Eq. (31a), and Eq. (31d) from Eq. (31c).
A nondegenerate symmetric bilinear form g is also called an inner
product. The image of (a,b) under g can therefore be denoted more
simply as a   b instead of as g (a,b). One example is the standard
inner product on Rn:
g (a,b) = a   b = a1b1 + a2b2 + . . .+ anbn, (34)
with a = ⇥a1,a2, . . . ,an  and b = ⇥b1,b2, . . . ,bn .
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ . When a bilinear form g acts as an inner
product, it is also called the metric tensor, or simply metric, of the
vector space M. In SR, the metric g is called the Minkowski metric.
Its metric signature ( ,+,+,+) implies that there is a basis of M in
which g (a,b) can be written (in diagonal form) as the sum of four
terms, one with a minus sign and the remaining three with a plus
sign, as in Eq. (30). Given the 4-tuple ( ,+,+,+), the Minkowski
metric g is said to have index (1, 3) (implying 1 minus and 3 pluses),
and the vector space M is often denoted as R1,3.
With those definitions and terminological conventions in place, we
are finally in a position to derive Eq. (30). Let {e0, e1, e2, e3} be a
vector basis for M. The 4✓ 4 matrix representing the bilinear form g
with respect to this basis is then defined to be the matrix  g↵ ⌥ with
elements
g↵  ⇥= g  e↵, e ⌥ . (35)
Defining the inner product of two 4-vectors a and b as
a   b ⇥= g (a,b) (36)
yields
a   b ⇥= g ⇥a↵e↵,b e   = a↵b g  e↵, e ⌥ = g↵ a↵b , (37)
where use was made of the bilinearity of g. The basis {e0, e1, e2, e3}
of M is said to be orthonormal iff
e0   e0 =  1; (38a)
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ei   ei = +1, 1 & i & 3; (38b)
e↵   e  = 0, ↵ j  . (38c)
In that case, the matrix  g↵ ⌥ of g is the Minkowski matrix  ⌘↵ ⌥:
⌘↵  ⇥=
 ⇣⇣⇣⇣⇣⇣⇣⇣ 
 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
 ⌘⌘⌘⌘⌘⌘⌘⌘✏ = diag ( 1, 1, 1, 1) , (39)
and we recover the expression in Eq. (30) for the (Minkowski) inner
product a   b with respect to this orthonormal basis:5
a   b = ⌘↵ a↵b  =  a0b0 + a1b1 + a2b2 + a3b3. (40)
The inner product of a vector with itself yields the Minkowski norm
squared:
a   a = ⌘ (a, a)   ∂∂a∂∂2   a2. (41)
Three more remarks: First, the norm ∂∂e∂∂2 of a unit vector e is always
±1. Second, two 4-vectors a and b are said to be ⌘-orthogonal when
⌘ (a,b) = 0. Finally, both the Minkowski inner product and the norm
squared are invariant under Lorentz transformations.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ . Having introduced the Minkowski metric
⌘, Minkowski spacetime can be defined as follows:
Definition 21. Minkowski spacetime: Minkowski spacetime is a 4-
dimensional real affine manifoldM, equipped with a nondegenerate
symmetric bilinear form ⌘ of Lorentzian signature ( ,+,+,+) on the
associated vector space. t
Schematically, Minkowski spacetime can thus be represented by the
2-tuple ÖM,⌘ã.6 Topologically,M is equivalent to R4. It is a pseudo-
Euclidean space of dimension 4 and signature (1, 3). All the structure
of Minkowski spacetime flows from the Minkowski metric, as will
become evident in the following sections.
5 To be mathematically precise, the Minkowski metric ⌘↵  is a bilinear form that
accepts two vectors ap and bp from the tangent space Tp (M) at p inM. However,
due to the canonical identification of Tp (M) withM itself, one can just as well use
the vectors a and b inM as arguments for the Minkowski inner product.
6 In general relativity, a relativistic spacetime is given by the 2-tuple ÖM,gã, where
M can have a variety of topologies, and the metric g typically varies from point to
point.
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When dealing with Euclidean 3-space, the metric g is a symmetric
bilinear form of signature (+,+,+). Accordingly, the Euclidean inner
product is positive-definite:7
æa "M, a   a ' 0. (42)
The Minkowski metric g, on the other hand, describes an altogether
different geometry and has a Lorentzian signature ( ,+,+,+), which
prevents the inner product from being positive-definite. Instead, the
Minkowski inner product of a 4-vector with itself is indefinite: it
can be positive, null or negative.8 This allows a classification of the
vectors in Minkowski spacetime in three classes:
Definition 22. Spacelike, timelike and lightlike vectors: A 4-vector
a of Minkowski spacetime is said to be
1. spacelike iff g (a, a) > 0;
2. timelike iff g (a, a) < 0;
3. null or lightlike iff a j 0 and g (a, a) = 0.
When a is timelike or null, it is also said to be non-spacelike. t
Since the Minkowski inner product is invariant under Lorentz trans-
formations, the above-mentioned classification of a vector holds true
in all inertial frames of reference.
Consider two spacetime points p,q "M with p j q. Then q is ei-
ther spacelike-, timelike- or lightlike-separated from p depending on
whether the vector (p,q) is spacelike, timelike or null. Hence, with re-
spect to any event p "M, Minkowski spacetime can be decomposed
into four mutually exclusive classes of events:
1. H (p) = {p};
2. S (p) = sq "M ∑ (p,q) is spacelikey;
3. T (p) = sq "M ∑ (p,q) is timelikey;
4. L (p) = sq "M ∑ (p,q) is lightlikey.
The set H (p) contains only p itself, and is commonly called the here-
now. S (p), T (p) and L (p) are referred to as the spacelike, timelike
and lightlike set, respectively.
7 The signature of a metric is said to be positive-definite (negative-definite) when
it consists exclusively of pluses (minuses). If, on the other hand, the signature
consists of a mix of pluses and minuses, then the metric is said to be indefinite.
Positive-definite signatures, such as (+,+,+,+), are called Euclidean or Rieman-
nian, whereas the indefinite signature ( ,+,+,+) of Minkowski spacetime is called
Lorentzian.
8 Notice that the scalar product of the 4-vector a with itself can be null even when
a j 0.









Figure 27: The lightcone L (p) of an event p. Given a temporal orientation,
a distinction can be made between the future lightcone L  (p)
and the past lightcone L⇤ (p) of p. The numbers in the figure
refer to the different classes of 4-vectors as enumerated in §7.1.
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The lightlike set L (p) consists of all events q "M that can be linked
to p via an electromagnetic influence, such as a light ray in vacuum.
L (p) is therefore also called the lightcone of p (Figure 27):
Definition 23. Null cone: For any p "M, the lightcone or null cone of
p is the lightlike set L (p) of all null vectors at p. t
The lightcone L (p) separates the timelike vectors from the spacelike
vectors at p: the timelike vectors are inside L (p); the spacelike vectors
outside L (p). The null vectors, by definition, are on L (p).
As can be seen from Figure 27, for each p "M, the lightcone L (p)
is an open submanifold ofM consisting of three parts: the spacetime
point p itself, and two connected components or lightcone sheets,
denoted L  (p) and L⇤ (p). Since the timelike vectors are all inside
L (p), T (p) is equally disconnected by p into two open convex lobes,
denoted T   (p) and T ⇤ (p), with L  (p) and L⇤ (p) the topological
boundaries of T   (p) and T ⇤ (p), respectively. The spacelike set S (p),
in contrast, is topologically connected.
Definition 24. Null cone structure: The set of all null cones in
Minkowski spacetime ÜM,⌘↵ å is denoted:
L ⇥=⌫
p
L (p) , æp "M, (43)
and is referred to as the null cone structure of ÜM,⌘↵ å (Figure 28). t
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Definition 25. Co-directionality: Let p,q " M be two spacetime
points. The open convex lobes T   (p) and T   (q) are then said to lie
on corresponding sides or to be co-directional if their set-theoretical
intersection is again an open convex lobe of another spacetime event
s "M (with s excluded):
T   (s) L T   (p) = T   (q) . (44)
The relation of co-directionality is reflexive, symmetric and transitive,
and hence an equivalence relation, generating two equivalence classes
T   and T ⇤ (Stein, 1968, Jammer, 1986). Each class contains exactly
one of the open convex lobes of the lightcone at every spacetime point:
T   ⇥=⌫
p
T   (p) , æp "M; (45a)
T ⇤ ⇥=⌫
p
T ⇤ (p) , æp "M. (45b)
The same method can be applied to determine the co-directionality
of different lightcone sheets. Once again, a partition is obtained of all
the null cones into two equivalence classes, L  and L⇤:
L  ⇥=⌫
p
L  (p) , æp "M. (46a)
L⇤ ⇥=⌫
p
L⇤ (p) , æp "M. (46b)
The null cone structure L is thus an open submanifold ofMwith two
components: L = L  <L⇤.
￿.￿ Temporal orientability and orientation
Definition 26. Temporal orientability: A relativistic spacetimeÖM,gabã is said to be temporally orientable iff the lightcone structure
L has two components, L  and L⇤. t
Definition 27. Temporal orientation: A relativistic spacetimeÖM,gabã is said to be temporally oriented iff one component of the
lightcone structure L is labelled future-directed and the other past-
directed. t
I will here denote the future-directed component by L  and the past-
directed component by L⇤, and similarly for T   and T ⇤.
Definition 28. Past and future of p: For any event p "M, the future
of p is the topological closure of T   (p) with p excluded. Similarly,
the past of p is the topological closure of T ⇤ (p) with p removed. t







Figure 28: The null cone structure of Minkowski spacetime ÜM,⌘↵ å.
Also, for any event p "M, L  (p) L L  is called the future lightcone
of p, and L⇤ (p) L L⇤ the past lightcone of p. Thus, with respect to
any event p "M, Minkowski spacetime can be decomposed into six
mutually exclusive classes of events:
1. H (p) ; 4. T   (p);
2. L  (p); 5. T ⇤ (p);
3. L⇤ (p); 6. S (p).
This classification holds true in any frame of reference: an event q "
M judged to be in class i (i = 1, . . . , 6) by one inertial observer, will
be judged to be in the same class i by all other observers.
￿.￿ The arrow of time
From the point of view of SR, the designation of L  and L⇤ as future-
and past-directed is completely aribtrary and conventional. The two
components of L cannot be distinguished intrinsically. That is, even
though Minkowski spacetime ÜM,⌘↵ å is temporally orientable, it
is not intrinsically temporally oriented. The choice of an orientation
thus corresponds to the introduction of an arrow of time, and should
be seen as the addition of a new element of structure to Minkowski
spacetime ÜM,⌘↵ å.9 To make clear which orientation is chosen, I
will denote time oriented Minkowski spacetimes as ÜM,⌘↵ ,  å andÜM,⌘↵ , ⇤å, respectively, with   or ⇤ referring to which equivalence
class L  or L⇤ is taken to be future-directed.
9 In what follows, we will consider all null and timelike vectors with a positive first
component (a0 > 0) to be future-directed, and those with a negative first component
(a0 < 0) to be past-directed.










Figure 29: The worldline of a particle is represented by a timelike curve C
inM, which is the image set of the path   ⇥ ⌃ L R∫M;  ¿
  ( ). Here p =   ( 1), q =   ( 2) and r =   ( 3).
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A (pointlike, idealized) particle at a ‘moment of time’ and ‘location in
space’ is represented by a point (event) inM. The trajectory it traces
out ‘in space over time’ is given by a one-dimensional curve in M,
which is called the worldline of the particle (Figure 29).
Definition 29. Paths: A path inM is a smooth map:10
  ⇥ ⌃ L R ∫ M
  ¿ p =   ( ) (47)
with ⌃ a connected interval in R. t
Definition 30. Curves: A curve C in M is the image set of a path  :
C =   [⌃].11 t
Definition 31. Parametrization: A curve C inM is said to be simple
when it is injective, i.e. when for all  1,  2 " ⌃, we have   ( 1) =
  ( 2)º  1 =  2. In that case,   is called a parametrization of C. t
With these definitions in place, all curves (and paths) in M can be
classified on the basis of their tangent vectors:
10 A map is a function f ⇥ A   B between two sets A and B, with A the domain and B
the target (or codomain) of f. The input a " A to the function is the argument, and
the output f (a) = b " B is the function value or image of a under f. That is, f maps
a to b. In shorthand, f ⇥ A   B; a ( f (a). Following the terminology introduced
by the Bourbaki group, a function f is said to be:
1. Injective (or one-to-one) if æx,y " A, f (x) = f (y)  x = y;
2. Surjective (or onto) if æy " B,øx " A ⇥ y = f (x);
3. Bijective (or one-to-one and onto) if f is both injective and surjective.
A path is said to be smooth when it is differentiable a number of times. A connected
interval is a connected set in R containing more than one point.
11 The image set   [⌃] of the entire domain ⌃ of path   is defined as follows:   [⌃] ⇥={p "M ∂ p =   ( ) for some   " ⌃}.
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Definition 32. Spacelike, timelike, lightlike and causal curves: A
curve C inM is said to be
1. spacelike when its tangent vector is spacelike for all   " ⌃;
2. timelike (or chronological) when its tangent vector is timelike for
all   " ⌃;
3. lightlike (or null) when its tangent vector is null for all   " ⌃;
4. causal (or non-spacelike) when it is timelike or null. t
Massive particles are represented by timelike curves. Photons (and
other massless particles), on the other hand, move along null curves.
Tachyons, finally, are hypothetical particles that travel along spacelike
worldlines. The worldline of a particle can never change its type: it is
either always timelike, null or spacelike.
Since Minkowski spacetime is temporally orientable (see §7.1), a
further classification of the non-spacelike curves is possible according
to their orientation with respect to the arrow of time:
Definition 33. Future- and past-directed curves: A chronological,
null or causal curve C inM is said to be
1. future-directed (or future-oriented) when its tangent vector is
future-directed for all   " ⌃;
2. past-directed (or past-oriented) when its tangent vector is past-
directed for all   " ⌃. t
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The causal structure of Minkowski spacetime describes the various
causal relationships between points in the manifold. These causal
relations in turn describe which events can influence which other
events in Minkowski spacetime. Due to the absence of curvature in
Minkowski spacetime, the causal relationships take up a particularly
simple form in SR. As will become clear below, the causal structure
of Minkowski spacetime can be entirely defined on the basis of its
lightcone structure, provided that a time orientation is first added. It
is the temporal arrow, in other words, that gives the causal arrow its
direction. As such, the causal asymmetry is grounded in the temporal
asymmetry.
Not everyone agrees, however, that the temporal asymmetry is
more fundamental than the causal one. Some philosophers of time
have thus reversed the grounding relation, and have sought to explain
the temporal asymmetry in causal terms. The most famous attempt
in this direction is the causal theory of time order, as developped by
Hans Reichenbach. Here, however, the arrow of time is taken to be
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primitive (see also Chapter 3 in that regard). The aim of this section,
then, is to introduce some definitions and basic results related to the
causal structure of Minkowski spacetime.
￿.￿ Causal relations
Definition 34. Causal relations: Given two points p,q "M, we say
that
1. p chronologically precedes q, denoted p 8 q, when there is
a future-directed chronological curve   ⇥ [a,b] ∫ M with
  (a) = p and   (b) = q.
2. p causally precedes q, denoted p T q, when there is a future-
directed causal curve   ⇥ [a,b] ∫ M with   (a) = p and
  (b) = q or if p = q;
3. p horismos q, denoted p  q, when p T q and p† q; t
A few further terminological remarks: We say that q follows p when
q9 p. Analogously, q is said to follow p causally when q U p. When
p T q but p j q, p is said to strictly causally precede q. Finally,
when p and q are not causally related (for instance, because they are
spacelike separated), this will be indicated as p≈q.
￿.￿ Causal regions
￿.￿.￿ Chronological future and past
Definition 35. Chronological future: Given a point p " M, the
chronological future of p, denoted I+ (p), is the set of points q " M
such that p chronologically precedes q:
I
+ (p) ⇥= {q "M ∂ p8 q} . (48)
The chronological future of p thus consists of all events q in M that
follow p (viz. that happen later than p). Each point q " I+ (p) can be
reached from p via a future-directed chronological curve. Notice that
the chronological future I+ (p) is the interior of the future lightcone
at p, denoted L  (p) (Figure 30).
Definition 36. Chronological past: Given a point p "M, the chrono-
logical past of p, denoted I  (p), is the set of points q "M such that
q chronologically precedes p:
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Figure 30: The causal future J+ (p) of p consists of the future light cone
L  (p) of p and its chronological future I+ (p). Similarly, the
causal past J  (p) of p consists of the past light cone L⇤ (p) of p
along with its chronological past I  (p).
￿.￿.￿ Causal future and past
Definition 37. Causal future: Given a point p "M, the causal future
(or absolute future) of p, denoted J+ (p), is the set of points q " M
such that p causally precedes q:
J
+ (p) ⇥= {q "M ∂ p T q} . (50)
The causal future of p thus consists of all events q inM that follow p
causally (viz. that can be causally influenced by p). This set includes
the future lightcone L  (p) of p, along with all the events inside the
future lightcone (Figure 30). The future lightcone thus functions as
the boundary of the causal future of p. Each point q " J+ (p) can be
reached from p via a future-directed timelike or null curve.
All events q ä J+ (p) that are not in the causal future of p cannot
be influenced by p. They are either outside the future lightcone of p
(at a spacelike distance from p), or in the causal past of p:
Definition 38. Causal past: Given a point p "M, the causal past (or
absolute past) of p, denoted J  (p), is the set of points q "M such that
q causally precedes p:
J
  (p) ⇥= {q "M ∂ q T p} . (51)
The causal past of p consists of all events q inM that can influence p.
The past lightcone of p, denoted L⇤ (p), acts as the boundary of the
causal past.
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￿.￿.￿ Future and past horismos
Definition 39. Future horismos: Given a point p " M, the future
horismos of p, denoted E+ (p), is the set of points q " M for which
the horismotic relation p  q holds true:
E
+ (p) ⇥= {q "M ∂ p  q} . (52)
The future horismos of p thus consists of all events q inM which are
in the causal future but not in the chronological future of p.
Definition 40. Past horismos: Given a point p " M, the past horis-
mos of p, denoted E  (p), is the set of points q " M for which the
horismotic relation q  p holds true:
E
  (p) ⇥= {q "M ∂ q  p} . (53)
The past and future horismos of p are nothing else than the past and
future lightcone of p. Their union, therefore, is the null cone:
L (p) = L  (p) < L⇤ (p)   E+ (p) < E  (p) . (54)
The sets I+ (p), I  (p), J+ (p), J  (p), E+ (p) and E  (p) for all p "M
collectively constitute the causal structure ofM.
One last remark: since the chronological future I+ (p) of p is the
timelike interior of the causal future J+ (p) of p, without its null-like
boundary, it is the complement of L  (p) in the causal future of p.
That is, I+ (p) = J+ (p) \L  (p).
￿.￿.￿ Causal regions for extended objects
All of the above definitions were applied to a single spacetime event
p " M. Nothing prevents us, however, from applying them to an
extended object, which is just an entire set of spacetime events. By
treating the extended object as a subset S of M, we can define its
chronological and causal past and future as follows:
Definition 41. Causal regions for extended objects: Given any sub-
set S LM:
I





± (S) ⇥= ⌫
p"S
J
± (p) . (55)
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This section introduces the notions of Cauchy developments (§10.1)
and global hyperbolicity (§10.2), both of which will be needed for the













Figure 31: The future and past domain of dependence, D+ (S) and D  (S),
of the spacetime region S .
￿￿.￿ Cauchy developments
Definition 42. Future domain of dependence: The future domain of
dependence of a spacetime region S LM, denoted D+ (S), is the set of
all events p "M such that every past-directed causal curve through
p with no past endpoint intersects S :
D
+ (S) ⇥= sp "M ∂ all past-endless causal curves through p meet Sy .
The set D+ (S) is also called the future Cauchy development of S . t
Definition 43. Past domain of dependence: The past domain of depen-
dence of a spacetime region S LM, denoted D  (S), is the set of all
events p "M such that every future-directed causal curve through p
with no future endpoint intersects S :
D
  (S) ⇥= sp "M ∂ all future-endless causal curves through p meet Sy .
The set D  (S) of S is also called the past Cauchy development of S . t
The full domain of dependence (or Cauchy development) D (S) of
S is then defined as the union of D+ (S) and D  (S):
D (S) ⇥= D+ (S) < D  (S) . (56)
The boundaries of D+ (S) and D  (S) are called the future and past
Cauchy horizons of S , respectively, and are denoted H+ (S) and
H
  (S) (Figure 31). Two more examples of the past and future Cauchy
developments of a spacetime region S are given in Figures 32 and 33.
￿￿.￿ Cauchy surfaces and global hyperbolicity
Definition 44. Achronal set: A subset S LM is said to be achronal if
no point in S precedes any other point of S , i.e. if there are no p,q " S
such that q " I+ (p). t











Figure 32: The Cauchy development D (⌃) of a Cauchy surface ⌃ L M is
the entirety of Minkowski spacetimeM.
In other words, S and I+ (S) are disjoint for an achronal set: S =
I
+ (S) = o. Since no two points of S can be joined via a timelike
curve, S can be thought of as a three-dimensional spacelike hypersur-
face of simultaneity.
If moreover S is global (i.e. without edges), S can be thought of
as representing ‘an instant of time’ throughout the universe. S then
functions as a ‘time slice’ representing the state of the universe at
that moment of time. Notice that any time slice S divides Minkowski
spacetimeM in three mutually disjoint regions:
1. The present moment S itself;
2. The future F (S) ⇥= I+ (S) of S ;
3. The past P (S) ⇥= I  (S) of S .
If F (S) L D+ (S), then S is said to be a future Cauchy surface. S
is called a past Cauchy surface when P (S) L D  (S). S is a Cauchy
surface when it is both past and future Cauchy (Figure 32).
Definition 45. Cauchy surface: A Cauchy surface is an achronal set
⌃ LM whose Cauchy development D (⌃) isM. t
Definition 46. Global hyperbolicity: When a spacetime ÜM,g↵ å
possesses a Cauchy surface ⌃, it is said to be globally hyperbolic. t
A globally hyperbolic spacetime can be foliated by Cauchy surfaces,
and admits a well-posed initial value formulation (see §11):
Theorem 3. Global time function: Let ÜM,g↵ å be a globally hyperbolic
spacetime. Then a global time function t ⇥ M∫ R can be chosen such
that each hypersurface of constant t is a Cauchy surface. In that case M
can be foliated by Cauchy surfaces, and the topology of M becomes that of
R ✓ ⌃, with ⌃ any Cauchy hypersurface. t
Importantly, Minkowski spacetime ÜM,⌘↵ å
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The aim of this section is to offer a brief discussion of the doctrine of
determinism in SR. For a more complete account, I refer the reader
to Earman (1986, 2007), and Roberts (2006). A good starting point is
the definition by Earman (1986) of Laplacian determinism in terms of
possible worlds. To that aim, let us first introduce some terminology:
Definition 47. Physically possible world: Call W the class of possible
worlds. The worlds in which the same laws of physics apply as in our
world form a subclassW L W of physically possible worlds. t
Definition 48. History: The history of a worldw "W is a mapH from
the reals to an N-tuple of values of the relevant physical variables
(observables):
H ⇥ R ∫ RN
t ¿ H (t) (57)
with H (t) the complete physical state of the world at time t. t
For example, for a classical world of n particles, the state of the world
at t is given by a specification of the particles’ positions and momenta
at t (N = 6n):
H (t) = ⇥x1 (t) , x2 (t) , . . . , xn (t) ,p1 (t) ,p2 (t) , . . . ,pn (t)  . (58)
With these definitions in place, Earman (1986) formulates Laplacian
determinism as follows:
Definition 49. Laplacian determinism: A world w "W is said to be
Laplacian deterministic iff for any wì " W and any time t, if w and
w
ì agree on the complete physical state at t, then they agree on the
complete physical state at all other times t ¨:
æw,wì "W ⇥ Hw (t) = Hwì (t) ø Hw ⇥t ¨  = Hwì ⇥t ¨  , (59)
with t a global time function. If Eq. (59) only holds for t ¨ > t, then
w is said to be futuristically deterministic. Likewise, if Eq. (59) only
holds for t ¨ < t, then w is said to be historically deterministic. t
It is worth exploring whether this definition is also applicable in a
special relativistic setting, and whether SR is a deterministic theory
or not. With respect to the latter question, Earman (1986) argues
that SR provides a much more friendly environment to determinism
as compared to the Newtonion world of classical mechanics. After
all, SR puts an end to the “guerrilla war against [space] invaders












Figure 33: The future and past domain of dependence, D+ (S) and D  (S),
of the spacetime region S .
A straightforward application of definition 49 is impossible, though,
due to the lack of an absolute time in SR (see §13.4). The definition
of Laplacian determinism above is formulated in terms of the state
of the world at a given moment of time t. In the previous section,
such moments of time were represented by globally achronal surfaces.
It thus seems natural to attempt a reformulation of definition 49 in
terms of an achronal surface S :
Proposition 1. The world w " W is said to be Laplacian deterministic iff
for any wì " W and any achronal time slice S , if w and wì agree on the
physical state on S , then they agree on the physical state everywhere. t
Unfortunately, the above proposition is too loose to provide a work-
ing definition of Laplacian determinism. To see this, consider the
globally achronal spacelike hypersurface S of Figure 33. Even though
S is a time slice, its entire Cauchy development D (S) is restricted to
the past lightcone L⇤ (p) of the event p. Now for any event q ä D (S),
a specification of the state in S is not sufficient in order to determine
the state at q since there are causal curves which pass through q but
do not register on S . In order to avoid such troublesome cases, the
set of allowed time slices should be restricted to Cauchy surfaces for
which D (S) =M, as in Figure 32:
Definition 50. Relativistic determinism: The world w "W is said to
be Laplacian deterministic iff for any wì " W and any Cauchy surface
⌃, if w and wì agree on the physical state on ⌃, then they agree on
the physical state everywhere. t
188 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
The metric tensor g can be used as an operator for measuring the
‘length’ between two points on the worldline of a particle. This
‘length’ corresponds to the elapsed time, or proper time, between
the two points.
Definition 51. Proper time: Consider the worldline of a massive par-
ticle, represented by a timelike curve C inM, and let p and p ¨ be two
events on C that are infinitesimally close. The infinitesimal vector dx
connecting p to p ¨ is then tangent to C (Figure 34). We define
c d⌧ ⇥= ∂∂dx∂∂ = ±’ g (dx,dx), (60)
where + is used when dx is future-directed, and   when dx is past-
directed. d⌧ is called the proper time elapsed between the events p and
p
¨ on C. t
Given an orthonormal basis (e0, e1, e2, e3) of Minkowski spacetimeÖM,gã, the inner product g (dx,dx) can be rewritten in terms of the
components of the displacement vector dx (see §4):
g (dx,dx) =   ⇥dx0 2 + ⇥dx1 2 + ⇥dx2 2 + ⇥dx3 2 . (61)
Substituting in Eq. (60) yields:
c d⌧ = ±
÷ dx0⌥2    dx1⌥2    dx2⌥2    dx3⌥2. (62)
If a parametrization   is given of the worldline C, the proper time
can also be expressed in terms of the tangent vector field where the
tangent vector v ( ) at each point is:
v ( ) = dx
d 
, æ  " ⌃, (63)
with d  the parameter difference between p =   ( ) and p ¨ =
  ( + d ). Using the bilinearity of g, we obtain:
c d⌧ = ±
’
 g (vd ,vd ) = ±’ g (v,v)d . (64)
The proper time between two events p and q along a worldline C is
found by simple integration:
⌧ (p,q) ⇥= E q
p




 g (v ( ) ,v ( ))d , (65)
with p =   ( 1) and q =   ( 2). Notice also that the value of ⌧ (p,q) is
path-dependent: different timelike curves connecting the same events
p and q will have different elapsed times. This observation lies at the







Figure 34: The worldline of a massive particle, represented by a timelike
curve C " M. The two infinitesimally close events p and p ¨
are connected via the tangent vector dx. Figure adapted from
Gourgoulhon (2013, 31).
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Having introduced proper time, I proceed by defining the notion of
an (ideal) clock, which can be used by an observer O to measure the
time of events along her own worldline C (§13.1). In order to assign
times to arbitrary events not on C, the Einstein–Poincaré criterion for
simultaneity will have to be invoked (§13.2).
￿￿.￿ Clocks
Definition 52. Clock: A clock is a physical system that (i) can be
treated as a point particle, (ii) follows a timelike curve C and (iii) emits
a sequence of signals, denoted by the events . . . , c 1, c0, c1, c2, . . . ,
with each ck a tick. t
Definition 53. Ideal clock: An ideal clock is a clock for which the
proper time ⌧ (ck, ck+n) between two ticks ck and ck+n is
⌧ (ck, ck+n) = n , (66)
with   a constant, and n the number of elapsed ticks. t
An observer O whose worldline is represented by a timelike curve
C in M, can use an ideal clock to measure the proper time ⌧ (p,q)
between any two events p and q on C. Setting ⌧ (p)   tp = 0 for an
event p " C fixes the origin of proper time. The proper time of any
other event q " C is then given by ⌧ (q)   tq = ⌧ (p,q).
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￿￿.￿ Einstein–Poincaré simultaneity
The problem facing O now is how to measure the time of events that
are not on C. One (intuitive) way of proceeding is by the following
proposition:
Proposition 2. An event q "M for which q ä C is said to occur at time
tp iff it is simultaneous with the event p " C whose proper time is tp. t
But this assumes there is a way to determine whether two events p
and q are simultaneous or not. In Newtonian spacetimeMN, this is
indeed the case. Due to the absoluteness of time, there is an absolute
(observer-independent) notion of simultaneity, wich allows a foliation
of the entire spacetime into different instants of time (see §14).
The situation in Minkowski spacetime ÖM,⌘ã is very different. The
fundamental structure of Minkowski spacetime is given by the met-
ric tensor ⌘, which is represented by the null cone at every point
p "M. But this structure cannot induce a foliation into simultaneity
hypersurfaces.12
Einstein was well aware of this problem. In his seminal paper on
SR, Einstein (1905) therefore offers a novel way of establishing the
simultaneity between events in Minkowski spacetime. The Einstein–
Poincaré convention or criterion for simultaneity, as it is now called,
allows a synchronization of spatially distant clocks by means of light
rays (or any other signal travelling at luminal speeds).
Definition 54. Standard synchrony: Let the worldline of an observer
O be represented by a timelike curve C in M (Figure 35). Equip O
with an ideal clock and a device for the emission and absorption of
light signals. Consider an event p " C of proper time tp. An event
q "M is said to be simultaneous with p iff
tq = tp ø tp =
1
2
(t1 + t2) . (67)
Here t1 denotes the proper time with respect to O of the emission of
a light signal to q. As soon as the light ray reaches q, it is reflected
back to O. The time of arrival is given by the proper time t2. t
Notice the operational character of this definition, which relies on
the absorption and emission of photons. What makes the Einstein–
Poincaré criterion for simultaneity so powerful is the fact that light in
vacuum always travels along null cones, which embody the invariant
structure of Minkowski spacetime.
12 Notice that synchronzing different clocks at p, and then moving them to different
points in space will not work, as moving clocks run slow with respect to stationary









Figure 35: A timelike curve C inM represents the worldline of an observer
O. At t1, O emits a photon to the right, which reaches q at the
unknown time tq. The photon is reflected back immediately, and
reaches O at t2. According to the Einstein–Poincaré convention
tq = tp ø tp = 12 (t1 + t2), where tp is the proper time of the
event p " C. Figure adapted from Gourgoulhon (2013, 65).
￿￿.￿ Simultaneity hypersurfaces
Definition 55. Simultaneity hypersurface: The set of all events q
simultaneous with p " C constitutes a 3-dimensional submanifold of
M, denoted ⌃ (p), and called the simultaneity hypersurface of p with
respect to O. t
The hypersurface of simultaneity ⌃ (p) intersects C in p (Figure 36).
Since all events q " ⌃ (p) are simultaneous with p, they all occur at
the same time tp according to O. In that sense, ⌃ (p) could be said to
represent space at the instant of time tp from O’s point of view.
Definition 56. Local rest space: The set of all spacelike vectors that
are orthogonal to C at p forms a 3-dimensional submanifold of M,
denotedM (p), and is called the local rest space of O at p. t
Notice that the local rest space M (p) of O at p is the space tangent
to the simultaneity hypersurface ⌃ (p) (Figure 36). When O is an in-
ertial observer, both spaces coincide andM (p) = ⌃ (p). Otherwise,
M (p) is an approximation to the simultaneity hypersurface ⌃ (p).
￿￿.￿ Relativity of simultaneity
With the help of the Einstein–Poincaré convention, any observer O
can measure the time for any event q " M, whether q lies on their
worldline or not. However, two different observers O1 and O2 will
not necessarily assign the same measure of time for a given event
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Fig. 3.3 Simultaneity hypersurface ˙u.A/ and local rest space Eu.A/ of an event A along the
worldline L0
“at rest”. For more details on the different perceptions of time between Poincare´
and Einstein, we refer to Damour (2006, 2007), Darrigol (2004, 2006), Galison
(2003), Reignier (2007), Rouge´ (2008) and Walter (2008). In particular, Darrigol’s
article (Darrigol 2004) is discussing in detail the influence of Poincare´ on the
definition (3.1) of simultaneity, and Walter’s article (Walter 2008) provides a deep
analysis of Poincare´’s conception of spacetime.
3.2.3 Local Rest Space
The set of events that are simultaneous to an event A on O’s worldline is a surface1
of dimension 3 of the affine space E , which intersectsL0 at A (see Fig. 3.3). Being
of dimension 3 in a space of dimension 4, one says that it is a hypersurface.2 We
shall call it the simultaneity hypersurface of A for O and denote it by ˙u.A/ or
˙u.t/,
#»u being the 4-velocity of observerO and t the proper time of A with respect
to O .
An important geometrical property of the simultaneity hypersurface is its
orthogonality (with respect to the metric tensor g) to the worldline of the considered
observer, as we are going to prove.
Let A be an event on L0 of proper time t and B an event not belonging to L0.
Let us consider the emission of a photon byO (eventA1 2 L0) that is reflected at B
to be received by O at the event A2 (cf. Fig. 3.4). We assume that B is located close
1The proper technical word is submanifold, whose precise definition will be given in Chap. 16.








Figure 36: The simultaneity hypersurface ⌃ (p) and local rest space M (p)
of p with respect to an observer O whose worldline is given by
the timelike curve C. All events on ⌃ (p) are simultaneous with p
according to the Einstein–Poincaré convention, and occur at time
tp. Figure adapted from Gourgoulhon (2013, 66).
q "M. To see this, consider two observers O1 and O2. For simplic-
ity, assume that O1 and O2 are inertial observers whose worldlines
are represented by two straight curves C1 and C2 in M (Figure 37).
Let C1 and C2 intersect in the point p. Using the Einstein–Poincaré
convention, we can construct the hypersurface of simultaneity of p
with respect to O1 and O2. As can be seen from Figure 37, ⌃O1 (p)
and ⌃O2 (p) are very different and tilted with respect to one another.
Whereas for O1, the relation tq < tp < tr holds true, O2 takes
tq = tp = tr to be true.
Because O1 and O2 judge the simultaneity of events differently,
they end up ‘slicing’ Minkowski spacetime up into different stacks
of spaces of simultaneous events. It is important to note here that
there are no privileged observers in SR. Hence, one cannot maintain
that O1’s judgements are right, and O2’s false, or vice versa. Indeed,
the principle of relativity ensures that both judgements are equally
good, even though O1 and O2 assign different times to the same
events. This phenomenon is called the relativity of simultaneity, and
constitutes one of the most important consequences of SR. Contrary
to Newtonian spacetimes, the notion of distant simultaneity is no
longer absolute, but has become relative to the observer. In order
to really bring home this message, it is worth comparing the order
structure in Newtonian and Minkowski spacetime in somewhat more
















Figure 37: Consider the worldlines C1, C2 of two inertial observers O1, O2.
The events p1,p2 " C2 are equidistant from p. The future light-
cone L  (p1) of p1 and past lightcone L⇤ (p2) of p2 intersect in
two points q and r, which are deemed to be simultaneous with
p according to O2. That is, q, r " ⌃O2 (p). Figure adapted from
Gourgoulhon (2013, 69).
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In our outline of SR so far, spacetime was taken to be the fundamental
spatio-temporal entity. That is, the spacetime events a, b, c, . . . "M
were taken to constitute the primitive ontology of SR.
The situation in classical Newtonian theory is very different. Due
to the strict separation between space and time, the spacetime events
are no longer treated as fundamental. Instead, the spatial and temporal
locations of these events are taken to be fundamental. That is, every
event location p can be analysed into an ordered pair Öx, tã, with x a
spatial location and t a temporal moment (Sklar, 1974, 57).
What this means on the set-theoretical level is that the set of spatial
locations S and the set of temporal moments T are truly fundamental,
and that the set of spacetime events M is composed out of these
two sets. To be precise, Newtonian spacetime MN is the Cartesian
product of space and time:
MN = S ✓ T . (68)
The structure of S is assumed to be Euclidean 3-space, denoted R3.
The structure of T is even simpler: it is taken to be Euclidean 1-space
R
1 (i.e. the structure of the one-dimensional real line). That is:
MN = R3 ✓R1 = R4. (69)
Time, according to Newton, is thus an independent entity. To be
precise, Newton’s absolute time is a surjective function:
T ⇥ MN ∫ R
e ¿ T (e) = te (70)
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An ideal clock records the absolute time te of any spacetime event
e "MN.
The composition of spacetime out of space and time, as outlined
above, is relatively straightforward. The reverse problem — that of
extracting space and time from spacetime — is perhaps a little trickier.
The question is whether there is a unique way of decomposing the
four-dimensional spacetime manifold MN into space S and time T ,
which are a three-dimensional and one-dimensional submanifold of
MN respectively. This will be explored in §§14.1–14.2.
￿￿.￿ Equivalence relations
LetMN be the abstract set of spacetime events a,b, c, . . . As I noted
in §2 above, more structure has to be provided if all the facts about
Newtonian spacetime are to be conveyed. Equivalence relations and
order relations provide the simplest such structure on MN by iden-
tifying and ordering the elements in the set.13
￿￿.￿.￿ Absolute simultaneity
Consider the Cartesian productM✓M and introduce the subset S L
M✓M. S defines a binary (two-place) relation among the events of
the setM, where S is standing for ‘is simultaneous with’. Then aSb is
shorthand for ‘event a is simultaneous with event b’. The truth-value
of aSb is easily determined:
æa, b "M ⇥ aSb ø T (a) = T (b) . (71)
Due to time’s absolute nature in classical Newtonian physics, every
observer O agrees on the absolute times T (a) and T (b) assigned to
the events a and b, respectively, irrespective of O’s position or O’s
state of motion.
Hence, there is an objective fact of the matter as to which events
are co-present. That is to say, the truth-value of aSb is observer-
independent. For this reason, the binary relation S is also called
absolute simultaneity.
￿￿.￿.￿ Equivalence relations
To be precise, S is an equivalence relation onM. This is easily verfied
since S satisfies the following three properties:
1. Reflexivity: æa "M ⇥ aSa;
2. Symmetry: æa, b "M ⇥ aSb º bSa;
13 In what follows, I will drop the subscript N when describing Newtonian spacetime
MN for notational simplicity.
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3. Transitivity: æa, b, c "M ⇥ aSb 0 bSc º aSc.14
￿￿.￿.￿ Equivalence classes
Given the set M and the equivalence relation S, let us define the S-
equivalence class [a]S of the event a " M to be the subset of all
events inM which are simultaneous with a:
[a]S ⇥= {e "M ∂ eSa} NM. (72)
For example, starting from the here-now, denoted o, we can use S
to construct the S-equivalence class [o]S of all events that occur now.
Observe that [o]S has the same cardinality as R3 and carries a 3-
dimensional Euclidean structure; it represents 3-dimensional space
S at the present moment. In general, every S-equivalence class of
simultaneous events represents (space at) an instant of time.
￿￿.￿.￿ Quotient sets
The set of all S-equivalence classes ofM is known as the quotient set
ofM modulo S (i.e. induced by S), and is denotedM/S:
M/S ⇥= {[e]S ∂ e "M} L P (M) , (73)
with P (M) the power set ofM. There thus exists a natural surjection
⇡ ⇥ M ∫ M/R
e ¿ [e]S (74)
which maps the elements of M into their respective equivalence
classes [e]S. The function ⇡ is called the projection of S (Figure 38).
￿￿.￿.￿ Partitions
It can be easily proven that the S-equivalence classes ofM are either
identical or disjoint:
æ [a]S , [b]S "M/S ⇥ [a]S = [b]S 1 [a]S = [b]S = o. (75)
In addition, there are no S-equivalence classes which are empty:
o äM/S. (76)
14 It is arguably mathematically more correct to describe the equivalence relation S as
a subset S LM✓M satisfying the following three conditions:
a) Reflexivity: æa "M: (a,a) " S;
b) Symmetry: æa, b "M ⇥ (a,b) " S º (b,a) " S;
c) Transitivity: æa, b, c "M ⇥ (a,b) " S 0 (b, c) " S º (a, c) " S.














Figure 38: Given an equivalence relation S onM, the set of all equivalence
classes [e]S is called the quotient setM/S ofM. The projection
⇡ of S maps elements ofM into their corresponding equivalence
classes. For example, ⇡ (c) = [c]S.
This last fact naturally follows from the reflexive character of S, which
implies that a " [a]S. Each event a "M thus belongs to at least one
equivalence class.
As a result of the above two properties, the family of S-equivalence
classes (i.e. the quotient setM/S) forms a partition ofM in the sense
that every event e " M belongs to one and only one S-equivalence
class ofM. That is to say, S divides the setM of all spacetime points
into non-empty, mutually disjoint subsets, called hypersurfaces of




A partition of M in submanifolds of lower dimension is also called
a foliation of M. The submanifolds are then different folia (or in
this case timeslices) of M (Figure 39). Due to the absolute nature
of time in classical mechanics, the foliation of M under S is unique.
Every observer O slicesM in the same fashion, and obtains the same
quotient setM/S of simultaneity hypersurfaces.
￿￿.￿ Order relations
So far, the introduction of S has made it possible to determine which
pairs of events are simultaneous. But for any two non-simultaneous
15 A cover ofM consists of a collection of subsets ofM whose set-theoretical sum isM.
If, moreover, the members of the cover ofM are pairwise disjoint, then the cover is
called a partition ofM. The equivalence relation S onM thus defines a partition of
M. The reverse holds true as well: given a partition ofM, an equivalence relation
S can be defined by claiming that two points are related iff they are members of the
same cover set. There is in other words a bijective correspondence between partitions







Figure 39: Classical four-dimensional Newtonian spacetime MN admits a
unique foliation into three-dimensional hypersurfaces of simul-
taneity. Figure adapted from Norton (2018b).
events, we also want to determine which of them precedes the other.
That is, we want to establish the temporal order between the events
ofM.
￿￿.￿.￿ Temporal precedence
Just like the simultaneity relation S, the temporal order is intrinsically
given in Newtonian physics. That is, given two events a,b " M,
there is an absolute matter of the fact as to whether a precedes b, a
succeeds b, or a and b are simultaneous. These temporal relations
are the same for all observers, irrespective of their state of motion.
Let us then introduce the binary relation of temporal precedence
& among the events of M, where & is standing for ‘is earlier than
or simultaneous with’. Then a & b is shorthand for ‘event a is ear-
lier than or simultaneous with event b’. The (observer-independent)
truth-value of a & b is determined as follows:
æa, b "M ⇥ a & b ø T (a) & T (b) . (78)
￿￿.￿.￿ Partial orders
The relation of temporal precedence & is said to be a partial order if
the following three relations hold true:
1. Reflexivity: æa "M ⇥ a & a;
2. Antisymmetry: æa, b "M ⇥ a & b 0 b & a º a = b;
3. Transitivity: æa, b, c "M ⇥ a & b 0 b & c º a & c.
Clearly, & is not (yet) a genuine order relation as the antisymmetry
relation is not met: a & b 0 b & a does not imply that a and b are the




The relation & defined in Eq. (78) is thus not a partial order, but a
preorder (or quasiorder) onM. In order to avoid confusion, we will
retain the symbol & for a genuine order relation, and use the new
symbol , for a preorder.
Every preorder induces an equivalence relation. That is, given the
preorder , on M, one can define an equivalence relation ⇥ on M
such that a ⇥ b if and only if a , b and b , a. In this case, the
equivalence relation ⇥ is of course the simultaneity relation S.
It is then possible to turn the preorder , into a partial order &,
where & applies to the equivalence classes [e]S of M/S, rather than
to the events e of M. To be precise, the preorder , on M is said to
induce an order relation & on M/S if the following condition holds
true:16
æa, b "M, æ [a] , [b] "M/S ⇥ [a] & [b] ø a , b. (79)
Indeed, for two ‘instants of time’ [a] , [b] "M/S, the antisymmetry
condition is met:[a] & [b] 0 [b] & [a] º [a] = [b] . (80)
￿￿.￿.￿ Total orders
What is more, for any two simultaneity hypersurfaces [a] , [b] "
M/S, either [a] & [b] or [b] & [a] (where the or is implied in the
exclusive sense). This turns & into a total (or linear) order. For all[a], [b], [c] "M/S:
1. Reflexivity: [a] & [a];
2. Antisymmetry: [a] & [b] 0 [b] & [a] º [a] = [b];
3. Transitivity: [a] & [b] 0 [b] & [c] º [a] & [c];
4. Totality: [a] j [b] º [a] & [b] 1 [b] & [a].
￿￿.￿.￿ Hasse diagrams
Whereas an equivalence relation partitions a set in mutually disjoint
and non-empty equivalence classes, an order relation orders all the
elements of the set in a (branched) chain (Figure 40). A total order
produces one long chain where for any two points b and c along the
chain, either b & c or c & b is true. A partial order, on the other hand,
gives rise to a branched chain (or lattice) where pairs of points b and
c exist for which neither b & c nor c & b holds true (Kroes, 1985, 8).
One last terminological remark: when a set is equipped with a
preorder, it is called a preordered set (or proset); a set that is paired













total order partial order
(chain) (lattice)
Figure 40: Left: According to the total order b & c. Right: According to the
partial order, however, it is undetermined whether b & c or c & b.
Figure adapted from Kroes (1985).
with a partial order is called a partially ordered set (or poset). Finally,
a set with a total order is a totally ordered set. To be concrete, ÖM, ,ã
is a proset, whereas ÖM/S, &ã is a totally ordered set.
￿￿.￿.￿ Absolute time
We have just seen that the quotient setM/S of all instants of time is
totally ordered under the relation of temporal precedence &. For that
reason, the 1-dimensional linearly ordered quotient set ÖM/S, &ã is
sometimes said to denote the time t of the setM of spacetime events,
where t is the parameter that orders (or labels) the different folia of
M/S (Jammer, 1986):
t ⇥= ÖM/S, &ã . (81)
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
The situation for Minkowski spacetime is fundamentally different.
Recall that in Newtonian spacetimeMN, S was a unique equivalence
relation: which set of events are simultaneous with one another was
unambiguously defined. That is, S had an objective status. In SR, S
loses this objective status. The reason for this loss of objectivity is
given in §15.1.
The order structure of Minkowski spacetime is also very different.
For one thing, the order relation & no longer applies to the quotient
setM/R but toM itself. What is more, the order thus obtained is a
partial one, in contrast to the total order of Newtonian spacetime. This
is outlined in §15.2.
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￿￿.￿ Equivalence relations
As before, let S be the binary relation standing for ‘is simultaneous
with’. Then aSb is shorthand for ‘event a is simultaneous with event
b’. The determination of simultaneity, or synchrony, between two
spatially distant events a and b (and, by extension, the determination
of the truth value of the proposition aSb) is no longer as straightfor-
ward as in the Newtonian case.
As outlined in §13.2, the standard way of defining simultaneity in
Minkowski spacetime is via the Einstein–Poincaré convention:
æa, b "M ⇥ aSb   ta = tb ø ta = 12 (ta1 + ta2) , (82)
with ta1 the (proper) time with respect to O of the emission of a
photon to b, and ta2 the (proper) time of the arrival of the photon
back to O.
What is crucial here is that the Einstein–Poincaré simultaneity is
defined in terms of an observer O whose worldline is represented by
a timelike curve C "M. Whether aSb is true or false thus depends on
the observer. Absolute simultaneity as such no longer exists. Instead,
there are an infinite number of simultaneity relations — one for each
observer O, denoted SO, and called relative simultaneity.
This also has repercursions for the foliation of spacetime into space
and time. In Newtonian mechanics, S induces a unique partitioning
of events. That is, there is only one way of foliating the 4-dimensional
spacetime M into 3-dimensional hypersurfaces of simultaneity. SR,
in constrast, no longer admits a unique foliation due to the relativity
of simultaneity (see also §13.4).
Each SO induces a different partitioning of Minkowski spacetime
into simultaneity hypersurfaces (Figure 41). That is to say, different
observers, moving relative to one another, foliate Minkowski space-
time differently: they slice it into a set of parallel timeslices which are
orthogonal to their own inertial worldline. None of these foliations is
privileged in any sense.
In SR, therefore, space and time are no longer absolute but relative
concepts. “Space by itself, and time by itself, are doomed to fade
away into mere shadows, and only a kind of union of the two will
preserve an independent reality”, wrote Minkowski in 1908 (Lorentz
et al., 1952, 75).
￿￿.￿ Order relations
Only the events in the chronological future or past of p have an in-






Figure 41: Special relativistic Minkowski spacetime M admits an infinite
number of foliations into three-dimensional hypersurfaces of si-
multaneity, depending on the observer. Two examples are shown
here. Figure adapted from Norton (2018a).
1. If p and q are timelike-separated, then either p & q or q & p
depending on whether q " I+ (p) or q " I  (p). All observers,
independent of their state of motion, agree on these temporal
relations. So in this case, the order relation & has an objective
status.
2. If p and q are spacelike-separated, there is no longer an absolute
(observer-independent) fact of the matter as to whether p & q
or q & p. Whether q is later than, simultaneous with, or earlier
than p depends on the state of motion of the observer. The order
relation & has lost its objective status.
As a result, the temporal order of events in SR is only a partial order.
Notice that, in contrast to Newtonian physics, the order relation &
satisfies the antisymmetry condition: p & q and q & p implies p = q.
Hence, the order relation & is a genuine order on the level of events,
in contrast to the preorder of classical mechanics.
The reason for the lack of a total order finds its origin in the causal
structure of Minkowski spacetime. Since SR introduces an upper
bound to the propagation of causal influences, only the events inside
the lightcone of p can stand in a causal relation with p. Either p is a
possible cause for q, or q is a potential cause for p. Since these cause-
effect relationships must be preserved, the temporal order relations
for timelike-separated events must be invariant.
But for spacelike-separated events, p≈q, no causal relation can exist
between p and q due to the upper bound on the velocity of causal
signals. As such, there cannot be an objective temporal order between
p and q. Of course, as soon as an inertial observer is considered, a
total order can be constructed, yielding an absolute time. But whereas
the total order in Newtonian physics is objective, the total order in SR
is relative to the observer.
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